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Abstract
Game theory is used to model conflicts between one or more players over
resources. It offers players a way to reason, allowing rationale for selecting strategies
that avoid the worst outcome. Game theory lacks the ability to incorporate
advantages one player may have over another player. A meta-game, known as
a hypergame, occurs when one player does not know or fully understand all the
strategies of a game. Hypergame theory builds upon the utility of game theory
by allowing a player to outmaneuver an opponent, thus obtaining a more preferred
outcome with higher utility. Recent work in hypergame theory has focused on normal
form static games that lack the ability to encode several realistic strategies. One
example of this is when a player’s available actions in the future is dependent on
his selection in the past. This work presents a temporal framework for hypergame
models. This framework is the first application of temporal logic to hypergames and
provides a more flexible modeling for domain experts. With this new framework for
hypergames, the concepts of trust, distrust, mistrust, and deception are formalized.
While past literature references deception in hypergame research, this work is the first
to formalize the definition for hypergames. As a demonstration of the new temporal
framework for hypergames, it is applied to classical game theoretical examples, as well
as a complex supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network temporal
hypergame. The SCADA network is an example includes actions that have a temporal
dependency, where a choice in the first round affects what decisions can be made in
the later round of the game. The demonstration results show that the framework is
a realistic and flexible modeling method for a variety of applications.
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A TEMPORAL FRAMEWORK FOR HYPERGAME ANALYSIS OF
CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENTS
I. Introduction
If you know the enemy and know yourself,
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.
If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself,
you will succumb in every battle.
- Sun Tzu [350]
Americans have been using a form of “cyber” since the 1840’s, with the invention
of the telegraph. While the telegraph did not present the same level of threat, as
our information systems do today, it still had privacy, authentication, and physical
security concerns. These same concerns still apply to technology in use today, except
our dependence on the devices has increased, to the point where almost every aspect
of everyday life is touched by cyber.
Life’s dependence on technology and interconnected devices requires advanced
diligence in order to protect the devices and technology, and life in general, from the
advanced cyber threats of today. Diligence must not only be given to the capabilities
and motivation of our adversaries, but also to our own capabilities, motivation, and
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vulnerabilities. This need has been demonstrated through the many comtemporary
cyber threats against the government (and its contractors) [1, 8, 142, 197, 237, 249],
the banking industry [3, 219, 226, 309], and other vital resources [146, 236, 273].
Often these processes are controlled by interconnected devices, also known as Cyber
Physical Systems (CPS).
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) pose a bigger risk than the telegraph did over a
century ago [295]. These devices are responsible for braking cars and trucks, as well
as the luxury controls such as radio, air conditioning, and heat. Airplanes rely on
these devices for navigation, maintenance, and control of flight surfaces. Common
household appliances are interconnected, allowing for lower energy consumption or
ensuring your favorite coffee is automatically prepared in the morning. Power and
energy services also use Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) to control all aspects of
function forming a smart grid.
1.1 Motivation
Knowing yourself and the enemy is becoming more important in securing and
defending critical electronic assets, such as CPS. As each CPS is connected to the
Global Information Grid (GIG), it is necessary to protect the device from cyber
threats. According to Clark et al. [74], cyber ”defenders are losing the cyber security
arms race” and defenders have been approaching the problem of cyber security the
wrong way. Defense strategies are often outdated, based on assumptions that no
longer reflect real world threats, the attacker’s capabilities, or vulnerabilities (current
attack surface).
1.1.1 Patch and Pray vs. Offensive Approach.
Often defenders use the ”patch and pray” approach to system security. This
approach involves waiting for a system to be attacked, analyzing the attack, and then
implementing strategies or policies to eliminate or mitigate future similar attacks.
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Antivirus software based on signatures or fingerprinting, is part of the “patch and
pray” approach, offering decent protection against known attack from the past, but
offering little to no protection against zero-day attacks (never seen before) or future
attacks. To better protect systems and improve security, it is necessary to take an
offensive approach to defense allowing the defender to better understand themselves
and the enemies they face, as well as the interactions between each participant.
Validating the need to find an offensive approach to defense is reflected in
government-sponsored research and directives. In 2006, the federal Plan for Cyber
Security and Information Assurance Research and Development [207] highlighted the
trend of espionage from industrial and state-sponsored groups. In 2008, the Center
for Strategic and International Studies produced the report, Securing Cyberspace
for the 44th Presidency [285] which emphasized espionage and included new threats
to digital intellectual property. The United States (U.S.) conducted a cyberspace
policy review in 2009 which concluded the nation is falling behind in terms of
cybersecurity and failed to keep pace with the growing threat [302]. In 2013, President
Barack Obama stated in an executive order, “[C]yber threat to critical infrastructure
continues to grow and represents one of the most serious national security challenges
we must confront.” [262] This executive order placed an emphasis on identifying
and improving the cyber security of critical infrastructure. President Obama also
signed a policy directive in 2013, stating the government should take proactive steps
to “reduce vulnerabilities, minimize consequences, identify and disrupt threats, and
hasten response and recovery efforts related to critical infrastructure” [261].
In 2015, President Obama recognized the importance of sharing data of cyber
security risks and incidents between private companies, nonprofit organization, and
federal government agencies in an executive order [264]. The President went even
further in another executive order by declaring a national emergency to deal with
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malicious cyber-enabled activities originating from persons outside the U.S. [263].
Both of these concepts are reflected in the Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber
Strategy published in April 2015. The cyber strategy focuses on three main concepts
[84]:
• Build and maintain forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations.
• Defend DoD information networks and secure data.
• Prepare to defend U.S. from disruptive or destructive cyber attacks.
These reports highlight the need for improved cyber security models for a
better understanding of how to protect mission critical assets. While these reports
show an interest in cyber and homeland security by the U.S. since 2006, continued
improvement is required as adversaries continue to develop new methods and
techniques for attacking critical assets.
1.1.2 Cyber Physical System Attacks.
Around July 2010, Stuxnet was found in Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems; but not just any SCADA system - Iran’s Nuclear
SCADA systems [323]. Stuxnet did not steal, manipulate, or ease information, as
in standard espionage [215]. Instead Stuxnet was designed to physically destroy
a military target. The goal was to physically destroy a nuclear power plant fuel
refinement systems through the SCADA control systems. Until this point, it was
largely believed that SCADA systems were immune to attack through isolation [97].
Stuxnet has been called the first cyberwarfare weapon [98, 215]. It was discovered in
Belarus by security firms [73].
Cyber-security was again put in the spot-light in September 2011 when Duqu was
discovered. The purpose of Duqu is to collect data and digital assets for intelligence
from industrial infrastructure and system manufacturers [345]. This information can
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be used to mount a future attack using the collected information. It contained a
remote access Trojan and a key logger, but could not self-replicate. It was highly
targeted against specific organizations, using phishing emails with malicious Microsoft
Office documents attached. Threats like Duqu provide the foundation for attacks like
Stuxnet, quietly collecting sensitive information, that can be used to customized an
attack with larger amounts of damage.
However, Duqu and Stuxnet appear to be just the beginning of a round of cyber-
warfare weapons. Flame quickly followed Duqu and Stuxnet. Flame also known
as sKyWIper, may have been in the wild for 5 to 8 years before discovery in May
2012 [80]. Flame steals information and is self propagating using multiple methods
which are configurable by the attacker. It uses the keyboard, screen, microphone,
storage devices, network, WiFi, Bluetooth, and USB to gather data on digital assets.
These digital assets could then be infiltrated out of an organization and used to inflict
damage.
Red October was discovered in October of 2012, and is believed to have been
in the wild for over 5 years [208]. The malware targeted government and scientific
research organizations in order to gather data and digital assets. Some assets, such
as credentials were later reused, when the attacker needed to guess passwords on the
network [210]. This attack was not just limited to Personal Computers (PCs) but
also inflected mobile devices. This increased the amount of desired data available to
attackers by opening the door to attacking to new forms of data generation, such as
phone calls, text message, and other personal data.
APT28, belonging to the family called CHOPSTICK, targets critical information
related to governments, military, and security organizations. Samples of APT28 were
discovered from mid-2007 to September 2014. It is believed this information is likely to
benefit the Russian government. APT28 appears to have a professional development
5
team, with standard working hours (8AM to 6PM) between Monday and Friday [99].
This indicates substantial financial backing over seven years and long term dedication
to espionage against military and government targets.
In 2015, it was discovered Adobe Flash being used to infect computers then
hold the computers for ransom or redirect internet traffic [333]. Attacker’s purchased
advertising space on websites and after a user visited a site with the ads, malware
is downloaded to the user’s computer. The malware looks for vulnerable versions of
Flash and uses it to gain control of the infected computer. This is only one example
of malware targeting the general public.
SLEMBUNK, belongs to a family of Android trojan applications, targets mobile
banking applications [374, 375]. Users become infected by downloading common
popular applications that are infected. It attempts to steal log-in credentials of the
mobile banking applications by detecting the launch of legitimate applications and
displaying fake log-in interfaces. This version of malware has targeted over 33 mobile
banking applications and covered North America, Europe, and Asia Pacific [375].
Duqu, Stuxnet, Flame, Red October, APT28, and SLEMBUNK have caused a
renewed interest in cyber-security. This is partly due to the high consequences of a
successful attack as well as the weaknesses that continue to exist in networks. As
we increase our understanding of the weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and interactions
concerning networks, we gain a better understanding of how to protect and defend
critical networks with limited resources.
1.1.3 The New Battlefield.
These recent attacks have transitioned the U.S. military from its traditional view
of a battlefield of a physical space into the new battlefield of cyberspace. First it is
necessary to define this new battlefield:
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Definition 1. Cyber - “Of, relating to, or characteristic of the culture of computers,
information technology, and virtual reality.” [86]
Definition 2. Cyberspace - Is “an operational domain whose distinctive and
unique character is framed by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum
to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via interconnected
Information-Communication Technology (ICT) based systems and their associated
infrastructures.” [207]
Definition 3. Cyberattack - Combing computer network attack and defense
methods to use as an individual act in order to cause damage, destruction, or
casualties for personal gain or a limited cause [221].
Definition 4. Cyberwarfare - Combining computer network attack and defense
methods with special technical operations by states or political groups, in order to
cause damage, destruction, or casualties for political effect [85] [221].
Definition 5. Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) - “Are integrations of computa-
tion, networking, and physical processes. Embedded computers and networks monitor
and control the physical processes, with feedback loops where physical processes affect
computations and vice versa” [295]
This new battlefield is defined within the increased dependence/reliance on
electronic systems. More and more of these systems are cyber-physical systems -
systems making life and death decisions as these appear in cars, planes, buildings,
phones, and medical devices.
Cyber may also be used as a weapon which requires some of the same principles as
kinetic warfare to be considered as well as additional principles specific to cyberspace.
Principles that must be considered include: lack of physical limitations, kinetic effects,
stealth, mutability and inconsistency, identity and privileges, dual use, infrastructure
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control, information as operational environment, assured response, and escalation
control. The utility of cyberwarfare has benefits and disadvantages, with tradeoffs
being made as different strategies are selected and the adversary reacts.
Game theory has been applied to model and analyze cyber security issues and
conflicts [72, 165, 306, 326, 331]. Game theoretic applications have often focused
on symmectric games where players did not have distinct advantages (known or
unknown) over other players. These advantages often happen in military engagements
as opposing forces try to protect information. Hypergame theory can model and help
understand the strategies that yield the greatest utility during cyber warfare while
considering advantages/disadvantages. That can help to maximize the benefits while
minimizing the disadvantages. It can also model the opponent in order to better
understand any response such as ”assured responses” and ”escalation control.”
1.2 Problem Statement
As the global economy develops, manufacturing is no longer the only means
of power and influence between countries. Instead manufacturing is becoming
concentrated among a handful of countries where goods can be produced at record low
prices. As countries like the U.S. watch manufacturing disappear, another commodity
is developing - knowledge as capital. Knowledge as capital can be in the form
of military weapon technology, cutting edge medical technology, and even foreign
intelligence. This capital can lead to increased power over other countries with less
means or countries in need of help defending themselves. The disadvantage is that
most of this knowledge is stored electrically on networked computer systems and is
susceptible to attack.
Over time this knowledge store has become the target of adversaries, who find it
cost effective to steal it instead of producing it themselves. Numerous cyber attacks
against U.S. contractors have shown the importance placed on this information by
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adversaries [1, 8, 142, 237, 249]. These cyber attacks against critical national security
systems are showing no signs of ceasing. Photos of China’s new fighter have emerged
that appear the technology used in the aircraft is very similar to the U.S.’s F-22
Raptor [197]. As shown in Figure 1.1, the technology in both aircraft is strikingly
similar, an indication of industrial espionage and cyber theft.
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Figure 1.1: U.S. media comparison of U.S. F-22 and China J-20 [197].
The United States Air Force, as well as the rest of the Department of Defense
(DoD), has an interest to build stronger defenses to cyber attacks. Building these
defenses require modeling, of the cyber attack as a conflict iof the adversary of the
true state of the U.S. network, and understanding of the interactions of all of these
elements over time. These interactions are often complex and not fully understood.
This incomplete information leads to changing models or models full of assumptions
which are hard to apply to general attacks/conflicts.
1.3 Temporal Hypergame Approach
While hypergames provide a clear and concise method of displaying information
about a scenario for analysis, this research proposes to address three current issues
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when applying hypergame theory to complex domains by extending hypergame theory
with temporal concepts to improve the representation of the cyber-conflict. In order
to achieve this goal, there are two objectives:
1. Develop a temporal hypergame mathematical framework and define trust,
distrust, and deception formally.
2. Extend the theoretical application of hypergames to cyber related conflicts.
A formal framework for a temporal hypergame is developed in order to allow
hypergames to model temporal aspects of games that are currently neglected. It
incorporates temporal logic to ensure decision makers are able to build a better model
of the problems decision makers face. Given the unbalanced nature of hypergames
where one player may not be aware of all the possible actions and outcomes in a
given game, deception is an important concept. While past literature discusses the
usefulness of using hypergames to model deception, no formal mathematical model
has been presented. This research takes key concepts from the literature and presents
a formal mathematical model over the developed framework. In order to analyze the
framework, it is applied to a complex cyber attacker/defender conflict of a SCADA
network.
The temporal framework for hypergames continues to incorporate the knowledge
of the domain experts, that requires human-in-the-loop interactions. Thus, this
methodology for analyzing conflicts/decision making is not intended to be totally
automated. While an automated system could be created, it is not the focus of this
research.
1.4 Significance
The alarming rate at which cyber threats continue to evolve has demonstrated
a need to help decision makers model the threat, select the best strategy based
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on resources, information, and beliefs about the adversary. The loss of critical
information or systems to the malicious actions of the adversary can have far-reaching
consequences and jeopardize the success of the mission. The deployment of accurate
and timely threat deterrents, damage reduction techniques, and intelligence gathering
techniques can prevent or lower the cost of recovering from a cyber attack.
This research provides the U.S. Air Force, Department of Homeland Security,
and other government agencies a method to organize information, resources, and
beliefs in order to reason about the cyber battle space and make rational decisions.
The extension of hypergame theory with temporal constructs allows the model to
evolve over time leading to a more actuate model for decision makers. The temporal
hypergame framework developed allows for a formal definition of deception over the
model. This helps improve the ability to identify and limit deception in decision
making.
1.5 Document Organization
This document is organized as follows. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 provide a review of
the background literature. In particular, relevant literature about game theory and
decision theory is provided in Chapter 2; the differences between game theory and
decision theory are also discussed. Chapter 3 covers the literature on hypergame
theory and representations, such as HNF, and develops the foundation of using
hypergames to model complex conflicts/decision making processes. A temporal logic
overview is presented in Chapter 4, providing a concise model to capture temporal
modeling aspects.
Chapter 5 presents mathematical models for the two hypergame models presented
in the literature. The models include the original model developed by Bennett and
the improved representation developed by Vane. These mathematical models serve
as the foundation on which to begin integration of temporal constructs for HGT.
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Chapter 6 integrates the temporal aspects 4 with the Hypergame Theory
presented in Chapter 3 and the hypergame models presented in Chapter 5. The
enhancements to the temporal model and the adaptability of hypergames are
discussed, followed by the entire temporal hypergame framework being presented.
The temporal hypergame framework is used to define key concepts important to
hypergames. The first is the definition of trust (as well as distrust), using the
temporal constructs of the framework. From the definition of trust, the concept
of misperception and deception is defined and discussed. Theorems about repeated
games are discussed in terms of applicability to the temporal hypergame model.
Chapter 7 applies the temporal framework. The first two applications are
classical game theory examples, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the game of Chicken.
These games show the framework is able to represent simple classical games (for
understanding) and capture the iterated (temporal) nature of the games. The
framework is applied to a SCADA cyber security hypergame. This application
exercises the framework and provides a clear application to a complex hypergame.
Chapter 8 states the research conclusions and summarizes possible future work.
The conclusions contain an organized list of findings and definitions evolved from the
framework of this research.
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II. Tale of Two Theories
Game theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help understand the
phenomena that observed when decision-makers interact [15]. Decision theory is
a formal mathematical theory about how decision makers make rational decisions as
they interact with their environment. What is the difference between game theory
and decision theory? There is a division between decision theory where the outcome
depends on the players decisions and the impersonal universe, and game theory
depends on the decisions made by interacting with other players. This chapter
discussed game theory and decision theory, as well as the differences between the
two theories.
2.1 Game Theory
Game theory is based on rationality and utility theory. Often it is assumed that
human beings are rational and always seek the best alternative when presented with
a set of possible choices. This increases the chance of predictability by narrowing
the range of possibilities. Utility theory is based on rationality and that an agent
will always maximize their utility through their choices. Utility is a quantification
of a person’s preferences with respect to certain objects and the environment. Game
theory is highly mathematical and assumes all interactions can be understood and
navigated by presumptions.
Game theory asks two questions about the interaction of the decision-makers
[364]:
• How do individuals behave in strategic situations?
• How should these individuals behave?
Answers to the two questions do not always coincide [1].
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2.1.1 Definitions.
The basics of game theory are presented in detail for greater clarity when the
concepts are applied in following sections. The following set of definitions provides
a basic understanding of game theory terminology. This terminology is further
developed in [270], [88], [248], or [258].
• Game A set of interactions between players, where constraints and utility are
considered without concern for response from other players.
• Player A decision maker in a game. The decision maker chooses actions in
order to carryout a strategy in a game. A player may be a person, as well as
an animal, machine, or group of people.
• Action A valid move in a game.
• Payoff Quantitative measurement of the reward received by each player at the
end of a game.
• Strategy The set of actions an individual player can make in a game.
• Pure Strategy A strategy that a player follows in every attainable situation
during a game.
• Mixed Strategy A strategy that consists of a multiple set of actions that
are chosen based on a probability distribution that determines how often each
action is played.
• Dominating Strategy A player’s strategy is said to dominate the strategy of
another player if it always results in a better payoff regardless of the strategy
of the other player. The strategy weakly dominates the other strategy if it is
always at least as good.
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• Rational Behavior Each player has a consistent set of payoffs for possible
outcomes and chooses the strategy that maximizes the player’s payoff.
• Perfect Information Information concerning an opponent’s past moves are
well known in advance. Tic-tac-toe, chess, checkers, and go are examples of
games with perfect information.
• Imperfect Information Partial or no information concerning the opponent’s
past moves are given in advance of the player’s decision. Imperfect information
may be diminished over time if the same game is repeated with the same
opponent.
• Complete Information All of the players in a game knows the strategies
and payoffs of every player. Complete information is not the same as perfect
information, because the former does not consider the actions each player have
taken in the past.
• Incomplete Information Partial or no information concerning the opponent’s
strategies or payoffs are given in advance of the player’s decision.
• Signaling Strategies that use signals.
• Signals Objective evidence or actions in a game that offer credible proof of a
player’s information.
• Screening A player can create a scenario in a game where another player must
take some action that reveals credible proof of that player’s information.
• Screening Devices Strategies that use screening.
• Normal Form A matrix representation of the possible outcomes based on each
decision by the players.
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• Nash Equilibrium A set of actions in which neither player can increase their
utility by unilaterally changing his or her strategy. If a player uses mixed
strategies, then the expected value of the payoffs are maximized.
• Simultaneous Game Each player chooses an action simultaneously without
knowing which action was chosen by the opponent. Each action may happen
at different times but the actions are unknown to each player. A one-shot
simultaneous game is also called a static/strategic game.
• Sequential Game Each player chooses an action in a predetermined order.
Players are allowed to observe the decisions of the other players before making
a decision.
• Non-cooperative Game Players in the game are in conflict with another
player. There is no incentive for players in conflict to compromise.
• Zero-sum Game The sum of payoffs remains constant during the course of
the game. Being well informed always helps the two players in conflict.
• Bayesian Game A player assigns a ”type” to all of the other players at the
start of a game. The information about the other player’s strategies and payoff
is incomplete. The outcome of the game is predicted using Bayesian analysis.
• Dynamic Game Players consider their actions in multiple stages of a game.
It is the sequential structure of the decision making by players in a strategic
game. The sequences are either finite or infinite.
• Stochastic Game Involves probabilistic transitions through states of the game.
The game has a start state where the players choose actions and receive a payoff
based on the current state. The game transitions into a new state using a
probability from the players actions and the current game state.
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2.1.2 Overview.
Game theory can be traced to Talmud (0-500 AD) with results similar to modern
game theory [21]. Cournot [79], Edgeworth [92], and Bertrand [49] published the first
papers on oligopoly pricing and production. These original papers were considered
special models. Modern game theory was born with the collective work of Zermelo
[372], Borel [56], and von Neumann [257] (original non-english [256]). In 1944,
von Neumann and Morgenstern published a seminal book on zero-sum cooperative
games where players form coalitions [258]. Maximizing expected utility payoff is first
attributed to Bernoulli [48]; the modern idea is from von Neumann and Morgenstern
[258]. von Neumann and Morgenstern showed that for each rational player there is
a way to assign utility numbers to the possible game outcomes, in which the player
will choose the outcome that maximizes the player’s expected utility.
Zermelo [372] applied game theory to the game of chess. While the initial theory
states that a game cannot end in a draw and one player has a winning strategy if: 1)
the game is finite, two-person; 2) perfect information; 3) chance does not affect the
decision making process. Zermelo’s theorem has been generalized for game theory
[234] [316]:
Theorem 1. Every finite game of perfect information has a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium that can be derived by backward induction. Moreover, if no player has
the same payoffs at any two terminal nodes, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium
that can be derived in this manner.
von Neumann [256] developed the Minimax Theorem in 1928. It is the
fundamental theorem of game theory that states a game has optimal mixed strategies
(for finite, zero-sum, two-person games). The Minimax Theorem is formalized by
[315, 365]:
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Theorem 2. Formally, let X and Y be mixed strategies for players A and B
respectively. Let M be the payoff matrix. Then
maxXminYX
TMY = minYmaxXXTMY = v
where v is called the value of the game and X and Y are called the solutions.
In the early 1950’s Nash contributed to noncorporative and corporative game
theory [251–253]. Nash [250] builds on von Neumann and Morgensterns work by
assuming the absence of coalitions where each player acts independently. His work
proves for each finite non-cooperative game there is at least one equilibrium point
assuming the players are rational. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy where none of the
players can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy. In a game of
mixed strategies, every game will have at least one Nash equilibrium.
Definition 6. Nash equilibirum [252] - A strategy pair (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium
of a game G if given all other strategies, r: Player1(G(p,q)) ≥ Player1(G(r,q)) and
Player2(G(p,q)) ≥ Player2(G(r,q))
Nash also showed that in a game with mixed strategies, and not just pure
strategies every game will have at least one Nash equilibrium [250]. The Nash
Existence Theorem stated formally:
Theorem 3. Every finite game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Additional work in game theory was completed during World War II (WWII) by
the Rand Corporation. This research combined military planning with game theory
research, leading to developments in reasoning under uncertainty.
Selten [320] presented the idea that in games where all the players can choose
contingent plans not all of the Nash equilibria are equally reasonable. This is due to
the fact that players can make empty threats - contingent plans - that may or may
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not be carried out. The concept resulted in subgame perfection to eliminate equilibria
that depend on threats.
When describing a game model, two forms can be used. The extensive form using
a game tree or graph to model the possible strategies and all possible outcomes. As
shown in Figure 2.1, there are two players, player 1 (P1) and player 2 (P2). Player
1 chooses first by selecting strategy U or strategy D. Player 2 is allowed to see the
action of Player 1 and then can choose strategy L or strategy R. After this, players
receive the outcomes located on a terminating branch on the tree. The extensive form
is used in [15, 325]. The strategic form (or normal form) uses a matrix to represent
the players, their strategies, and the possible outcomes as shown in Figure 2.2. While
the majority use the strategic model [23, 72], there are a few that use both models
[23, 162]. The strategic form has a simplicity that lends to a straightforward analysis.
For cyber security games players are not making decisions one at a time in sequence,
as in the extensive form game. Instead players are making decisions dynamically and
possible at the same time, where the strategic form is better suited.
2.1.3 Classical Games.
The following section discusses some of the games used in classical game theory.
A brief overview is given in Table 2.1 of the game characteristics. These are a few of
the important games and not an inclusive list. A more detailed list can be found on
Wikipedia [77].
2.1.3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma described by Melvin Dresher [90], Merrill
Flood [104], and Albert Tucker [284] is a classic example of how the interaction
between two individuals leads to cooperation or not. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma there
are two players, Prisoner A and Prisoner B. Each player can choose one of two actions,
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P1
P2 P2
(6, 4) (5, 5)(0, 0) (0, 0)
U D
L RR L
Figure 2.1: Example of Game in Extensive Form.
Figure 2.2: Example of Game in Strategic (Normal) Form.
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Table 2.1: Overview of Games in Game Theory.
Property/ Prisoner’s Chicken Matching Rock, Paper, Battle of
Game Dilemma (Hawk-Dove) Pennies Scissors the Sexes
Players 2 2 2 2 2
Strategies 2 2 2 3 2
# of Pure NE 1 2 0 0 2
Sequential No No No No No
Perfect
Information No No No No No
Zero-sum No No Yes Yes No
either the player can choose to cooperate by staying silent or defect by betraying the
other player. The consequence of selecting an action results in no jail time (jail(0))
or jail time (jail(x) where x is the amount of time in jail). The payoff function is if
the player cooperates and the other player cooperates, both receive one year in jail,
otherwise if the other player defects the player receives 10 years in jail while the other
player receives no jail time. If both players defect, then both players receive five years
in jail. This game is shown in normal form in Figure 2.3.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, betrayal always has a higher reward than cooperation.
If all players are purely rational, then they would betray each other by choosing to
defect. It is clear both players would receive a better reward by both cooperating.
2.1.3.2 Chicken.
Chicken , also known as the Hawk-Dove or Snow-Drift game, is a game where
players prefer to not yield to each other, while the worst outcome is obtained when
both players fail to yield. The game of Chicken and the Hawk-Dove game are identical
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Figure 2.3: The Prisoner’s Dilemma - Normal Form.
from a game theoretic view. The differences in names are from each game being used
in different research areas such as economics or biology [270].
In Chicken [293] two players drive towards each other on a possible collision
course. Each player has two options: swerve or continue straight. It is possible that
if neither player swerves, both may die in a head-on collision. If a player swerves
they are called a ”chicken”, which is considered bad. Since the worst outcome for
both players is a collision, it is presumed that the best outcome is for each player to
stay straight while the other player swerves. Here each player risks the most, while
attempting to secure the best outcome. This is represented in Figure 2.4, where the
benefit of winning is 1, the cost of losing is -1, and crashing costs -10.
The cost of swerving is trivial compared to the cost of a crash, it is therefore
reasonable to assume the strategy to swerve is likely. But if the player’s opponent
is considered reasonable, then it may be better to stay straight, believing the other
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Figure 2.4: The Game of Chicken - Normal Form.
player will be reasonable and swerve to avoid the collision. In this game of chicken,
the pure strategy equilbria are the two outcomes where one player stays straight and
the other swerves.
2.1.3.3 Hawk Dove.
The name Hawk-Dove comes from biological literature by John Maynard Smith
[286] and the traditional payoff matrix is given in [335] and [334]. It is similar to the
game of Chicken.
2.1.3.4 Differences in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both players have a dominating strategy. This means
that regardless of the strategy chosen by the opponent, the player should choose a
specific action. In this case the player would choose to defect. If both players choose
their dominating strategy, then the outcome is a Nash equilibrium. In the sense of a
Pareto equilibrium this is inefficient because all of the players would prefer a different
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outcome. While each player has a preferred strategy, collectively the strategies result
in an inferior outcome.
In Chicken, none of the players have a dominating strategy. The best strategy
is not cooperate with the other player; therefore, swerve if the other player stays
straight or stay straight if the other player swerves. This position is adversarial as
each player has a preferred strategy, but are in a rivalry with each other.
2.1.3.5 Matching Pennies.
A simple game used in game theory is Matching Pennies [244] [265], which is
equivalent to the game Odds or Evens and is the two strategy equivalent of Rock,
Paper, Scissors. In the game, two children try to determine who is required to do the
nightly chores. The children first determine who is ”same” and the other is ”different”.
Then each child places a penny face up or face down in their palm concealing it from
the other player. The children reveal both coins simultaneously; if both coins match
(both coins are heads or both are tails) then the ”same” child wins, otherwise if they
are different (one coin is heads and the other is tails) then the ”different” child wins.
Figure 2.5 shows the normal form for the game of Matching Pennies.
The game of Matching Pennies is a zero-sum game as shown in Figure 2.5. Given
the pure strategies, there is no set of pure strategies where both players would switch
strategies Therefore the equilibrium is obtained by playing mixed strategies. Each
strategy has an equal probability of being played, resulting in each player receiving
an expected payoff of zero. The mixed strategy makes the opponent indifferent to
playing pure strategies, so neither player has incentive to switch to another strategy.
2.1.3.6 Battle of the Sexes.
Another classical game in game theory is the Battle of the Sexes, or Bach or
Stravinsky [270], a coordination game between two-players. In the game a husband
and wife have agreed to meet for an evening together, but neither can remember if
24
Figure 2.5: The Game of Matching Pennies - Normal Form.
they decided to attend an opera performance or a football game. It is considered
common knowledge that both will forget. The husband prefers to attend the football
game, while the wife prefers to attend an opera performance. Both the husband
and the wife prefer to be at the same event instead of different events. The goal of
the game is to determine where each should go assuming they cannot communicate.
Figure 2.6 shows an example payoff matrix for this game.
The Battle of the Sexes has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, where the couple
either attend the opera or a football game. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists
in both games, where the players choose to attend their preferred event more than
the other. This means the Nash equilibria are deficient in some way. In the pure
strategy Nash equilibria, one player will consistently do better than the other, while
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium will cause the players to appear at different
events the majority of the time.
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Opera
Football
Opera Football
Wife
Husband
(3, 2) (1, 1)
(2, 3)(0, 0)
Figure 2.6: The Game of the Battle of the Sexes - Normal Form.
2.1.4 Beyond Normal and Extensive Forms.
There are game theoretic representations for player interactions other than
normal and extensive forms. These other representations provide important models
for representing realistic interactions, where the games may not be finite and instead
repeated with no end or that the set of agents is uncountably infinite. Repeated
Games, Bayesian Games, and Stochastic Games provide richer models with which to
analyze player interactions.
2.1.4.1 Repeated Games.
In real-life strategic situations, players interact over time often repeating the same
interaction. This happens where trust and social pressure exists between multiple
parties, such as trades without a legal contract. Chamberlin describes a repeated
game where oligopolists my collude on higher prices [69]. In 1963, Macaulay observed
the relationship between a business and its suppliers are largely based on reputation
and the threat of losing future business [228].
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Repeated games do not allow for the set of actions available to the players or
the payoff functions to change according to the past play of the players[115]. It is
possible for the action taken by one player to open up new actions for opponents
in real-life, for example war where mass killings can change public option. Payoffs
can also change overtime in real-life, for example availability of computer network
resources may not be devastating for short outages while long term outages are more
costly. This limits the ability of repeated games to model phenomena such as business
investment in capital or learning about the physical environment [115].
A repeated game is a situation where the same game is played multiple times
consecutively by the same players. This repetition allows for the possibility the players
will utilize cooperative strategies during interaction that are not available in one-shot,
or non-repeated, games. The specific game being repeated is called a stage game (i.e.,
each time a game is played it is a stage in the repeated game). The Prisoner’s Dilemma
is shown in Figure 2.7 as a two-round, finitely-repeated game in normal form and in
Figure 2.8 in extensive form.
Figure 2.7: Two-Round, Prisoner’s Dilemma in Normal Form.
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Figure 2.8: Two-Round, Prisoner’s Dilemma in Extensive Form.
The normal form representation of a repeated game, similar to Figure 2.7, hides
key components of the game. These key components are important and are [327]:
• Do the other players know what their opponent(s) did earlier?
• How much to the players remember of the past?
• What is the utility of the entire repeated game?
These key components are approached from two different types of games: finitely
repeated, or finite-horizon, games where the game is repeated but eventually ends
and infinitely repeated, infinite-horizon, games where the game is repeated but
indefinitely.
In repeated games, players have the ability to cooperate from round to round.
The key to cooperation is that the players must have incentive to follow through on
the commitments they have made to other opponents. The multiple round Prisoner’s
Dilemma is an example of the ability of players to cooperate in a finite game.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for any number of rounds greater than one, the
dominant strategy in the last round is to defect no matter what happened in the past.
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The dominant strategy is common knowledge among players, so the players cannot
affect the outcomes of the last round. Thus in the second-to-last round the dominant
strategy is to defect. Using induction (backwards-induction) the only equilibrium in
the finite repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is to defect since none of the players can make
a credible promise of cooperation.
This allows the outcome of a finitely repeated game to be determined by analyzing
a one-shot version of the same game. Backward induction will always lead to the same
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). It is not always the case a finite game will
empirically lead to backward induction, while backward induction in a finite game is
logically correct assuming all players are rational.
In 1978, Reinhard Selten proposed the chain store paradox [322]. He proposed
a finitely repeated game with two players, where the incumbent firm is a monopolist
with a chain of stores in twenty different locations. At each location, the chain store
is challenged by a rival firm. This game is a sequential game, in which the first firm
decides whether to enter or not at the first location then the chain store must decide
to fight or accommodate. Play is continued with the next firm deciding, etc. Using
backward induction, the chain store will accommodate in the last round and will
therefore accommodate in every round of the game. Selten calls this the “induction
hypothesis” and shows the chain store can reach a better outcome by fighting the
first fifteen rivals and accommodating the last five.
If a game is repeated, as long the number of repetitions is finite, then there
is an unique SPNE. This is stated formally in Theorem 4. If a stage game has
multiple Nash equilibria, then the strategies can be history-dependent. This results
in a possible SPNE in the repeated game, where for some repetitions, actions are
played that are not part of the Nash equilibria of the stage game [193].
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Theorem 4. Suppose 0 ≤ T < ∞ and the stage game has a unique (possibly mixed)
Nash equilibria, α∗. Then the unique SPNE of the repeated game is the history-
independent strategy profile σ∗ s.t. ∀ t ∈ T and ht, σ∗(ht) = α∗. Where T is the set
of game iterations or rounds numbered 1, 2, ..., n.
Payoffs in infinitely repeated games cannot be precalculated. When the infinitely
repeated game is modeled using extensive form and an infinite tree. There is no way
to attached the payoffs to any terminal nodes (as none exist in the infinite tree), or
can the payoffs be the sum of the individual stage games. The two most common way
to calculate payoffs in an infinitely repeated game are average reward and discounted
reward [327]:
• Average Reward - Let (r(1)i , r
(2)
i , ...) be an infinite sequence of payoffs for the
player i, then the average reward for player i is:
limk→∞
∑k
j=1 r
(j)
i
k
• Discounted Reward - Let (r(1)i , r
(2)
i , ...) be an infinite sequence of payoffs for
the player i, and β be a discount factor with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, then the discounted
reward for player i is:
∑∞
j=1 β
jr
(j)
i
The sequential nature of repeated games allows players to adapt strategies which
depend on the actions chosen in the preceding games; these strategies are called
contingent strategies. Trigger strategies are contingent strategies, where a player
plays cooperatively as long as the opponents do as the same but any change by the
opponent will trigger a period of punishment. Two well-known trigger strategies are
the grim strategy and tit-for-tat [88]. In the grim strategy, the player cooperates with
their opponents until the opponent defects at which time the player will defect for
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the rest of the game as punishment. In the tit-for-tat strategy, the player plays the
same strategy as their opponent did in the previous round of the game. This means
the punishment only lasts as long as the opponent chooses to not cooperate.
The strategy space of an infinitely repeated game is large which makes it hard
to characterize all the Nash equilibria of the game. The Folk Theorem [112] does
not characterize the equilibrium strategy profiles in a game, but it does characterize
the payoffs obtained from the strategies. It states that the average rewards obtained
when in equilibrium are the same as the rewards obtained under mixed strategies in
a single-stage game, where each player receives a payoff of at least what he would
receive if opponents played minmax strategies [327].
Let a repeated infinitely game, G = (N, A, u) and r = (r1, r2, ... rn) be
the strategy profile, where N is a set of players, A a set of actions, and u a set
of payoffs. Then player i’s minmax value, the utility received with opponents play
minmax strategies and player i plays his best response, is vi.
vi = mins−i∈S−imaxsi∈Siui(s−i, si)
Given a strategy profile r = (r1, r2, ... rn):
• Enforceable - The payoff profile is enforceable if ∀ i ∈ N, ri ≥ vi
• Feasible - The payoff profile is feasible if there exists rational, non-negative
values αa, such that ∀i, ri =
∑
a∈A αaui(a), with
∑
a∈A αa = 1
The Folk Theorem states that for any game, G, and any payoff profile, r:
1 If r is the payoff profile for any Nash equilibrium s of the infinitely repeated G
with average rewards, then for each player i, ri is enforceable.
2 If r is both feasible and enforceable, then r is the payoff profile for some Nash
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated G with average rewards.
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The Folk Theorem stated formally [272]:
Theorem 5. Let G be a finite, simultaneous move game of complete information, let
(u∗1, ..., u∗n) denote the payoffs from a Nash equilibrium of G, and let (u1, ..., un) be a
feasible payoff of G. If ui ≤ ei ∀ i ∈ N (the set of players) and if γ is sufficiently close
to 1, then there exists a Subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the infinitely repeated
game G(γ) that achieves an average payoff arbitrarily close to (u1, ..., un).
In repeated games, the one-shot deviation principle states that for any player
when profitable deviations from a SPNE are considered, only the strategies where the
player plays as he is expected to at all round except one (i.e. at a single history the
player behaves differently) [193].
Theorem 6. Fix a strategy profile σ. A profitable one-shot deviation for player i is
a strategy σ′i , σi s.t.
• there is an unique history ht
′
such that ∀ ĥt , ĥt
′
, σ′i(ĥt) = σi(ĥt).
• ui(σ
′
i|ht
′
, σ−i|ht
′
) > ui(σi|ht
′
)
Where σi|ht is the restriction of strategy σi to the subgame following history ht.
In Theorem 6, the requirement states there is only one history at which the
strategies are different. The differences in strategies can have a significant effect on
the path of play, since all histories after ĥt
′
may depend on what was played in ĥt
′
.
The second requirement states the deviation has to be profitable. The profitability
of the deviation is defined as a conditional on history ht being reached, since strategy
σ may not lead to ht being reached. By definition this means a Nash equilibrium
can have a profitable deviation, but this cannot be the case so the following lemma
results:
Lemma 7. A strategy σ is a SPNE iff there are no profitable one-shot deviations.
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The one-shot deviation principle implies repetition of the stage-game Nash
equilibrium is a SPNE of a repeated game [193]. Formally this is stated as:
Theorem 8. A strategy profile σ is history-independent if ∀ ht and ĥt, σ(ht) = σ(ĥt)
Theorem 8 implies the existence of an SPNE in infinitely repeated games.
Lemma 9. If the stage game has a Nash equilibrium, then the repeated game has a
SPNE.
2.1.4.2 Stochastic Games.
Stochastic games where first introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953 [324]. In
stochastic games, the same stage game is not always repeated. Stochastic games
generalize both repeated games and Markov decision processes (MDPs). A repeated
game is a stochastic game where only one stage game is repeated, while an MDP is
a stochastic game with only one player [327].
A stochastic game is a repeated game where agents play games from a set of
games repeatedly. At any iteration in the future, the game played depends only
on the previous game and the actions chosen by the players in that previous game.
Stochastic games are a generalization of the Markov decision process. This is defined
by multiple players, one reward function per player, and the action chosen by both
players determines the transition and reward functions. A stochastic game is modeled
as [327]:
S = (Q, N, A, P, r)
– Q is a finite set of stage games
– N is a finite set of players
– A = A1 × ... × An where Ai is a finite set of actions for player i
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– P : Q × A × Q → [0,1] is the transition probability, P(q, a, q̂) is the
probability of transitioning form state q to state q̂ after action profile a
– R = r1, ....., rn where ri : Q × A → R is a payoff function for player i.
In stochastic games it is assumed the strategy space of the agents is the same
in all games in the set of stage games. Resulting in the only difference between any
game being the payoff function. This assumption can be removed without adversely
affecting the overall stochastic game [327]. Stochastic games are also often modeled
with finite state space and action sets (as shown in the previous stochastic model),
which are not needed to receive the benefit from stochastic games and can be relaxed
[241].
There are three types of strategies of interest over the strategy space of an agent
in stochastic games. A strategy space is defined as ∏t,Ht Ai, where ht = q0, a0, q1,
a1,....,at−1, qt) denotes the history of t stages and Ht is the set of all possible histories.
Given an agent’s strategy can consist of any mixture over deterministic strategies:
• Behavioral Strategy
– is where the mixing of strategies takes place at each history independently,
instead of only once at the start of the game
– si(ht, aij ) gives the probability of playing action aij for the history ht
• Markov Strategy
– is where for time t, the action probability distribution only depends on the
current state
– si(ht, aij ) = si(ht′, aij ) if qt = qt′, where qt and qt′ are the final states of
ht and ht′
• Stationary Strategy
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– is where the strategy has no dependence, not even on time
– si(ht1 , aij ) = si(ht2 ′, aij ) if qt1 = qt2 ′, where qt1 and qt2 ′ are the final states
of ht1 and ht2 ′
For the discounted-reward payoff case, a Nash equilibrium exists in every
stochastic game. If the strategy profile only consists of Markov strategies then it
is called a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), and is a Nash equilibrium regardless
of the starting state of the game. MPE is similar to the subgame-perfect equilibrium
in perfect information games [327].
2.1.5 Applications to Cyber Security.
The large number of network intrusion incidents, especially Stuxnet, Flame, and
Duqu are causing a rapid evolution of malware and defense techniques. As the authors
in [331] discuss the evolution of these techniques is similar to a game between malware
authors and security analysts, with each trying to win the game by outperforming the
opponent. This shows cyber attack and defenses can be modeled as a game between
multiple players. Insight into the best strategy choices can be obtained by using a
game to model the adversarial players. In most game theory models for cyber security,
the objective is to select the security measures with the lowest cost, while achieving
the highest level of security [326]. This shows game theoretic models can be used to
guide decisions for network defense.
There is an inverse relationship between computer/network usability and
computer/network security - a double edge sword. When a system is more usable,
it becomes a liability for the operator, while a system with higher security results in
decreased usability for authorized users. When authorized users are unable to use
the system for authorized tasks, this is the same as a denial of service attack by a
potential attacker. It is necessary to realize the need to carefully balance usability
and security so authorized users are not hampered by security and give up, leading to
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the cyber-battle being lost [6]. Sometimes it is necessary to conduct trade-off analysis
to determine a balance between usability and security, while protecting critical data
and resources and minimizing the impact on authorized users.
Human administrators are able to reason and make decisions on how to use
defensive capabilities to minimize threats and allow users to maximize their usability
experience, but may overlook certain combinations of defenses [306]. Computers can
enhance the decision making of human administrators by analyzing large amounts
of data and finding all possible combinations of defensive capabilities, allowing
exceptions to be found and optimization to take place. One should not infer a human
in the loop is not needed, instead this shows the complexity of the problem and how
computers can aid in finding a solution. When using game theory, it is necessary for
the model to be as accurate as possible in order to achieve the best possible solution
to the real-world situation.
Scalability of a game model can be problematic as the number of variables can
grow exponentially. This leads to most models using a simplification of the real-
world problem in order to reduce the variables and the complexity of the model. One
simplification most models use is to reduce the game to a two player game, such as one
attacker and one defender. Another simplification is to reduce the number of strategies
in the game model, because for each additional strategy in the player’s strategy set the
number of outcomes increases by the total of the other players’ strategies. Stability
concerns lead to models with two players, each with two strategies. For example, in
[72] there is an attacker and a defender, while the attacker can attack or not attack
and the defender can defend or not defend.
2.1.6 Related Work to Cyber Security.
Previous work has built information warfare models using game theory. David
Burke [62] presents an information warfare model, that is a repeated non-zero sum
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game with incomplete information. The model consists of two players - an attacker
and a defender. Defenders try to protect the most valuable information while
attackers try to obtain highly valuable information. Each player is one of three types:
social, infrastructure, and node. Each type of player prefers one type of information to
all others (this player realizes higher payoffs for defending/obtaining this information).
The social player prefers sensitive information such as passwords, names, phone
numbers, etc. This player represents banks, and insurance companies. The
infrastructure player prefers sensitive network information, such as internet addresses,
network architecture, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP)
ports and services, etc. This player represents telecommunication companies or
Internet Service Provider (ISP)+. The node player prefers sensitive computer
equipment information, such as hardware addresses, computer configurations, file
names, encryption keys, etc. This player represents the end user such as businesses
and home users. This model represents the logging and network status sensing
normally used in enterprise networks (e.g. security audit logs, intrusion detection
system, etc.). This is done by allowing the defender to carefully observing the payoffs
the defender receives. The defenders have three possible actions: social engineering
defense, infrastructure defense, and node defense. Attackers have three possible
actions: social engineering attack, infrastructure attack, and node attack. Payoffs
are represented in US dollars for each type of information. This work uses players to
represent each component in a complex network, such as the internet. The attacks
are abstract and do not get into detail.
Tait [348] also presented an information warfare model. In his information
warfare model there are four main elements: players, playoffs, information, and
strategies. A set of players consists of an attacker and a defender. Each player a
limited number of resources to use (funds, strategies, manpower, etc.). Each player
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is assumed to be rational and will seek to maximize his or her expected payoff. The
attacker’s strategies include: attack system integrity, attack system confidentiality, or
attack systems availability. The defender’s strategies include: defend system integrity,
defend system confidentiality, or defend systems availability. Each player may also
choose to not implement a strategy. In this model the strategies are symmetrical
across players, but the actions selected to carry out each strategy may be different.
This work is based on the CIA model: confidentiality, integrity, and availability, which
is used to determine network and data security. An important piece of this work is
the constraint of limit resources available to deploy an agent.
Vejandla, et al. [358] proposed a method for generating gaming strategies for the
Attacker-Defender game using evolutionary approach. The model takes into account
objectives like cost, time, reward and performance. They use a memory-based Multi-
objective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA) to generate the series of actions with the
highest payoffs. The MOEA performed better than the existing approaches used to
currently solve anticipation games.
Monderer and Tennenholtz [243] introduced the idea of Distributed Games. In
this model, each player controls a number of agents, although the agents do not
appear in the formal definition of the distributed game. Each agent participates in
an asynchronous parallel multi-agent game and there is one agent for each location
(node). Agents communicate by broadcasting messages. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
is played at all locations by each agent based on the messages received from other
agents. The overall goal of this research is to show the cooperative nature of the
agents.
Kivimaa, et al. [196] have presented an expert system for modeling graded
security. Graded security is intended to determine a reasonable set of security based
on a set of security requirement levels. The goals of security are confidentiality,
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integrity, availability, and satisfying mission criticality. Four levels are used for
each goal: 0, 1, 2, 3. This represents the required security; level 0, represents the
absence of requirements. Nine security measures are used to achieve the security
goals: user training, antivirus software, segmentation, redundancy, backup, firewall,
access control, intrusion detection and encryption.
Several applications over the last few years have used multi-agent systems
to allocate limited resources in order to protect mission critical infrastructures
[20, 30, 184, 200, 281]. These multi-agent systems have been used for the Los Angeles
International Airport, U.S. Federal Air Marshals Service, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Transportation Security Agency, and Urban Security in Transit Systems. Multi-agent
systems are also being applied to protecting forests [187] and police patrols for crime
suppression [268].
2.1.7 Deception in Game Theory.
Deception in game theory has been mostly studied in turn-based, or dynamic
games, where a player choose an action then reports the action or outcome to the
other player. This type of game is called signaling games, after the “signal” sent
between players. The signal is subject to deception, since the player can be truthful,
deceptive, or choose not to send a signal.
Carroll and Grosu [67] study network defense using deceptive signaling games.
In their research, the defender can disguise a normal computer as a honeypot, a
honeypot as a normal computer, or use no disguising techniques. The attacker has
the ability to test the system type and the defender sends the appropriate signal,
deceptive or truthful. The authors showed that deception is an equilibrium strategy
for the defender, either by disguising all honeypots as normal computers or all normal
computers as honeypots, provides an increase in utility for the defender over using
only truthful signals.
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Multi-turn attacker-defender games are used by Zhuang to study deception [376].
In the game, a defender type is randomly selected from a set of possible defender
types and at each turn of the game the defender selects a strategy and “signals” the
attacker of the selected strategy. The defender may be either truthful or deceptive.
The attacker then uses the signal to update his belief of the defender’s true type and
selects an attack strategy. After each turn the payoffs are used to update the belief
state until the game ends. The authors state, given their game, deception can be a
beneficial strategy for the defender.
Hespanha, et al. [82] modeled an attacker-defender game where the defender
has three units available to defend two locations. In the game the defender signals
the locations of the units either by sending a truthful or deceptive signal or not
camouflaging the units revealed to the attacker. The authors also discuss the
possibility of a malfunction of the either the attacker’s sensors or the defender
camouflage, which may mean the signal seen may not be correct. The authors
conclude that the use of deception can render the information collected from sensors
and other methods to be useless to the attacker.
Deception has also been studied in repeated games. In this type of game the
players both choose an action and make their moves simultaneously. Depending
on the game, the players may receive information about how the environment stat
changed between selecting moves. Pursuer-evader games are commonly modeled with
this type of repeated game. Yavin [370] studies pursuer-evader deception, where both
players choose a strategy based on the bearing of the other player and the distance
between them, by corrupting the evader’s bearing signal to the pursuer. The author’s
goal is to determine the optimal (or near-optimal) pursuit strategies for a pursuer
when faced with deceptive or incomplete information.
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2.1.8 Bounded Rationality.
Bounded rationality is where a players rationality is limited in the decision
making process by the information the player has, cognitive limitations of their minds,
and time available to make the decision [330]. H.A. Simon originally proposed the
concept of bounded rationality as an improvement to the model of human decision
making [329]. Bounded rationality helps to explain why the most rational decision is
not always the decision chosen by the player in game theory or decision theory.
Bounded rationality does not mean irrationality, since players want to make
rational decisions, but cannot always do so [188]. Players are often very complex,
but in order to be fully rational they need unlimited cognitive capabilities [321].
The cognitive capabilities of players are limited and therefore cannot conform to full
rationality. Players will use the cognitive resources they have, with the information
available, and often within time constraints to reach a decision that is as rational
as possible. Bounded rationality allows the player to make a decision based on
their perceived state of the game or environment, leading to multiple players having
different perceptions of the game or interaction.
2.2 Decision Theory
This section provides an overview of decision theory, as decision theory is one
method to theorize about decision-making. In any given situation, there are actions
which an agent can choose between and make a choice in a non-random way. The
choose between actions are goal-directed activities [157]. Given a set of actions,
decision theory is concerned with goal-directed behavior to reach a desired outcome.
2.2.1 Overview.
Decision theory is a formal mathematical theory about how decision-makers make
rational decisions. It is also known as normative decision theory [280, 301], Bayesian
decision theory [157], rational choice theory [319], and statistical decision theory [47].
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Decision theory predates the development of game theory. Decision theory can be
divided into three parts: normative, descriptive, and prescriptive [26, 145].
• Normative Decision Theory [280, 301] - studies the ideal agent and the decisions
this perfectly rational agent would make, often referred to as the study of how
decisions should be made.
• Descriptive Decision Theory [340] - studies the non-ideal agent, such as humans,
and how they make decisions, often referred to the study of how decisions are
made in reality.
• Prescriptive Decision Theory [161] - studies how non-ideal agents, given their
imperfections, can improve the decisions they make.
2.2.2 Basis For Theory.
Normative decision procedures are defined by beginning with some axioms of
rational decision making behavior, then use the axioms to derive a characterization
of rational decision making [299]. Von Neumann and Morgenstern present the first
axiomatization for decision theory. They give four axioms which an agents preferences
must follow in normative decision theory [259]:
• Completeness - Each agent must have a preference for each pair of outcomes or
be indifferent between the two.
• Transitivity - If A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A is always
preferred to C.
• Independence - Preferences hold independent of any other possible outcomes.
If A is preferred to B, then A is always preferred to ApB (read as A with
probability p else B), which is preferred to B.
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• Continuity - If A is preferred to B, then when given the choice between CpA
(read as C with probability p else A) or CpB, then CpA is always preferred to
CpB.
These four axioms lead to the conclusion that “a rational decision maker will
act according to their degree of belief which conforms to probability calculus”[100].
For example, a decision theorist may describe a rational decision maker as having the
following characteristics [299]:
1) A rational decision-maker’s behavior is guided by their degree of belief in the
occurrence of an event. For example, if a sports fan is offered the choice to win
$500 if their team wins this week or $500 if the team wins next week, but can
only select one option. A rational sports fan would make their decision based
on the belief of the team’s best chance to win, given the opponent, weather
conditions, etc.
2) When given the option between being guaranteed breaking even in a game or
the possibility of breaking even with a chance of losing, a rational decision maker
will always select being guaranteed breaking even.
These five characteristics lead to a rational decision maker that acts with the
following behaviors [157, 356]:
1) has a set of beliefs represented by a probability distribution (P) over all possible
outcomes
2) assigns an utility (U) to every possible outcome using an utility function that
results in preferred outcomes receiving higher utilities
3) selects a strategy or action (A) by determining the expected utilities (EU) and
selecting the highest EU, thus maximizing expected utilities
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2.2.3 Bayesian Decision Theory.
Bayesian decision theory, or Bayesianism, is based on subjective utilities and
subjective probabilities. It can be described by the following four principles, where
the first three refer to the agent with probabilistic beliefs and the fourth refers to the
agent as the decision-maker [157].
• Coherent set of probabilistic beliefs - where the agents beliefs comply with the
mathematical laws of probability.
• Complete set of probabilistic beliefs - where each outcome is assigned a
subjective probability
• Beliefs are updated according to the agent’s conditional probabilities - that is
beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ Rule: p(A—B) = p(A&B)/p(B).
• The outcome with the highest expected utility is always chosen.
In descriptive Bayesianism, decisions made by decision-makers satisfy the
previous four principles. With normative Bayesianism, rationality is key, decisions
made by rational decision-makers satisfy the previous four principles. Subjective
Bayesianism does not present a particular relationship between the subjective utilities
used or the objective frequencies, such as a coin flip.
Bayesianism is not as popular in practical decision situations. This is because of
the subjective probabilities and utilities are hard to test. Objective probabilities and
utilities lead to predications that can be validated through testing.
Bayesian games have been proposed by Harsanyi [160]. Harsanyi claimed a game
of incomplete information can be captured by subjective probability distributions over
the outcomes without loss of generality. This is done by introducing a set of types
and each player’s belief about the types. Bayesian games, based on Harsanyi’s claim,
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allow all players to share a common set of the possibilities of the game structure [313].
This claim is often controversial as real interactive situations may lead to possibilities
that are not shared by all players [138].
2.2.4 Weakness of Decision Theory vs. Game Theory.
The “outguessing problem” is based on a player’s worry of what the other player
may do. There is nothing in the decision theory axioms that would encapsulate the
outguessing problem. This would imply worrying is not rational under decision theory.
A normative decision maker has a probability distribution over all possible outcomes,
and a probability distribution of the adversary’s behavior given the possible actions.
Unlike game theory, decision theory does not have a way to predict a column’s action
based on the column’s understanding of the row’s strategy [356]. In this case decision
theory does not require columns to select actions according to rational behavior; it
only requires that a row has the ability to assess the intent of column during the
game.
It is possible for the decision-maker to use the two different approaches during
game play. For example, decision-makers may use a risk adverse approach where the
agent prefers actions that lead to less risk in the expected outcome values, where the
agent could also use a risky approach where the agent prefers actions that lead to
more risk in the expected outcome values, but also higher expected outcome values.
This is especially realistic in retirement planning, a person normally starts out risky,
choosing investments with high risk and volatility, but with high reward. As the
person ages and approaches retirement, they start accepting less and less risk. Under
decision theory, modeling a decision-maker with two different approaches is difficult.
None of the decision theory axioms determine how the probability distributions
are derived. It is possible to model a decision-maker that uses multiple approaches the
decision-maker could use game theory to gain insight into the opponent’s behavior by
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using game theory to derive the probability distributions and explain the opponent’s
behavior.
Decision theory lacks the ability to quantify the risk of being outguessed during a
game. During a game, belief weights are associated with the column that results in the
least desirable outcome, since the belief weights corresponding to the most dangerous
column may be less than one [356]. This may lead to actions being discarded that
would help mitigate the worst-case condition. This idea stems from the fact that
in the real world, players may not be able to reach their preferred or most desired
outcome because their opponent has an unknown action or information, but at the
same time they could guard against reaching their least preferred outcome by taking
risk into account.
None of the four axioms in normative decision theory determine how to derive
the probability distribution corresponding to the beliefs of the opponent player. This
means that playing a game according to the player’s beliefs does not make any decision
irrational, but the decision may be ineffective if the beliefs used as the basis for the
probability distribution do not correspond to reality, leading to a delusion for the
player.
Within decision theory it is implied that a probability distribution can be
determined by the decision-maker [356]. This is without regard for the number
of actions, strategies, players, or opponents. It is also implied the probability
distribution of the situation it models. In real world events it may be hard to create
realistic probability distributions, do the possibility of asymmetric information.
2.2.5 Summary.
This section discussed decision theory as a method to theorize about decision-
making. It requires a probability distribution to be derived by the decision-maker.
The probability distribution must be consistent according to the axioms of decision
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theory, but decision theory does not specify how to update the probabilities. This
leads to Bayes’ rule being used in Bayesian decision theory to update the probabilities.
This allows decision theory based on a set of actions, given the axioms, to reach a
desired outcome using goal-directed behavior.
2.3 Game Theory vs. Decision Theory
Game theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help understand the
phenomena that observed when decision-makers interact [270]. Decision theory is
a formal mathematical theory about how decision-makers make rational decisions as
they interact with their environment. What is the difference between game theory
and decision theory? There is a division between decision theory where the outcome
depends on the players decisions and the impersonal universe, while game theory
depends on the decisions made by interacting with other players.
2.3.1 Overview.
Throughout the literature on decision theory and game theory there are slightly
different views on the division between the two theories. As shown in Figure 2.9a -
2.9d there are four possible high level views of the division between decision theory
and game theory. While it is possible decision theory and game theory are completely
independent of each other (as shown in Figure 2.9a, this is not considered in the
literature. The application of the theories also does not support this.
It is possible for game theory to be part of decision theory, as shown in Figure
2.9b. Given the definitions of decision theory and game theory from the literature,
this does not seem likely. Most definitions define decision theory as more specific
theory than game theory. For example, the definitions presented in this appendix
define game theory as a bag of tools and decision theory as a mathematical theory or
tool.
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Some literature considers some parts of decision theory and game theory to be
distinct, while there is some overlap between the two, as shown in Figure 2.9c. Often
the opponent of the player in question is different between the two (with decision
theory focusing on a player against nature and game theory focusing on the interaction
of evenly matched players). There are some characteristics shared by both theories.
For example, decision theory and game theory make use of rationality and preference
ordering, as well as probability theory.
(a) Independent Theories (b) Game Theory part
of Decision Theory
(c) Related Theories (d) Decision Theory
part of Game Theory
Figure 2.9: Possible Division of Game Theory and Decision Theory.
It is also possible for decision theory to be part of game theory, as shown in Figure
2.9d. Given the definitions of decision theory and game theory from the literature,
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this is possible. This is due to the fact that decision theory is defined as a more
specific theory than game theory. Using the definitions presented in this appendix, it
is easy to see that if game theory is a bag of analytical tools and decision.
Often the division appears to be arbitrary. The arbitrary division appears when
the players in the game are borderline players, such as animals or small children.
Other players could only be interacting minimally, such as workers in a building and
facilities management. The rest of this appendix discusses the differences between
decision theory and game theory.
2.3.2 A Short Story.
One of the easiest ways to see the differences between game theory and decision
theory is through an example. While this story is a bit contrived, it does show
differences in decision-making. The following short story, taken from Scientific
American, illustrates the difference between game theory and decision theory [351]:
A hat seller, on waking from a nap under a tree, found that a group of
monkeys had taken all his hats to the top of the tree. In exasperation
he took off his own hat and flung it to the ground. The monkeys,
known for their imitative urge, hurled down the hats, which the hat
seller promptly collected.
Half a century later his grandson, also a hat seller, set down his
wares under the same tree for a nap. On waking, he was dismayed
to discover that monkeys had taken all his hats to the treetop. Then
he remembered his grandfather’s story, so he threw his own hat to the
ground. But, mysteriously, none of the monkeys threw any hats, and
only one monkey came down. It took the hat on the ground firmly in
hand, walked up to the hat seller, gave him a slap and said, “You think
only you have a grandfather?”
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In the story, the grandfather uses decision theory to reach the decision that since
monkeys will imitate actions, then to get his hats back he just has to throw his hat on
the ground. Here decision theory would apply since the monkeys can be considered to
be acting naturally given their nature. The grandfather makes his decision without
assuming or considering the monkeys are rational or think like himself.
The grandson, on the other hand, uses decision theory to reach the decision to
throw his hat on the ground, recalling his grandfather’s story. While using decision
theory, the grandson never considered the monkeys as strategic decision-makers. If
he would have used game theory, he would have reasoned that if he learned the hat
trick from his grandfather, then the monkeys would have learned the hat trick from
their grandfathers.
2.3.3 Questions From the Theories.
Decision theory deals with single player games, or games where a player is against
nature, with the focus on preferences and the formation of beliefs [220]. The implicit
assumption in decision theory is nature is not cheating, interfering with, or assisting
the player; nature continues to function without regard to what the player wants
wishes to accomplish.
The main focus of decision theory is on one question:
- How do individuals make decisions?
Game theory deals with multi-player games, often involving groups of people,
where players are in cooperation or competition with competing strategies. It
explicitly assumes the other players are rational and may be cheating, interfering
with, or assisting the player or other players. In game theory it is necessary to
interact with other rational and intelligent players in order to resolve the conflict.
The focus of game theory can be summarized with two questions about the
interaction of the decision-makers [364]:
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- How do individuals behave in strategic situations?
- How should these individuals behave?
2.3.4 The Differences Between Game Theory and Decision Theory.
The first difference is how the decision is made to select an action with two
actions that have equal expected utilities[356]. Decision theory sees both actions as
desirable, so it would be rational for either action or a combination to be chosen.
This follows directly from the axioms of decision theory. In game theory, the other
player(s) is considered and with this in mind, even with two actions of equal expected
utilities, the player may prefer one or the other. For example, in a conflict with an
enemy, choosing the one action out of the two, which leads to a lower expected value
for the opponent would be preferred. Otherwise, if the player were playing family
member, they would prefer the action that leads to the higher expected value for the
opponent.
The second difference is how to handle when a player is wrong about their
opponent’s intent. Generally in decision theory, if there are two different views, then
these views are combined in the probability distribution. This leads to a player’s
best guess always being used, which is the only rational behavior [314]. In game
theory, two different views can be considered during game play and become part of
the rational reasoning expected with game theory. This allows the game theory based
solution to maximize the expected value while minimizing the chance they are wrong
about their opponent’s intent.
2.3.5 Where the Two Meet.
The foundations of decision theory do not guide how the probability distribution
are derived. In order to model a decision-maker that uses more complex interactions,
the decision-maker could use game theory to gain insight into the opponent’s
behavior by using game theory to derive the probability distributions and explain the
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opponent’s behavior. In this environment, game theory adds value to the decision
analysis through its suggestion on how the decision maker should form its beliefs about
the behavior of the environment, i.e., about the actions of players whose behavior is
modeled as uncertain [50].
2.3.6 Summary.
While game theory and decision theory are similar on the surface, after a closer
look they are different. Game theory focuses on multi-player games often involving
groups of people where players are in cooperation or competition with competing
strategies. While decision theory focuses on single player games or games where a
player is against nature with the focus on preferences and the formation of beliefs.
This chapter discussed the differences between game theory and decision theory, as
well as the similarities between the two theories.
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III. Hypergame Preliminaries
This chapter describes the background and related work for understanding
hypergame theory. Section 3.1 provides background on hypergame theory focusing on
its ability to model complex conflicts with unbalanced information. Section 3.2 covers
application of hypergames where competitive nature and proprietary information
often lead to missing information and a desire to introduce misperceptions (such
as in military conflicts, sports, resource allocation, business, and cyber). Related
work in hypergame theory is discussed in Section 3.3.
3.1 Hypergame Theory
Game theory, decision theory, and hypergames can be used to model conflicts
as games. When very little is known about the opponents, game theory is used for
adversarial reasoning. Decision theory is a better choice if the opponents are well
known. If one or more of the opponents are playing different games because they are
not fully aware of the nature of the game, hypergames can be used to reason about
subgames that are shared between opponents. Decision theory is not discussed in
the following section because in most cyber operations the opponents are not well
known. This may be due to the trouble of attribution, government operations that
are classified, or the global nature of the Internet.
“A conflict is a situation in which there is a condition of opposition [116], and
parties with opposing goals affect one another [106].” The study of how decision
makers interact during a conflict is known as game theory. An overview of game
theory and its applications are given in Chapter 2. Game theory analysis often falls
short when one player has an advantage over the other in a conflict. When one or
more players lack a full understanding, have a misunderstanding, or incorrect view of
the nature of the conflict, hypergame theory can be used to model the conflict.
53
Hypergames extend game theory by allowing for an unbalanced game model
that contains different view of the game representing the differences in each player’s
information or beliefs. The unbalanced game model allows for a different game model
for each player’s view, while having overlap where there is common knowledge. The
solution to the hypergame model is dependent on the player’s perception of the game
model, including how the player views the game and how the player believes the
opponent is viewing the game. Because of the multiple game models, each model
has to be analyzed in order to determine the outcome to the hypergame. This allows
hypergames to more accurately provide solutions for complex real world conflicts than
those modeled by game theory and excel where perception or information differences
exists between players.
3.1.1 Decision Making and Learning.
There is a feedback loop between experience and views in a hypergame [310]. This
feedback loop is taken from [310], extended with hypergame concepts, and is shown is
shown in Figure 3.1. Every player in a hypergame starts with a set of perceptions. A
player’s perceptions consist of beliefs, preferences, knowledge, and subgames. Beliefs
are based on past experiences and the player’s environment. Preferences represents
the player’s preferred ordering of actions and preferred results of the playing the
game and it is unique to each player. Knowledge of the game (which may be faulty
or incomplete) is important to forming player perceptions. A player uses orientation
and observation, along with the player’s perceptions in order to make a decision. The
player orients their view of the environment and observes the experiences of the game.
Each player has a set of experiences. The experiences can consist of deception,
subversion, payoffs, and denial. Players may be aware of certain aspects of their
experiences, such as payoffs, and may be unaware of other aspects such as deception
or subversion. Experiences provide feedback and elements of surprise in order to allow
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Figure 3.1: Relationship Between Decision Making and Learning.
a player to learn and update/change their perceptions throughout the course of the
game.
This process when used in real life conflicts requiring decision making, often
results in the process retaining temporal aspects. Often a time dependence develops
and becomes an integral part of the decision making process.
3.1.2 Hypergame Basic Concepts.
Hypergames, first discussed by Bennett [34], are used to model the games where
one or more players are playing different games [43]. Hypergame theory decomposes
a single situation into multiple games. By reasoning about multiple games, the
outcome to the single problem can be improved. Each player in a game has their
own perspective of how the other players view the game with regards to the possible
actions, and player preferences. In a hypergame each player may [106]:
• have a false or misled understanding of the preferences of the other players
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• have incorrect or incomplete comprehension of the actions available to the other
players
• not have awareness of all the players in a game
• have any combination of the above; faulty, incorrect, incomplete, or misled
interpretations
A player’s choice of actions reflects the player’s understanding of the game
outcomes; the player chooses actions based on the way they perceive reality, which
may not be the true state of reality. Figure 3.2 shows a basic two player hypergame
between ”row” and ”column”, where Ci and Ri are different actions each player could
take.
Figure 3.2: Example of a hypergame.
Hypergame analysis is conducted by first examining Row’s belief about Column’s
reasoning, and then by examining Row’s available actions [353] [354]. In Figure 3.2,
the game on the left shows how Row thinks Column will reason about the game.
Based on this Column will play C2 while Row plays R2, the Nash equilibrium concept
from game theory. This allows the experience and intuition of the decision maker to be
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incorporated into hypergames. For example, this could apply to planning variables,
such as a novel course of action for Row or Column’s lack of time to plan, or to
situational variables, such as the hidden location of Row’s resource [106].
Hypergames allow for domain knowledge incorporation, therefore it does not
require the game theory equilibrium condition [106]. Furthermore, the standard
rationality arguments from game theory are replaced by knowledge of how the
opponent will reason [106]. It is also valid to assume unequal availability of
information in hypergames, when many players in games have imperfect information.
Wang et al. [361] proposed different levels for developing mathematical
hypergame models based on perceptions of the players. The lowest level (level 0)
is a basic game with no misperceptions among the players. In a first level hypergame,
players have different views of the game but are not aware of the other players’ games.
In a second level hypergame, at least one player is aware there are different games
being played and that misperceptions exist. A third level hypergame is possible and
is when at last one player is aware that at least one other player is aware different
games are being played. A nth level hypergame can be described, but the authors
state this does not add to the hypergame model, instead it adds complication and
excess information not needed for the hypergame analysis. This not only allows the
perceptions of the players to be incorporated into the hypergame model, but varying
degrees of perceptions in order to reach a more complete game model.
3.1.3 First Level Hypergame.
A game G is defined by a set of preference vectors, Vn , for all game players;
where n is the number of players, and Vi is the preferences vector for player i.
G = {V1, V2, . . . , Vn}
In game of complete information, all players know the other player’s preference
vectors, therefore all players are playing the exact same game. In hypergames, one
57
or more players may have incomplete information, that leads players to form slightly
different versions of the same game or completely different games altogether. A game
formed by player q includes any and all lack of information about the conflict, which
is denoted by:
Gq = {V1q, V2q, . . . , Vnq}
Where Viq represents the preference vector of player I as understand(perceived)
by player q.
A first level hypergame H is a set of games as understood from each player:
H = {G1, G2, . . . , Gn}
Table 3.1 shows a hypergame in matrix form.
Table 3.1: Matrix form of a hypergame.
Player Perceived Game perceived by player
1 V11 V12 . . . V1n
2 V21 V22 . . . V2n
...
...
...
...
...
n Vn1 Vn2 . . . Vnn
G1 G2 . . . Gn
Since players may have different misperceptions, each player may make a different
decision which will result in a different outcome to the conflict. A mapping function
can be used to relate the outcomes between the player’s individual games. Bennett
[36] gives an algebraic description of this problem, while an application is presented
in Bennett et al. [42].
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Game analysis is performed by treating each player’s game separately. This
means player q’s game is analyzed from q’s understanding about the conflict. The
decisions made and the strategies chosen by q depend on q’s interpretation of the
conflict, therefore a given player may not perceive all outcomes of a game. The
player cannot unilaterally change from an perceived outcome, so for the purpose of
stability analysis the outcome is stable for that player [106]. Therefore an unknown
outcome to a player can be stable in the hypergame analysis. When a game contains
an unknown outcome it is known as strategic surprise.
For player q’s game, an outcome is stable if the outcome is stable in each of q’s
preference vectors. This means the equilibriums of q’s game are only the outcomes q
believes would lead to a resolution of the conflict. Hypergame equilibriums depend
on each player’s perception of the stability of the outcomes. When determining
equilibriums of hypergames, the equilibriums of each player’s game are not needed,
but these individual equilibriums can be useful to demonstrate what each player
believes will happen.
3.1.4 Second Level Hypergame.
A second level hypergame is a hypergame where at least one player is aware a
hypergame is being played. This situation can happen if at least one player perceives
another player’s misperception [106]. Player q’s hypergames is defined as the (hyper)
game perceived by player q. This hypergame is denoted as:
Hq = {G1q, G2q, . . . , Gnq}
Where Giq is the game of the ith player as it is perceived by player q. It is not
necessary for player q to be one of the players who are aware a hypergame is being
played. If set Hq is missing a player’s game, it is because player q does not perceive
the game.
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A second level hypergame is a set of hypergames perceived by each player,
denoted as:
H2 = {H1, H2, . . . , Hn}
Table 3.2 shows a second level hypergame in matrix form, where the hypergame
for player p is the pth column. Each element of the matrix is a game made up of a
preference vector for each player.
Table 3.2: Matrix form of a second level hypergame.
Player Perceived Game perceived by player
1 G11 G12 . . . G1n
2 G21 G22 . . . G2n
...
...
...
...
...
n Gn1 Gn2 . . . Gnn
H1 H2 . . . Hn
Similar to a first level hypergame analysis, game analysis of second level
hypergames is performed by treating each player’s game separately. This allows
stability information to be determined for every preference vector in a conflict. This
information can further be used to determine each game’s equilibrium.
The preference vectors of each player’s game provides the stability information
that determines the equilibriums of the second level hypergame. ”Just as the
equilibriums of a game within a hypergame are not needed to determine the
equilibriums of that hypergame, so the equilibriums of a hypergame within a higher
level hypergame are not needed to determine the equilibriums of that higher level
hypergame.” [106]
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3.1.5 Hypergame Normal Form.
Russell Vane [356] incorporates a player’s beliefs with the opponent’s possible
actions in the hypergame model. Vane refers to this as Hypergame Normal Form
(HNF) this is based largely on the strategic from used in standard game theory
analysis, as shown in Figure 3.3. Like the strategic form, HNF contains a grid with row
and column strategies labeled and utility values defined for each cell where strategies
intersect.
Figure 3.3: Hypergame Normal Form (HNF) [356].
The HNF grid has additional sections which contain hypergame situational
information. This hypergame situational information is represented by Row Mixed
Strategy (RMS) and Column Mixed Strategy (CMS). A RMS is a hyperstrategy
based on what the row player believes in the game being played by the column
player. Hyperstrategies are strategies that do not apply to the full game, except for
the hyperstrategy R0 which represents the Nash Equilibrium for the full game. A
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CMS represents row’s beliefs about the percentages column will use when selecting a
strategy. The Nash Equilibrium for column for the full game is represented by C0. A
CMS cell containing a zero (0) indicates column is playing a subgame with strategies
that are either unknown or disregarded. Another section contains belief contexts
represented as the percentage that row believes the adjacent CMS will be selected
and played by column. Belief contexts will sum to one since they represent all possible
strategies from row’s view, any remainder corresponds to the Nash Equilibrium belief
context.
The HNF is completed by first calculating the Nash Equilibrium for the full game
by determining the utility values, which is the input for R0 and C0. The CMSs can be
calculated manually by knowing the player’s preference for the strategies or by finding
the Nash Equilibrium of a subgame for the column player. A weight is assigned to
each CMS as a belief context value, which is used to determine row’s belief of column
using that strategy. These weights are then used to calculate the amount that affects
row’s expected utility, CΣ. Hyperstrategies can be placed in the RMS section for the
row player. Expected utility values are calculated for the full game CMS, C0, and
CΣ in order to determine the effectiveness of which RMS hyperstrategy row should
select.
The effectiveness of RMS hyperstrategies is measured using three levels:
ineffective, partially effective, and fully effective. These levels are shown in Figure
3.4 along with the Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy (NEMS). Ineffective strategies
do not increase utility, leading to a best case outcome of the Nash Equilibrium. This
means there is no reason for the player to choose an ineffective strategy. Partially
effective strategies lead to greater expected utility at CΣ than at R0, while providing
a lower expected utility at C0. A partially effective RMS may provide a good outcome
based on row’s information, but a good outcome is not guaranteed. Fully effective
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strategies lead to in the worst case the same expected utility R0 results in for C0,
but with greater utility than CΣ. If row’s beliefs about the game are correct, then a
RMS strategy that is fully effective is a reasonable strategy for row to play. These
relationships are summarized in Figure 3.5. While a fully effective strategy is a
reasonable strategy for row, it does not guarantee this is the best strategy in all
cases. The utility values are expected and not actual utility values. In order to
mitigate the risk when using expected utility values, the worst case scenario can be
used to select the strategy.
Figure 3.4: Effectiveness of Hyperstrategies in HNF [356].
Vane uses quantified outguessing in order to measure a players adversity to
risk. This measure quantifies the player’s fear of obtaining the worst outcome or
lowest utility from the game by being out maneuvered. There are three types of
hyperstrategies for analyzing quantified outguessing: Modeling Opponent (MO), Pick
Subgame (PS), and Weighted Subgame (WS). In MO, row’s strategy that provides
the greatest utility given all of row’s strategies and row’s belief of how column is
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Figure 3.5: Relationship of Hyperstrategy Effectiveness [356].
viewing the game. In PS, row’s strategy is the Nash Equilibrium given the same
game considered in MO. The WS strategy takes the PS strategy values and multiplies
by the belief context percentage for the given CMS then adds the R0 multiplied by
the belief context for each C0. This produces a hybrid strategy between PS and the
Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy of the full game. Each of the hyperstrategies are
then analyzed against the full game to obtain the worst case utility (G), which is the
expected utility value if column selects the best counter strategy. The Hypergame
Expected Utility (HEU) can be calculated using the Expected Utility (EU) and G,
along with the percentage, g, that represents row’s fears of being outguessed based
on the hyperstrategy (hs) as shown in the following equation:
HEU(hs) = EU(hs)− (EU(hs)−G(hs)) ∗ g
A hyperstrategy’s ability to provide a better utility at the Nash Equilibrium
Mixed Strategy decreases as row’s fear of being outguessed increases, as shown in
Figure 3.5. MO is the best solution when the fear of being outguessed is low. As
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the fear of being outguessed increases PS dominates until the Crossover Point. At
the Crossover Point the Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy of the full game becomes
dominant. WS does not provide a suitable choice as it is always dominated. It is
possible to select hyperstrategies with higher utility than standard game analysis,
with better information about the intents of the opponent.
Figure 3.6: The Effect of g on the Hypergame Expected Utility (HEU) [356].
In hypergame theory subgames represent a smaller game that differs in a key way
from the larger main hypergame. Often subgames differ by different combinations
of actions. Analyzing the subgames allows the player to see how the outcomes
change as the game model changes. This allows the modeling of false or misleading
understandings, incorrect or incomplete comprehension, lack of awareness, and faulty
interpretations of the game.
As shown in Figure 3.7, subgames can differ by the column player having a
different set of actions, which could lead to different outcomes/payoffs. A full game
is defined in Definition 7 and a subgame is defined in Definition 8.
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Figure 3.7: Hypergame Subgame Example.
Definition 7. Full Game Hypergame - When the row player has m actions and
the column player has n actions (called a m x n hypergame), it is called a full game
hypergame.
Definition 8. Subgame - Given a full game hypergame, a subgame is a game defined
with up to m rows and up to n columns (called a u x v subgame), where u ⊂ m and
v ⊂ n.
The equation to determine the possible number of subgames is Equation 3.1
[356]:
(
m
u
)
·
(
n
v
)
=
(
m!
u!(m− u)!
)
·
(
n!
v!(n− v)!
)
(3.1)
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While a large m x n hypergame game could result in hundreds of subgames,
limitations normally result in just a few subgames. Limitations include [356]:
• Time and effort
• The way human memory works
• Leaders distilling situation into a few courses of action
• Decision-makers condense plan selection problem into a handful of reasoning
contexts
Subgames are important when players interpret the payoffs in the environment.
The player’s interpretation can be wrong. For example, in Figure 3.7, Player 2 may
believe Player choose an action that leads to Subgame B, while reality is that Player
1 choose an action that lead to Subgame A. This means Player 2 continues playing
the game according to Subgame B.
Vane expanded hypergame analysis by exploring the robustness of strategy plans
[181]. This shows the ability of using hypergames for strategy selection. He also
applied HNF to a real world example of a terrorist attack [180]. The research aims
to pick the strategy to best protect first responders by applying the belief contexts
to the types of attackers expected during an attack. HNF is also applied to the Fall
of France in 1940 [32]. This application shows that information in the HNF model
is not removed even if a strategy is discounted with a chance of zero. The strategy
remains in the Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy and is not entirely removed from
the model, showing the flexibility and robustness of the HNF model.
3.2 Applications of Hypergame Theory
Hypergame theory has been used to examine past military conflicts, which
by their nature are conducted with missing information and misperceptions. Past
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conflicts lend to analysis because the excitement and fog of war has cleared
as well as the outcome has already been determined. Hypergame theory has
also been applied to sports, resource allocation, and business, where competitive
nature and proprietary information often lead to missing information and a desire
to introduce misperceptions. Recently, it has been applied to cyber conflicts
using attacker/defender models, where resource constraints and advantage are
important.This section provides an overview of each type of application.
The applications of hypergames are separated into five distinct categories as
shown in Figure 3.8: military conflict, sports, resource allocation, business, and
cyber. These categories contain the majority of the hypergame application work.
En overview of the numerous applications in hypergame theory is summarized in
Table 3.3. Each is listed chronologically and denoted with the corresponding year
and topic category.
Figure 3.8: Hypergame Application Characterization.
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3.2.1 Military Conflicts.
Bennett and Dando [39, 40] first applied hypergames to the first real world
application during their analysis of the Fall of France during WWII. They show how
misperceptions between the two countries can lead to unexpected outcomes using
hypergames. The hypergame model they used is shown in Appendix A and discussed
in detail.
Wright, et al. [328, 369] presented a more complex hypergame example in their
analysis of the Nationalization of the Suez Canal in the 1950s. This hypergame shows
how one player waiting to participate in the conflict can lead to strategies changing
over time. While this is a temporal concept, the analysis is only made for one point in
time during the conflict. The hypergame used for analysis is presented in Appendix
A.
Said and Hartley [308] use hypergame theory to analyze the 1973 Middle East
War. Their analysis shows that each player behaves in a rational manner within their
own perceptual beliefs. The deailts of the 1973 Middle East War are let out, as the
Fall of France and Nationalization of the Suez Canal are similar. The contribution of
this work is the proposed methodology for applying hypergame theory to a crisis:
• Specify all conflict participants (individuals, groups, or organizations)
• Divide the conflict in phases, but only initially proceed with the first phase
• Model each player’s perceptions of the conflict
– List all the strategies a player perceives all players (including himself)having
– Estimate the player’s preferences for outcomes
– Estimate the preferences of other players perceived by the current player
– Use the resulting game to explore alternative modes of behavior a player
may be expected to exhibit
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– Repeat process for each player, resulting a set of possible games based on
perception
• Map the strategies in the current player’s game into the set of possible games
in order to help correlate how each player perceives the actions of opponents.
Bennett and Dando [41] model an arms race between two nations as a hypergame.
Their analysis forces he modeler to consider the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of ll
parties involved, which they claim to lead to a more competent analysis. Appendix
A has additional details on the arms race model.
Fraser, et al. [107] apply five conflict analysis models to a possible nuclear
confrontation between the USA and USSR. The five conflict analysis models are
normal form analysis from game theory, metagame analysis [175], and hypergame
analysis [108] [106]. An overview of each of the models follows is in A. Their analysis
determines that the hypergame analysis of conflicts is the best for modeling real-world
conflicts.
Hipel, et al. [167] examine the Falkland/Malvinas conflict in 1982. The authors
approaches the conflict from a different angle in their analysis of the conflict between
Britain and Argentina. The hypergame analysis of the conflict is used to show how
misperceptions dictated an outcome that was unexpected by all sides. This analysis
uses three specific points in the conflict to construct three different hypergame models.
The authors construct the hypergame model based on historical material, using a
first-level hypergame, as discussed in A.
3.2.2 Sports.
In the literature there is only one example of hypergame being applied to sports.
While this is far fewer than military or business conflicts, it is easy to see how the
competitive nature of sports lends to hypergame modeling.
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Bennett et al. model soccer hooliganism [42] which appears in U.K. soccer
around the late 1970s. They use the hooligan fans and the authorities as the players.
Empirical studies were used to build up possible games that may be played between
the players. The hypergame analysis showed that there were three critical variables:
(1) the fans interpretation of how the authorities prepared for possible conflict; (2)
how the authorities interpret the “Play Hooligan” strategy by the fans; (3) the effect
previous incidents have on perception for future conflicts. The result of the analysis
is that tolerance should be used by the authorities. This reduces the over preparation
and expectation everyone is a hooligan, and in time reduces the effect of previous
incidents.
When the hypergame goes through a number of iterations, additional forces put
pressure on players in the game. For example, previous incidents will place pressure
on the authorities to be seen taking firm measures and may cause the authorities to
expect trouble. If this is the case, then authorities will start using tougher measures.
If the authorities expect malevolent fans, then there is the possibility that the fans will
become malevolent and start playing the role after being categorized. Over several
rounds, if each player is unhappy about the previous interaction, then they will start
to see the other player as increasingly malevolent.
3.2.3 Resource Allocation.
Hypergames are well suited to model resource allocation conflicts. The two
applications of hypergames in this area are to water resource managements between
multiple players. While hypergames often involve misperceptions, one example shows
how different degrees of power over another player can affect the outcome of the game.
Okada, et al. first applied hypergame analysis to water resource allocation in
Japan’s Lake Biwa conflict in the early 1970âĂŹs [266]. The conflict is a water
resource management problem, where the downstream users desire more water from
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the upstream water source, but the controllers of the water source are unresponsive.
While each player in the Lake Biwa conflict had misperceptions about the other
player’s preferences, the hypergame analysis was able to correctly identify the
compromise that resolved the conflict historically.
This hypegame has three players: the Shiga Prefecture, downstream prefectures,
and the national government. The authors use the notation from Howard [175] and
the metagame analysis in [107] to solve the hypergame. While this game is unique in
that is models three players, the details are of the analysis are similar to [107].
Hamandawana, et al. again applied a game theoretic analysis to a water
management conflict [156]. They use a method similar to hypergame analysis to
model the interstate conflict between Angola, Botswana, and Namibia over the shared
water resource of the Okavango River. The authors use a hypothetical game to build a
framework for developing sharing arrangements that minimize conflict, where players
make compensatory sacrifices to offset the losses of other players.
Their model introduces the idea of perceived comprised strategic relationships.
There are three types: fate control, reflexive control, and behavior control. In fate
control, the player’s outcome may be influenced by the actions of other players. With
reflexive control, the player has some degree of control over the outcome regardless of
the actions of other players. Behavior control is the case where the player’s outcome
is only feasible through interdependent actions of co-partners. This idea follows that
of Bennett with perceived games, and Fraser with enforceable/credible equilibriums.
3.2.4 Business.
Hypergames have been applied to business conflicts on many occasions. Business
conflicts allow modeling using hypergame naturally, given the misperceptions that
arise from company’s keeping secrets and leveraging for bargaining position.
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3.2.4.1 Applications to Shipping.
Hypergame theory was applied to a conflict in the oil shipping business in [137]
[136]. The incident in 1954 almost led to the bankruptcy of Aristotle Onassis, an oil
tanker fleet owner. The hypergame analysis showed that decisions made by a player
which appear to be irrational under a conventional game theory model, are actually
rational when the perceptual limitations and differences in information are considered
in hypergame theory.
Hypergame analysis was applied to an ongoing ship building conflict in [44]. The
authors were invited by staff of an U.K. shipping company. Ship building had taken
off in the 1970’s in the U.K., but due to developing countries building completing
fleets and the oil crisis in 1973. The hypergame analysis helped to show how different
countries supported the crisis in different ways. For example, Japan’s profitable
industries support the less profitable ones, which allow Japan to keep producing ships
when the ship market went into a depression. Other developing countries had labor
rates that were below those in the U.K. and support for the ship building industry
was lacking in the U.K.
3.2.4.2 Negotiation and Contracting.
Fraser and Hipel explore contract bargaining using hypergame theory [110]. They
build a model using the information available to the bargainer and look at the effects
of providing opponents with misinformation. They use the model to predict the
expected course of events during a negotiation session. The authors provide the first
implementation of hypergame analysis on a microprocessor called Conflict Analysis
Program (CAP) âĂŞ discussed later.
Fraser and Hipel [111] explore labor-management negotiations, where they apply
hypergame analysis to a hypothetical labor-management conflict. The hypothetical
conflict is developed in detail in [109]. The authors again use the CAP to show
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that the best model does not always conform to the way things should be, but
sometimes will conform to how things actually are. For example, they build their
model without considering union demands, fairness of salaries, benefits, or working
conditions. Instead they model the power of the individual players.
Bennett used a hypergame analysis to explore a conflict where multiple bidders
negotiate with a dispenser, who is able to accept the most generous offer [35]. This is
a case of two nations bidding to get a multinational corporation to relocate to their
jurisdiction. The model focuses on the ability of the dispenser to play bidders against
each other.
Graham, et al. [144] apply hypergame theory to study supply relationships
and modify control systems. They use hypergames to identify misperceptions in
the process that are causing inefficiency. These misperceptions are then identified
and targeted for correction to improve efficiency in the supply relationships of the
players. While the authors are studying twelve pairs of companies, they discuss the
types of games created to study the relationship between a vendor of forgings and an
engineering company.
3.2.4.3 Trade and E-Commerce.
Stokes and Hipel use hypergame theory to study an international trade dispute
over government subsidized export credits [343]. They model the awarding of large
contracts to supply subway cars in New York City, which involves the U.S. and
Canada, as well as the New York transit authority. Their analysis of the hypergame
highlights the role of strategic deception in awarding contracts and presents logically
reasonable resolutions.
Hypergame theory is applied to ecommerce by Leclerc and Chaibdraa in [217].
They use hypergame theory as an analysis tool for a multiagent environment. They
show how multiple agents interact through communication and a mediator when each
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has differing views of the conflict. A discussion is also provided on how agents can
take advantage of misperceptions.
Novani and Kijima [260] use a symbiotic hypergame model to examine the mutual
understanding process between customer expectation and provider capability. They
try to formalize the players’ internal model dealing with the way each player identifies
the situation subjectively and the interpretation function concerning how each player
interprets the set of strategies. This model is then applied to different types of
customers and providers that the authors develop.
3.2.5 Cyber.
There has been very little research with hypergame theory and its application to
cyber warfare, while there has been a variety of research using game theoretic models
to improve network security. These models use standard game theory methods,
instead of the hypergame theory methods. It is not impossible for hypergame theory
to be used where game theory has been applied. If the hypergame model contains valid
information, hypergame theory will do as well as the game theory models, with the
possibility of outperforming the game theory models [135]. It has also been suggested
hypergame agents can be used in place of agents based on decision theory and game
theory [179] although no application has been made to cyber warfare defense.
Cybenko [81] studied how different variants of game theory could be applied to
cyber adversarial applications. An overview from his work is shown in Table 3.4. He
found that hypergame theory provided a high applicability, realism, and robustness,
but had a medium level of maturity.
This section describes two research efforts to model cyber warfare scenarios.
These are believed to be the only two applications of hypergame theory to cyber
warfare and show how hypergame theory is still in its infancy.
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3.2.5.1 Information Warfare.
Kopp [198] uses hypergame theory to model Information Warfare. He uses a
hypergame to describe how the manipulation of an information channel is reflected
in the behavior of the adversaries. Figure 3.9 provides a graphical overview of the
general differences between a standard game model and a hypergame model based
on information flow. It also shows how hypergames improve upon the game theoretic
model by incorporating misperceptions of the players into the game model.
The author focuses on the Information Warfare techniques of denial of
information or degradation, deception and corruption, disruption and destruction,
and subversion. The hypergame provides a tool for understanding the nature of
Information Warfare and allows for quantifying the effects of the action during
warfare. The author determines the hypergame theory can be used to model
Information Warfare, because the strategies map directly into hypergame models.
3.2.5.2 Model with Obfuscation.
There has been at least a small amount of work performed in the use of hypergame
theory applied to cyber warfare. House and Cybenko have a model for generic cyber-
attack using hypergame theory [174]. In their model, the defender has the option
to choose a specific subgame or the full game, which represents the experience level
of the defending administrator. It is based on the HNF work by Vane, using static
utility values and placing the attacker as the row player. Learning models are used
to determine the belief context percentages representing the possibility that each
subgame is being played. The authors ran their simulations for multiple iterations
and where able to show the belief context percentages were within ±5% of the
true percentages. This research indicates a learning strategy may allow a player
to learn the strategy selection of the opponent, thus increasing the maximum utility
by obtaining a better understanding of the player’s opponent.
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of a game theoretic model and a hypergame model [198].
The authors then look at how the defender can obfuscate the learning ability of
the attacker. By using the obfuscation Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy, column is
able to interfere with row’s ability to learn the true percentages. Nash Equilibrium
Mixed Strategy is obtained by rearranging the initial utility values used during the
row learning experiments. This game setup is contrived in order to allow column
to select strategies that will lead to misinterpretation. However, the authors use
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this approach because payoffs and subgame definitions are the foundation of the
hypergame scenario.
The authors use of hypergame game theory to model a cyber-attack/defense
scenario is the most interesting part of this research. Instead of using the full HNF
model proposed by Vane, the authors focus on learning the game by repeated play.
This is a different approach than proposed originally by Vane [356]. More research
into cyber warfare modeling using hypergame theory is needed in order to refine the
models and theory.
3.2.5.3 Atacker-Defender Model.
Gibson [135] presents a hypergame model (based on HNF) of the work of Chen
and Lenectre [72]. At the heart, this model is an attacker-defender game. It keeps
the functional and nonzero-sum utilities from the Chen and Lenectre model.
With Gibson’s model, the attacker is given a new strategy, zero-day exploit,
which is an attack where there is no defense since the vulnerability is undiscovered.
The defender is given two new strategies: providing ruse or shutdown. A defender may
provide a ruse by following the attacker into attacking a honeypot, while collecting
information about the type and style of the attack. The shutdown option allows the
defender to remove the system from the network and stop the attack in its tracks
but also removes the system form operation even for mission critical activities. This
model is discussed in detail in Appendix B.
3.3 Related Work in Hypergame Theory
This section provides an overview of the related work in hypergame theory.
While each of these sections explores expanding hypergames in some way, each is
representative of the flexibility of hypergames to be used as models for real-world
conflicts.
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3.3.1 Hypergame Modeling.
Huxham and Bennett [178] introduce the idea of preliminary problem structuring.
In this phase the problem is explored, the relevant participants are identified, along
with the possible interactions. The authors try to build up a ’ structured picture’
in hypergame terms of the situation, instead of a hypergame model. The idea is to
explore how the various pieces fit together. The ’structured picture’ will often be too
complex to form into a formal hypergame model. It is therefore necessary to abstract
farther, making simplifications by asking specific questions [178]:
• How two different problem aspects relate?
• Where are the complexities of the system?
• Can simplifications be made while retaining the essential structure?
• Which participants are most important or influential?
In Hipel et al. [166] hypergame theory is applied to modeling misperceptions in
bargaining situations. The authors present a new game theoretical model and apply
it to a bargaining situation with two or more players (the new model is originally
introduced in [361]). They develop a new algorithm, called the HCCAS. The HCCAS
algorithm is shown in Figure 3.10.
The real-world situation is represented at the top of the algorithm and provides
critical information for the algorithm. The first step is to use the real world
information to define the structure of the bargaining situation. This stage involves
selecting a point in time at which the analysis will be conducted, as well as identifying
the participants, and potential interactions. The second step in HCCAS is modeling,
where the actions and outcomes of the players are identified. The third step of
HCCAS is the hypergame framework where the bargaining situation structure and
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Figure 3.10: HCCAS Algorithm as presented by Hipel et al. [166].
the levels of misperception for each player are identified. Following this step, the
preference vectors for each player are formed using information from the previous
steps; this is referred to the preference assessment in Figure 3.10. Stability analysis
of the hypergame is performed in the fifth step. After this, a strategy is selected and
can used to explain the real-world events. The HCCAS algorithm is then applied
to the Seymour landfill case, between Eau Claire city and the town of Seymour in
Wisconsin.
3.3.2 Stability Analysis.
Wang et al. explores stability analysis for n-players in [362]. The authors presents
a relationship of possible outcomes, as shown in the Venn Diagram in Figure 3.11.
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Nash stability is when players make a rational decision based on the best outcome for
the player, this type of outcome is considered rational (R). Nash stability is harder to
achieve when misperceptions exist between players. A General Metarational (GMR)
outcome is where other players have joint action for player i, and player i cannot
achieve a better outcome than the original. A Symmetric Metarational (SMR)
outcome is when there is one jointly sequential strategy selection that results in
player i achieving the same outcome. If a response to a player’s strategy results in
that player not achieving a better outcome and the responding player cannot possibly
achieve a worse outcome, it is known as a Sequential Stable (FHQ). The contribution
of this research is an FHQ outcome exists in all hypergame levels, which implies a
GMR outcome also exists in all hypergame levels.
Figure 3.11: Venn Diagram of Stability Analysis Outcomes for n-players [362].
Another view of stability analysis with mixed Strategies is introduced into
hypergames by Sasaki et al. [311]. This allows for generalization of Nash’s theorem
about noncooperative games [252] to hypergames [312]:
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Theorem 10. In every finite hypergame with mixed strategies, there is at least one
hyper Nash equilibrium.
Sasaki proposes the base game as an analysis tool for hypergames [310]. The
base game is the overlap of the perceived games between the players [310]. It
represents the game that would have been had there been no misperceptions among
the players. When a hypergame is compared to the base game, the misperceptions in
the hypergame can be analyzed.
Theorem 11. Let H = (Gp, Gq) be a hypergame with Gp = (N, Σ, up) and Gq = (N,
Σ, uq) where p, q ∈ N. A normal form game G = (N, Σ, u) is called the base game
of H iff up = upp and uq = uqq. Let the base game (BG) of hypergame H be denoted by
BGH .
A Hyper Nash provides an equilibrium solution for a simple hypergame, where
a stable hyper Nash equilibrium exists if all the hyper Nash equilibria that exist in a
hypergame are also Nash equilibrium in the base game. The hyper Nash equilibrium
[312] is used to describe a stationary state, where every player is not willing to change
their strategy or perception in the game. It is the solution to a hypergame that is
perceived as a Nash equilibrium by every player.
Theorem 12. Let H = (Gp, Gq) be a hypergame with Gp = (N, Σ, up) and Gq = (N,
Σ, uq). Then a∗ ∈ Σ is called a stable hyper Nash (SHN) equilibrium iff a∗ ∈ N(Gp)
and a∗ ∈ N(Gq) where N(G) represents the Nash equilibriums for game G.
This also means that if an outcome is a stable hyper Nash equilibrium, then in
the base game it is a Nash equilibrium. This implies that only outcomes that are
Nash equilibriums the base game are stationary states in the long run [310]. This
gives the following lemma:
Lemma 13. In a hypergame H, SHN(H) ⊂ N(BGH).
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Shown in Figure 3.12, the stability relationships are between the Hypergame (H),
Hyper Nash equilibrium (HN) of H (HN(H)),Base Game (BG), Stable hyper Nash
equilibrium (SHN) of H (SHN(H).
Figure 3.12: Stability Analysis Outcomes for Hyper Nash equilibrium [311].
3.3.3 Player Beliefs.
Vane and Lehner [352] deal with beliefs over games. The hypergame framework
allows a player to hedgs its risk about what the other opponents are doing. This is
donw by selecting a set of possible game that repreent the action the opponents may
take, and then a probability distribution is built over this set of games and evaluated
using the maximum expected utility. This allows the player to hedge its risk by using
the probably that an opponent will select an action, increasing payoffs by lowering
the effect of misperceptions on the hypergame model.
3.3.4 Perceptions and Deception.
Early work in hypergames have used matrices, trees, and tableaux to model
interactive decisions [37] [38]. The authors expand this repertoire by showing
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preliminary problem structuring, where there are games within games (subgames),
and build the concept of perception in hypergames. This provides the foundation for
using hypergames to solve complex decisions and additional graphical representations
of hypergames.
Mateski et al. explores perception, misperception, and deception in conflict using
hypergames [235]. They introduce a diagrammatic representation for hypergames
called the Hypergame Perception Model (HPM). The HPM is used to model
misperception and deception during the Cuban Missile Crisis where perception played
a critical role in the conflict. The HPM diagram is shown in Figure 3.13. The two
middle columns, denoted Awareness Notation, indicate if the player is aware at the
particular level of the hypergame. A check mark indicates correct awareness, and
‘XâĂŹ indicates incorrect awareness, and no mark indicates no awareness. Actions
available to the players are represented by white circles and strategies are represented
by darkened circles.
Figure 3.13: Hypergame Perception Model (HPM).
Gharesifard and Cortés [130] present the notion of inconsistent equilibrium in
the repeated play of first-level hypergames with two players. Inconsistent equilibrium
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refers to the equilibria of the hypergame where at least one player expects the other
to move away from. Just the existence of inconsistent equilibrium means there is
some misperception about the game among one of the players. A class of actions,
call exploratory, are also identified by the authors to allow players to move away from
inconsistent equilbiria and decrease the misperception. If only one player in the game
uses exploratory actions, then the hypergame will arrive at an outcome rational for
the player. If both players use exploratory actions, then the repeated play may finish
in a cycle.
They [132] also study the situations where the perceptions of players in the
game are inconsistent and evolving. The authors present a new method, called swap
learning, which allows the incorporation of information gained by observing their
opponents actions into the player’s beliefs. This method allows a player to decrease
misperceptions, but at a cost of incorporating inconsistencies into their beliefs. For
example, if player A originally believes player B’s preferences are 15 >3 >7 >11
(where each digit is an outcome), but the player B’s actions leads from outcome 15 to
11, then player A interchanges the positions of outcomes 15 and 11. Player A would
then believe player B’s preferences are 11 >3 >7 >15; this is called swap learning.
Since the swap of preferences does not take into account the other outcomes, then
inconsistencies can form in the beliefs of player A. To eliminate the inconsistencies, the
modified swap learning method is presented. This method assumes that the opponent
has perfect information and plays their best strategy, buts yields consistent beliefs
and decreases player misperception. The swap learning method place the origin of
the misperception on the player performing the belief update.
Again, Gharesifard and Cortes [131] [133] focus on conflicts with incomplete
information, where players may have different perceptions about the conflict.
Specifically they focus on a 2-player hypergame where one player, the deceiver, has
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full information about his opponent’s game and wants to introduce a certain belief
in it. They use their previously developed H-digraph [128], a special class of digraph
used to encode the belief structure of the hypergame players. Using the H-digraph
they are able to characterize deception when stealthy actions are possible in the game.
Their papers [128] [129] [132] also presents two algorithms for updating perception in
the hypergame. These methods can decrease the misperception between the player’s
perceived game and true payoffs.
3.3.5 Dynamic Payoff Functions.
Gibson presents a model based on the intrusion model presented by Chen and
Leneutre [135] and the Hypergame Normal Form model presented by Vane [355, 356].
Appendix B contains a detailed discussion. The author achieves a model that has
a changeable nonzero-sum utility values with a process for delineation of strategy
selection [72]. In order to achieve this model, the Chen and Leneutre intrusion model
is extended by adding strategies for both the attacker and defender, while the HNF
model is used to hide r discount strategies from the other player.
3.3.6 Mutual Interaction.
Inohara et al. discuss the ability of players to engage in multiple games
simultaneously [182]. Each game a player engages in may have interactions with
other games which can affect outcomes. The basic example they give, is a situation
in which a company competes in two different markets with two different opponents
(i.e. in market Y, Company A competes with Company B and in market Z, Company
A competes with Company C). A similar real life conflict would be a global company
deciding whether to invest in a specific country’s market knowing they will be face
completion from the country’s local established vendor. They integrate different
games in order to capture the interactions, which is realistic of real-life situations, and
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an example is given using the hypergame methodology, in order to model hypergames
that are mutually interactive and increase perception ability of players.
3.3.7 Fuzzy Logic.
Song et al. [338] [337] present a novel method that uses fuzzy logic to obtain
the outcome preference in first-level hypergame models. A fuzzy aggregate algorithm
is applied to get the group fuzzy perception of the opponents ’ outcome preference.
The preference sets are then obtained by solving linear programming models. The
authors obtain the crisp perception for the opponents’ outcome preference by using
a defuzzification function and the Newton-Cotes numerical integration formula. The
authors then use the concept of consensus winner to determine the preference vectors
in the hypergame models. In [339], artificial neural networks (ANNs) are trained to
learn the criteria for comparing fuzzy outcome preference numbers.
Yong et al. [291] use fuzzy pattern recognition to establish a nonlinear
programming model. This model is used to integrate different outcome preferences
for opponents perceived by different experts. Each expert perceives the outcome of
the game and this information is processed using fuzzy pattern recognition to obtain
a standard outcome.
Zeng et al. [371] develop an integration model for hypergames with fuzzy
preference perceptions. In conflicts, players cannot perceive information about the
opponent’s game clearly, so an integration model of multiple perceived fuzzy games,
using hypergames is developed. Each player has fuzzy preference perceptions. The
authors use linguistic values for the outcome preferences over the outcome space,
which are represented as triangular fuzzy numbers. Hypergames with fuzzy preference
perceptions are demonstrated with a military example about two country’s Navys.
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3.3.8 Bayesian Games.
Yasuo Sasaki and Kyoichi Kijima compare Bayesian games with Hypergame
games [313]. A detailed analysis of their work appears in Appendix D. The discussion
includes what was accomplished in their research, how the claim that Hypergames
can be reformulated in terms of Bayesian games is stronger than the method they
actually propose, and covers the uniquness of hypergame as proposed by P.G. Bennett
[34] and later refined by Russell Vane [356].
3.3.9 Multi-agent Environments.
Chaib-draa [68] use hypergames to analyze differences in perceptions in multi-
agent environments. They show how multi-agents can interact using a third party,
while having different views and perceptions of the game. The third party is used to
observe the exact perceptions of the players from an external context. The players
can then choose to trust the external observation and update their perceptions of
the game (with assurance from the third party of correct perception). If one of the
players deviates from the agreed upon outcome, the third party informs the other
player. Overall, the third party is used to enforce perceptions between players or to
create misperceptions between players. For example, the third party could be used
to have nested perceptions in different hypergame levels.
3.3.10 Combining Approaches.
Huxham and Bennett [177] explore combining hypergames with cognitive
mapping, since both deal with the subjective world of decision-makers. They started
with the idea that maps could be built up, then the players, preferences, and outcomes
could be extracted. The authors determined this process was not straightforward.
They then structure the problem in hypergame form then used piecemeal maps
to explore certain outcomes. The relationship between hypergames and cognitive
mapping is explored theoretically by Bryant [59].
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Bennett and Cropper [33] examine combining hypergames with Strategic Choice
to provide an effective method for modeling decision problems. Strategic Choice
deals with uncertainty [113], where a participant moves between the activities of:
problem-shaping, generating alternatives, comparing solutions, and finally choosing
how to act. While hypergames and Strategic Choice often deal with uncertainty,
both offer different perspectives. In Strategic Choice, the emphasis is on the need to
coordination between parties, where in hypergames the emphasis is on communication
as a means to makes threats, bluffs, or deception [33].
Putro et al. [290] [289] [288] combine hypergames with genetic algorithms to
produce adaptive learning procedures. The genetic algorithm is used to choose
nature’s strategies in order to improve perceptions. They present three learning
methods where each method varies a part of the genetic algorithm (such as fitness
evaluation, modified crossover, action choice). The authors present two experiments
that analyze the effect of uncertainty and crossover rates on the outcome of the
learning procedures.
Kanazawa et al. [191] [190] [192] study hypergames and evolutionary game
theory. They use hypergames to add perceptions to evolutionary game theory,
which result in evolutionary hypergames. Interpretation functions, which specifies
the relationship between the player’s strategies and those of their opponent(s),
from hypergames are introduced into evolutionary games. These interpretation
functions are then used to create the replicator dynamics for the evolutionary game,
which describe the selection process for the distribution of the strategies in a given
population. This process is demonstrated using the original application by Bennett
to Soccer Hooliganism [190].
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3.3.11 LG Hypergames.
While not directly related to hypergame theory as envisioned by P.G. Bennett,
LG Hypergames have a similar goal: to “account for drastic mutual influence of
multiple subgames” and are applied to abstract board games (ASB) [341] Linguistic
Geometry (LG) hypergame was first demonstrated in [341], where it was used to
infer the direct and indirect effects. Each ASB is dynamically linked together by
interlinking maps, a concept similar to hyperlinks in an HTML document [342]. A
detailed application of LG hypergames is given in [363].
3.3.12 Conway Games and Hypergames.
Honsell and Lenisa study Conway games, forming a “hypergame” from basic
Conway games [173]. A Conway game is a combinatorial game with 2-players, no
chance, a set of positions for both players, and perfect information [78]. These games
represent board games such as Nim or Go. Games where both players have the same
set of moves (Nim) are called impartial and games where players have different sets
of moves (i.e. Go) are called partizan [173]. In this case the term hypergame refers
to a non-wellfounded game or a game that do not terminate. The term is not used
in the same way as this research.
3.4 Hypergame Analysis Software
Hypergame analysis is possible by hand but not recommended; it is a tedious
process which is better accomplished by software using the computational power
of modern computers. Hypergame analysis requires calculation of utility from
mathematical functions, multiple runs of game models with different strategy selection
such as static or random, as well as update model variables and player belief contexts
between each game iteration. The ability of software to fit these requirements are
discuss as different tools are explored for hypergame analysis.
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3.4.1 Statistical Software Packages.
Microsoft Excel, MiniTab, and other statistical software packages are able to
model hypergames and can easily calculate utility functions from mathematical
equations as shown at the IEEE/WINFORMS Joint Program for Capital Science
[267]. The main disadvantage is these programs have the inability to run multiple
game iterations and update variables between iterations. Mathematical software, such
as Matlab or Mathematica, can calculate the utility functions from mathematical
equations and run multiple game iterations and update variables as well as player
beliefs between iterations, but this software is not specialized for hypergame analysis.
This means for each game model the entire model has to be built from scratch; there
is no standardization of hypergames between researchers.
3.4.2 Gambit.
Gambit is software designed for analyzing finite, non-cooperative games using
the strategic form [239]. Players and strategies can be added using the Gambit
interface to quickly create a game for analysis. It has the ability to exchange game
model to external tools, creating a standard for game theory model data. The main
disadvantage of this software is lack of support for the complex hypergame model;
there is no way in the Gambit interface to enter different games based on each player’s
perceptions or to use mathematical equations to calculate utility values during game
analysis.
3.4.3 HYPANT.
A software tool specifically designed for hypergame analysis, called HYPANT,
was written by Lachlan Brumley [58]. It uses a standard notation, referred to as
a language, to represent hypergame models called Hypergame Markup Language
(HML). The HML allows the hypergame model data to be saved, restored, and
transported, as well as supported subgames based on the player’s perceptions. The
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disadvantages to HYPANT are the lack of support for functional utility values, it only
supports the stability and unilateral improvement values used by Frasier and Hipel
in their analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis [106].
3.4.4 SPA.
Another hypergame analysis program based on Vane’s HNF theory is called
Security Policy Assistant (SPA). SPA was created to assist in deciding if classified
documents are released or withheld from foreign disclosure [183]. While the software
manual was available, the software is not given its sensitive nature in decision making
with classified information. This software supports the application of hypergame
theory beyond the previous applications of military, sports, and business conflicts,
given this software’s ability to assist in decision making about classified documents.
3.4.5 HAT.
The lack of suitable software meeting all the requirements for hypergame analysis
caused Alan Gibson to create the HNF Analysis Tool (HAT) software [135]. HAT
is written in Java and supports using the Extensible Markup Language (XML) to
input and save game design. XML is an improvement over the HML language used
by HYPANT because XML is widely supported, has many tools to create, read, and
verify, as well it is not proprietary like HML.
Once a game in XML is loaded, HAT allows multiple game iterations to be run,
supporting static or random strategy selection. It also allows variables and belief
contexts to be updated between hypergame iterations. Given the availability of the
HAT software and its ability to handle hypergames using HNF concepts developed
by Vane [356], this software is used and updated throughout this research effort. The
HAT software is shown in Figure 3.14 with a game loaded.
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Figure 3.14: HNF Analysis Tool (HAT) Software.
3.4.5.1 Nash Equilibriums.
The HAT software uses the Lemke-Howson algorithm to calculate Nash
equilibriums which is appropriate for non-zero sum bimatrix games [218]. This
algorithm is not guaranteed to find all Nash equilibriums but will find at least one
as proven by Nash’s Existence Theorem [252]. This Nash Equilibrium is then used
as the initial belief context. Additional belief contexts are used for the creation of
hyperstrategies.
3.4.5.2 Belief Contexts.
Belief contexts consist of row’s belief that column will choose the specific context
and the percentages of each strategy column can choose from. Each belief context
forms a subgame where column strategies with a percentage use of zero are removed.
Subgames are determined using the supplied belief contexts in the XML game file
and by removing all strategies labeled as hidden. This allows hyperstrategies to be
created by examining the subgames from the hypergame analysis.
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The HAT software generates the hyperstrategies as the Modeling Opponent
(MO), Pick Subgame (PS), and Weighted Subgame (WS). These subgames are not
actually hyperstratgies, but are included by the software for a complete model.
3.4.5.3 Utility.
The Expected Utility (EU), worst case utility (G), and Hypergame Expected
Utility(HEU) are calculated for each hyperstrategy. The EU is calculated by
multiplication of utility values with row’s strategy selection percentage, as well as
the aggregate of column strategy selection in CΣ. The final EU value is calculated
by adding each strategy utility together. The G value is calculated using the worst
case outcome, where the lowest utility available to row’s strategies is multiplied by
the strategy’s percentage use. The HEU is calculated as follows:
HEU(hs) = EU(hs)− (EU(hs)−G(hs)) ∗ g
The fear-of-being-outguessed, g, is used to calculate the HEU of each
hyperstrategy. The HAT software allows the g value to be fixed (predetermined) or
changed between executions so each game can have differing HEU values. Different
HEU values can lead to different hyperstrategy choices.
3.4.5.4 Game Execution.
Each hypergame can be executed, which consists of selecting player strategies
and calculation of utility values. The strategies for the column player are selected by
a usage value or usage file. Usage values are in the XML game file as percentages
assigned to each column strategy. The percentages are then used to choose a column
strategy stochastically. If a usage file is used, then the file contains a list of strategy
names and the strategies are chosen in order. The strategy for the row player
is determined by selection of a hyperstrategy. The strategy is selected from the
hyperstrategy with the highest HEU value and a random number. Based on the
strategy selected by row and column results in the utility each player receives in the
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game outcome. The results of the execute game can be exported to a file in comma
separated value (CSV) format for manipulation by external software.
3.4.5.5 Update Modes.
The HAT software supports for update modes for game execution. The variables,
g value, and belief context can be updated. The fourth mode is where all are updated.
Variables are updated using a supplied algorithm which can be affected by strategy
choices. This allows costs for certain actions to change over time. The update
algorithms are contained in the XML file variable node. The g value is updated by
determining if the player was able to obtain the expected utility for that particular
game iteration. If the expected utility is reached then the g value decreases, otherwise
it increases. The values to increase or decrease by are settable within the XML file.
The initial belief context are based on utility values, which are affected by the variable
changes. If the game changes, then it is expected the player’s belief about how the
game is being played will change. The belief context will be updated whenever the
utility values are changed in the software.
3.5 Summary
This chapter describes the foundational model for hypergames, as well as provides
applications of hypergames that indicate its ability to model complex conflicts with
imperfect information. The foundation provided in this chapter is built upon in the
following chapters as hypergame theory is extended with temporal logic. The next
chapter provides an overview of temporal logic, which is used in this research to
extend the hypergame model.
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Table 3.3: Listing of Hypergame Applications, Chronological.
1st Author and Citation Year Category
Giesen [136] 1978 Business
Bennett [39, 40] 1979 Military conflicts
Giesen [137] 1979 Business
Wright [369], Shupe [328] 1980 Military conflicts
Bennett [42] 1980 Sports
Fraser [109, 110] 1980 Business
Bennett [35] 1980 Business
Bennett [44] 1981 Business
Fraser [111] 1981 Business
Said [308] 1982 Military conflicts
Bennett [41] 1982 Military conflicts
Fraser [105, 107] 1983 Military conflicts
Stokes [343] 1983 Military conflicts
Okada [266] 1985 Resource allocation
Hipel [167] 1988 Military conflicts
Graham [144] 1992 Business
Vane [355] 1999 Cyber
Vane [356] 2000 Cyber
Leclerc [217] 2002 Business
Kopp [198] 2002 Cyber
Hamandawana [156] 2007 Resource allocation
Novani [260] 2010 Business
House [174] 2010 Cyber
Gibson [135] 2013 Cyber
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Table 3.4: Variants of Game Theory and applicability to Cyber Adversarial
Applications
Maturity Applicability, Robustness Preliminary
Realism Results
Games with Complete high low low low
Information
Games with Incomplete high high medium medium
or Imperfect State
Information
Games with Incomplete high medium medium low
or Imperfect Objective
Information
Adaptation, Evolution, medium high medium medium
Learning in Games
Hypergame Theory medium high high high
Behaviorial Models medium high medium medium
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IV. Temporal Preliminaries
This chapter presents the background and related work for temporal logic, logical
reasoning, and belief revision. First, background information on the foundation of
temporal logic is given. Then logical reasoning, such as deductive, inductive, and
abductive reasoning is discussed. Finally, a brief overview of belief revision is given
with application to game theory.
4.1 Temporal Logic
Until now, past research using hypergame theory has not considered time as an
integral part of the hypergame model, this research uses temporal logic to represent
the changes to the hypergame model as player perceptions change over time. The
only known research to use iterations with hypergame theory was in the analysis of
the Falkland/Malvinas conflict [167]. Here the authors picked three distinct points
in time and created three individual hypergames to model the conflict.
Temporal logic provides a method and notation to impose constraints on a time
based model. By using temporal logic to constrain the hypergame model, time is
able to be incorporated leading to more accurate modeling of real life conflicts. Real
life does not happen in distinct iterations, instead events play out over time with
information and beliefs being updated overtime.
4.1.1 Temporal Logic History.
Modal logic is based on the notion of necessity and possibility. Introductory
writing on modal logic can be found in Hughes and Cresswell [176] and Chellas [71].
It was developed by philosophers to understand the different modes of truth. It
flourished during Medieval times when it was used for theological argumentation
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[229]. Widely accepted semantics for modal and temporal logic were developed by
Kripke [206].
On one hand, temporal logic is believed to have evolved from modal logic, through
the process of interpreting the modal operators in the context of time-dependency.
Alternatively, the logic can be specialized with time modalities. Rescher and Urquhart
[300] and Goldblatt [139] study this view in detail.
Logical analysis of natural languages provide additional motivation for the study
of temporal logic This view evolves temporal logic form the formalization of linguistic
conventions where tenses are modeled using formal calculus. The seminal paper on
this view was published by McTaggart [240]. Prior further applies this approach in
[287], along with Kamp [189], Gabbay [117], and van Benthem [45].
Pnueli [283], Goldblatt [139], and Emerson [94] provide general surveys on
temporal logic uses in Computer Science, while Fisher et al. [102] presents a survey
on temporal reasoning in Artificial Intelligence.
4.1.2 Types.
Temporal Logic Temporal Logic (TL) for reasoning about concurrent programs
can be divided into different types: propositional versus first-order, global versus
compositional, branching versus linear, points versus intervals, and past versus future
tense. The various types are discussed in more detail below.
4.1.2.1 Propositional versus First-order.
Propositional TL is based on non-temporal classical propositional logic. The
proposition is built by a formula of atomic propositions, which are used to express
atomic facts about the concurrent system state, truth-functional connectives, such
as ∧, ∨, ¬ (and, or, and not), as well as temporal operators. Wolper [367]
presented an extension to propositional temporal logic with right-linear grammar
operators, showing the resulting system leads to greater expressive power. Banieqbal
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and Barringer [24] show Wolper’s proof is complete with some modifications. An
alternative is propose by Wolper et al. [367] where finite automata are used on
infinite words.
Atomic propositions are refined into expressions, created from variables,
constants, functions, predicates, and quantifiers. These expressions are referred to
as First-order TL. There are many sub types of First-order TL: uninterpreted,
interpreted, fully interpreted, and partially interpreted. In uninterpreted First-order
TL, no assumptions are considered about the special properties of the structures,
while interpreted TL makes assumptions about a specific structure. In fully
interpreted First-order TL, each variable has a specific domain and each function
symbol has a concrete function over the domain. On the other hand, when a specific
domain is assumed but the function symbols are uninterpreted, this is called partially
interpreted First-order TL. TL as distinguished between local and global variables.
Local variables are assigned values in different states, where the value can differ
between states. Global variables are assigned a single value, which holds over all
states of the system.
Syntactic restrictions can be imposed on the interaction of temporal operators
and quantifiers. In unrestricted syntax, temporal operators appear in the scope of
the quantifiers and are normally undecidable. Restricted First-order TL does not
allow temporal operators to appear in the scope of the quantifiers. This results in a
propositional TL and a first-order language for stating atomic propositions.
4.1.2.2 Global versus Compositional.
Endogenous TL interprets all temporal operators corresponding to a single
concurrent program, in a single universe. Exogenous TL allows the temporal operators
to express the correctness properties related to program fragments or different
programs within the same formula. This allows compositional reasoning, where
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the whole program is verified by specifying and verifying each of the subprograms,
then combining each subprogram to obtain the proof of correctness for the complete
program. In this case, each sub game proof is used as a lemma.
4.1.2.3 Branching versus Linear Time.
Two possible views of the nature of time exist when defining a temporal logic
system. If at any given moment there is only one possible future moment, time is
linear. If at any given moment there are alternate courses leading to different possible
future moments, time is branching. Linear time logic is used to describe events over a
single time line, while branching time logic allows quantification over possible futures.
These views have been used to reason about programs in [213] [96] [282].
4.1.2.4 Points versus Intervals.
Most program reasoning use temporal operators that evaluate to true or false
at a certain point in time. Temporal operators can also be evaluated over intervals
of time. Intervals of time have been used by [317] [247] [155], and are claimed to
simplify the creation of specific correctness properties.
4.1.2.5 Discrete versus Continuous.
Time is discrete if the present moment corresponds to a program’s current state
and the next future moment corresponds to the program’s next successor state. Time
progresses in discrete units using nonnegative integer values. Discrete time has been
applied to real-time system in Koymans et al. [203], Ostroff [271], Alur and Henzinger
[17] [18], Harel et al. [158], and Henzinger et al [163]. Time is continuous if the
current state of the program and the successor state are continuous, for example over
the reals or rationals instead of only at distinct values. Burgess [60] offer a proof for
temporal logic over continuous time domain, and Burgess and Gurevich [61] analyze
the decidability of the satisfiability problem. Barringer et al. [29], Koymans and de
101
Roever [202], and Alur et al. [16] apply continuous-time temporal logic to real-time
systems.
4.1.2.6 Past versus Future.
Classical temporal logic defined by Kamp [189] includes both past and future
operators. The future tense operators are used to describe what may happen to
future system states, while past operators allow the system to take into account what
happen in the past. Past tense operators are similar to history variables and allow
for compositional specification. Gabbay et al. [121] claim the expressive power is
not reduced by restricting the logic to only future operators. On the other hand,
Lichtenstein et al. [222] and Pnueli [283] show that the past operators lead to more
uniform classification of program properties.
4.1.3 Common Language.
4.1.3.1 Model.
The general model for point-based temporal logic is (S, R, π), where S is the set
of time points, π maps each point to true propositions at the given point in time, and
R is an earlier-later relation between the points in S [103]. In discrete temporal logic,
the accessibility relation, R, can be replaced by a relation between adjacent points, N.
This forms the next-time relation, which is applied over the set of all discrete moments
in S. Therefore, for all s1 and s2 in S, N(s1, s2) is true if s2 is the nextdiscrete time
moment after s1.
For non-discrete models, such as the reals, R, there is no clear idea of the next
point in time. If a temporal relation, R, is based on R then if the two time points
are related, there is always another time point between the points, since R is dense
[103]:
∀i ∈ S,∀k ∈ S.R(i, k)⇒ [∃j ∈ S,R(i, j) ∧R(j, k)]
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The next point in time does not make sense in this context, so logic based on
dense models use operators relating to intervals. These require interval-like operators,
which refer to a particular subsequence of points.
4.1.3.2 Representation.
In temporal logic, temporal operators are used to reason about how truth values
vary with time. Two temporal operators are sometimes P which is true now if in the
future there is a time moment at which P becomes true and always Q which is true
now if Q is always true at all future time moments.
ϕ - ϕ is always true in the future
^ϕ - ϕ is true at some time in the future
There exists temporal aspects that cannot be represented using  and ^ [189]
[51] [367]. Kamp [189] and Burgess [60] introduced the until operator, : U , and the
unless operator, W , from tense logic:
ϕUψ - there exists a moment when ψ is true and ϕ will continuously be true
from now until this moment
ϕWψ - ϕ will continuously be true from now on unless ψ occurs, at which time
ϕ will cease
The unless operator is often referred to as a weak until, because of the connective
similarities. In most situations this is fine, since sometime and always can be defined
using the until operator. The next time operator, O, is added as a convenience in
discrete models of time.
Oϕ - ϕ is true at the next moment in time
Using the next-time relation, in the discrete case, example semantics can be given
over model M = ‹S, N, π›:
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‹M, s›|= Oϕ iff, ∀ t ∈ S, if N(s,t) then ‹M,t›|= ϕ
In some cases it is possible to define the Ooperator directly using the U operator
[95].
Past-time connectives, such as since, were originally incorporated in tense logics
[189] [60]. These connectives were originally not used by temporal logics in Computer
Science, but have been added for convenience [28] [222]. If both past and future
operators are required in a temporal model, are a matter of discussion [216]. Therefore
there are past-time counterparts of , ^, etc., such as the previous operator, l, the
past-time dual of the next operator.
l ϕ - ϕ is true at the previous moment in time
A more general definition, dependent only on the discreteness of the model, shows
the interaction between the two operators. The next-time relation is used and l is
defined over model M = ‹S, N, π›:
‹M, s›|= Oϕ iff, ∀ t ∈ S, if N(s,t) then ‹M,t›|= ϕ
‹M, t›|= lϕ iff, ∀ s ∈ S, if N(s,t) then ‹M,s›|= ϕ
The duality between l and Ois seen with lfalse (or Ofalse). lfalse can only
be satisfied in a temporal model at the first or last moments. Using the previous
definition the only way lfalse is satisfied is if there are no previous moments in time.
For example, given the axiom:
ϕ ↔ lOϕ
The state, s, is either disallowed by the axiom, or if the state is allowed then
it cannot be distinguished from the current state in any temporal formula. The
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interactions of the until and since or the sometime future and sometime past are
explored in [123] [349] [303].
For example, in Computer Science and Artificial intelligence, first-order logic
statements are used in temporal modeling. This treats one of the arguments to each
of the predicates as a time parameter and is called the temporal arguments approach.
Given that each statement is to be evaluated at the moment in time i, the following
formulas can be represented in classical logic [103]:
p ∧ Oq −→ p(i) ∧ q(i+1)
 r −→ ∃ j, j ≥ i ∧ r(j)
 s −→ ∀ k, k ≥ i → s(k)
The until and since, as well as sometime in the future and sometime in the past
are useful for linear models, not only discrete models [189]. These operators describe
temporal properties in dense, non-discrete models. Until and since have been used
to change arbitrary formulas into normal form, this allows past-time to be separated
from future-time [27] [101] [118] [170]. While sometime in the future, F, and sometime
in the past, P, have been used in non-discrete logics based on R [122] [123] [119].
In [29] and [194] until is the basic temporal operator and the temporal model
is based on R. This allows only the future moments in time to be considered.
The authors had trouble with the model over R, so they introduced the additional
constraint of finite variability. In finite variability, a property’s value is allowed to
only change a finite number of times, between two points in time. This prohibits the
property from varying between true and false infinitely over a fixed, finite period of
time. Finite variability is also used in [83] [126].
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4.1.3.3 Interval Temporal Representations.
Two different approaches exist for interval temporal representations. Allen
developed interval algebra for Artificial Intelligence, while Moszkowski et al.
developed interval temporal logic for Computer Science. Thses two approaches are
discussed below.
Allen Interval Algebra is referred to as the reification approach. In this approach,
predicates like holds and occurs are applied to properties and moments in time and
each property will either hold or occur. Allen used binary relations for intervals to
describe the relationships of intervals [12] [13]. For example, for interval Ik where k
is an specific time period:
IA overlaps IB is true if the intervals IA and IB overlap
IA during IB is true if the interval IA is contained completely in the interval IB
IA before IB is true if the interval IA occurs before IB
Allen Interval Algebra was further formalized and analyzed in [224], [223], [212],
[211], [154], [14]. The algebraic properties are explored in [169] [168]. Allen’s initial
binary relations have been extended in [147] and associated with computational
problems in [89]. There are also other publications on reified approaches, such as
McDermoott’s logic of plans [238], Situation Calculus [298] [225], and the Event
Calculus [201]. Detailed surveys on reified approaches can be found in [227], [125],
[25], and [296].
Moszkowski et al. [153] [245] developed interval logic that was directly related to
the discrete propositional temporal logic [120]. Moszkowski et al. originally developed
their logic to model digital circuits and called it ITL.Formulas in ITL are interpreted
in sub-sequences (σb, . . ., σe) instead of at a specific point in the model σ. This means
the propositions are only evaluated at the start of the interval. Given proposition P:
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‹σb, . . ., σe ›|= P iff, P ∈ σb
With this definition, the definitions of sometimes and next time are as follows:
‹σb, . . ., σe ›|=  ϕ iff, ∀ i, if b ≤ i ≤ e then ‹σb, . . ., σe ›|= ϕ
‹σb, . . ., σe ›|= Oϕ iff, e >b and ‹σb, . . ., σe ›|= ϕ
ITL uses the chop operator, ;, to fuse time intervals together [305] [359] with the
basic temporal operators:
‹σb, . . ., σe ›|= ϕ; ψ iff, ∃ i such that b ≤ i ≤ e where both ‹σb, . . ., σe ›|= ϕ
and ‹σb, . . ., σe ›|= ψ
The chop operator is problematic because it guarantees a high complexity logic
[103]. It is highly useful because it allows the splitting of intervals on their properties.
For example, if there is a sub-interval where true is satisfied which is immediately
followed by a sub-interval where ϕ is satisfied:
 ϕ ≡ true; ϕ
Further examples of formulas in ITL are given with explanations [103]:
• p persists through the current interval
 p
• Definition of steps within an interval
up ∧ Odown ∧ OOup ∧ OOOdown
• Sequences of intervals can be constructed
 January; OFebruary; OMarch; . . . .
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• p has a period of being false which is followed by a period where it is true
¬p;Op
Granularity in ITL has been explored with the temporal projection operator [57],
[149], [150], and [246]. Halpern and Shoham have proposed HS logic over intervals
[154]. This logic captures Allen’s algebra with unary modal operators and uses binary
operators to capture the chop operator from ITL [141].
There are several extensions to the interval approaches already discussed. In
[124] and [75] intervals over arbitrary relations are considered, this allows spatial
and spatio-temporal logics. Spatial logic is any formal language interpreted over
geometical entities and relations [5], while spatio-temporal logic is a combination of
spatial logic and temporal logic. Duration calculi [373] [70] on been used to introduce
real-time concepts into interval temporal logics. An extension to interval temporal
logic that allows endpoints to be moved called compass logic is explored in [233].
4.1.3.4 Quantification.
Propositional temporal logic has been extended to allow quantification over
propositions. This allows first-order quantifier symbols, ∀ and ∃ to be used with
boolean valued variables. This is referred to logic Quantified Propositional Temporal
Logic (QPTL). For example, the following formula is allowed:
∃ p, p ∧   ¬p ∧ OOp
This form of quantification is called substitution interpretation [152] and is
defined as:
‹M, s ›|= ∃ p. ϕ iff, there exists a model M ′ such that ‹M, s ›|= ϕ and M ′
differs from M at most by the valuation given to p
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Substitution interpretation is used in QPTL and in other extensions to
PTL. Haack [152] presents a discussion on the differences between substitution
interpretation and the more common objectual interpretation of quantification:
‹M, s ›|= ∃ p. ϕ iff, there exists a proposition q ∈ PROPERTIES such that ‹M,
s ›|= ϕ (p/q)
where ϕ (p/q) is the formula ϕ with p replaced by q throught the formula
QPTL allows regular properties to be defined, and was inspired by Wolper’s work
[367] right-linear grammar operators for PTL, called ETL. These right-linear grammar
operators are restricted fixpoint operators [229]. Wolper [52] also introduced the
notion of fixpoints, extending PTL with least, µ, and greatest, , as fixpoint operators.
This allowed expression of more complex expressions:
 ϕ ≡ . ϕ ∧ Oξ
Where  ϕ is the maximal fixpoint, ξ, of the formula ξ → (ϕ ∧ Oξ). Therefore,
the maximal fixpoint results in  ϕ as the infinite formula:
ϕ ∧ Oϕ ∧ OOϕ ∧ OOOϕ ∧ OOOOϕ ∧ . . .
Related work has shown the extensions QPTL, ETL, and fixpoint are expressively
equivalent under specific circumstances [24] [332] [357] [367].
Adding objectual quantification to temporal logic allows the formula to capture
arithmetical induction, which is the basis for representing full arithmetic [2] [346]
[347]. This results in first-order temporal logic being incomplete and the formula is
not finitely axiomatisable over models such as the Natural Numbers. Hodkinson et
al. [171] presented work on monodic fragments of first-order temporal logic. They
showed that monodic fragments have complete axiomatisations and are decidable.
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A formula is monodic if the temporal subformulas have only one free variable. For
example:
Monodic Formula: ∀ x, p(x) → Oq(x)
Not Monodic: ∀ x, ∀ y, p(x,y) → Oq(x, y)
4.1.4 Summary.
Temporal logic provides a method and notation to place constraints on
hypergame models by expressing properties of dynamic systems. It does this by
allowing requirements to be stated for the model. Often these requirements have a
truth value associated with it, that may vary over time. The truth values can be used
to verify the model and ensure the model does not violate the stated constraints over
time.
It is well understand that real world conflicts are dynamic systems; the conflict
is constantly changing and developing over time. This requires a standard method
to express the properties of complex conflicts. Temporal logic provides the necessary
structure and notation to express the properties of complex conflicts and can be used
with hypergame models.
4.2 Reasoning
”Reasoning is the process of using existing knowledge to draw conclusions, make
predictions, or construct explanations.” [93] During a conflict is necessary for players
to reasoning about the information they have and their beliefs. In a hypergame
model the row player is reasoning not only about the strategy to use, but also what
strategy the column player may select. In a hypergame model that is repeated over
time, reasoning also helps players update their information and beliefs based on what
it appears the opponent did previously. There are three methods of reasoning that
may be used in hypergame analysis: deductive reasoning where the conclusion is
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guaranteed, inductive reasoning where the conclusion is only likely, and abductive
reasoning where the conclusion is a best guess.
4.2.1 Deductive Reasoning.
Deductive reasoning starts with a general statement or statements, then reasons
to reach a guaranteed logical conclusion. In deductive reasoning general statements
are called premises. If the premises are true then the conclusion is also true. For
example mathematics is a deductive system:
if x = 2, 0
and if y = 5
then 3x + 2y = 16
Deductive reasoning can also be expressed in ordinary language, which is called
a syllogism (such as an If, Then, Else statement from first order logic):
If entropy in a system increases unless energy is expended
And if my bedroom is a system
Then disorder increases in my bedroom until I clean it.
In the syllogism above, the first two statements are premises, and together lead to
the third statement, which is the logical conclusion. The conclusion is either sound,
true, or unsound, false, which depends on the truth of the original premises. The
deductive inference can be either valid or invalid, without regard to the truth or
falsity of the original premises. The deductive inference may be valid even when the
original premise(s) were false. This means the syllogism results in a false conclusion
because one or more premise(s) where false, but the syllogism is still valid since it is
logical - the conclusion logically follows from the stated premises.
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If premises are sound, then deductive reasoning leads to specific logical
conclusions. Deductive reasoning is nonampliative, therefore it cannot increase human
knowledge. Conclusions are reached by reducing the premises to tautologies, this
allows observations to be made and implications to be expanded, but deductive
reasoning cannot be used to predict future or non-observed events.
4.2.2 Inductive Reasoning.
Inductive Reasoning starts with specific observations with limited scope, then
reasons to reach a generalized conclusion which is likely, but not guaranteed or certain,
based on the observations. Most scientific research uses inductive reasoning where
evidence is gathered, patterns are identified and a hypothesis or theory is formed to
explain the observations [76].
Conclusions based on inductive reasoning are not logical necessities. The
evidence does not guarantee the conclusion, since there is no way to know all
the possible evidence has been collected and any new evidence may invalidate the
hypothesis or theory. Therefore inductive reasoning is probabilistic, with some
probability the conclusion is true, given the premises. For example,
Of the life forms known today, 100% depend on liquid water.
Therefore, any newly discovered life form will probably have some dependence
on liquid water.
The above argument can be made every time a life form is discovered and may
be correct every time in the past. The truth of the argument in the past does not
mean in the future it is impossible to discover life not dependent on water; it only
refers to the truth of the argument over the known evidence.
Inductive arguments are not just true or false, since they are not logical
necessities. Instead arguments based on induction are cogent (strong) or not cogent
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(weak). Cogent is when the evidence is complete and relevant, so one is convinced
that the conclusion is probably true. Cogent describes how probable the reached
conclusion is true.
Inductive reasoning is ampliative, therefore it can increase human knowledge.
Since the conclusions are not guaranteed, it can be used to predict future or non-
observed events.
4.2.3 Abductive Reasoning.
Abductive reasoning normally begins with an incomplete set of observations,
then reasons to reach the likeliest possible conclusion for the set [143]. Charles
Sanders Peirce first referred to abduction as ”guessing” [279]. He also stated that
to abduct a hypothetical conclusion, α, from an surprising observation, β, requires
α to be sufficient (or nearly sufficient), but not necessary for β [277]. It is used in
daily decision-making processes that make the best use of the information at hand,
which is often incomplete. Often abduction results in success that exceeds random
luck, Peirce thought that ”man have a natural bent in accordance with nature’s”
which allows man to understand nature through a process called instincts [278]. The
following example was offered by Peirce for abduction:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
The hypothesis is present in a premise, but its truth not asserted. Then in the
conclusion the hypothesis is asserted as rationally likely.
A network administrator trying to recover from a cyber attack is an example
of abductive reasoning. Based on a set of symptoms in the network (missing data,
unauthorized access, etc.), the administrator must decide what causes explain most of
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the symptoms. This is necessary so the problem can be fixed and avoided in the future.
Simply stopping the attack and not fixing the cause does not give a healthier network
protected from cyber attacks. Cogent inductive reasoning requires fairly complete
evidence, while abductive reasoning is defined by a lack of completeness, where either
the evidence, explanation, or both are incomplete. When trying to recover from a
cyber attack, system logs may be unavailable to report system details as the attacker
may have deleted or corrupted the logs to hide the attacker’s intentions. Yet, the
administer still needs to reach the best causes (thus the best fixes or mitigations) or
conclusion based on the incomplete set of network symptoms.
Abductive reasoning can be creative, intuitive, or revolutionary. Peirce stated
that abduction in regards to complicated phenomenon lays the ”plank of its advance”
using plausible, instinctive reason [278]. Abductive reasoning is weak when a fact is
used to reason to a potential explanation out of many possible explanations. Strong
abductive reasoning is when a fact is used to reason to the best explanation.
Abductive logic is often said to be ignorance-preserving. When knowledge is
missing the first response is to acquire new knowledge to reach a solution to the
problem and perform some action. The second is to abandon the problem and leave
it unsolved while taking no action. The third is abduction, where the problem is
unsolved, but the result is still the rationale for some action. This is seen in the area
of common law: ”When jurors find an accused guilty of the offence with which he
has been charges, they do not know whether in fact the offence was committed by
him”[368]. While abduction fails to fully answer the ignorance problem, it provides
rationale for selecting specific actions [11]. This shows how humans respond to the
lack of information; in the case of law, the accused is found guilty and convicted.
The strength of abductive arguments can be increased by following the Surprise
Principle and avoiding the Only Game in Town Fallacy [214]. The Surprise Principle
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states [336] that for some observation θ, it strongly favors one hypothesis (H1) over
another (H2) if the following are true:
• If H1 were true, θ is expected to be true.
• If H2 were true, θ is expected to be false.
The ”Only Game in Town” Fallacy happens when there is one explanation
available for a series of surprising events and the reasoning wrongly assumes this
only explanation has to be accepted [214]. Lane presents the following example of
the ”Only Game in Town”:
Hundreds of Americans have reported they have been abducted by space aliens.
The only currently available explanation of this fact is they really have been
abducted by space aliens.
Therefore, hundreds of Americans really have been abducted by space aliens.
Lane claims this abductive argument is not strong. Just because there is only
one explanation, does not mean the reasoning requires it to be believed. Instead the
explanation may be too radical, instead it is possible there is an explanation and it
is unknown.
Abduction has been presented as an epistemic process for belief revision [10]
• anomalous (or novel) experience results in surprising phenomenon.
• a state of doubt interrupts the belief habit and triggers abductive reasoning
• goal is to explain the surprising phenomenon and soothe the state of doubt
• doubt is soothed rather than removed because in abduction the hypothesis needs
to be tested and proven viable before being converted into a belief
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According to Woods, ”not only does abduction not secure us knowledge, it does
not warrant belief” [368]. Abduction only gives a reason to suspect a hypothesis is
true, it does not guarantee the hypothesis is true. In the example of common law, all
the evidence has already been presented to the jury and there is no way to conduct
further testing of hypotheses.
4.3 Belief Revision
Generally beliefs in game theory are represented by a probability distribution
over a set of state and Bayes’ rule is used to model belief revision. Belief revision is
the main building block for two game theoretic solution concepts: perfect Bayesian
equilibrium [31] [53] [114] and sequential equilibrium [204].
In perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium, a player updates his
beliefs during a game using Bayes’ rule. The information is represented as a set of
nodes in the information set. If during the game an information set is reached which
has zero prior probability, then the beliefs are formed arbitrarily. From this point
forward these new beliefs must be used with Bayes’ rule, unless new information is
received that is conflicting with the revised beliefs.
Alchourron et al. [7] pioneered belief revision in computer science. Known as
AGM theory, it has been widely studied. Gardenfors provides a detailed overview
[127]. In AGM theory beliefs are modeled as belief sets, or sets of formulas.
Information is represented as a formula and belief revision is modeled as an operation,
transforming a belief set into a new belief set that is updated based on the new
information. For more information on belief revision with AGM see [255].
According to Bonanno [22], ”the tools of modal logic have not been explicitly
employed in the analysis of the interaction of belief and information over time.” He
therefore presents a simple modal logic for iterated belief revision, extending his
previous work [54]. For example, based on a patient’s symptoms a doctor concludes
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the patient is suffering from one of the following: viral infection (V), bacterial
Infection (B), medication allergy (M), or food allergy (F). Kripke structures [205]
are used to represent the set of states, i.e. Ω = B, V, M, F. At every time t the
doctor’s beliefs are represented as a binary relation Bt on Ω. Given some state ω ∈
Ω let Bt(ω) = ω′ ∈ Ω : ω Bt ω′, then Bt(ω) is the set of states at time period t, that
is considered possible when the true state is ω.
From the doctor example above, given the true state is F, the evolution of the
doctor’s belief may be: B0(F ) = B, V, B1(F ) = V, B2(F ) = M, and B3(F ) = F. Beliefs
are updated through the receipt of new information. Information is represented as a
sequence of binary relations It, for every time t. Therefore, It represents an individual
learning φ at time t. The state ω is then set ω |= Itφ if and only if the following two
conditions hold:
• For every ω′ such that ωItω′, ω′ |= φ
• For every ω′ ∈ Ω, if ω′ |= φ then ωItω′
These conditions mean that at state ω, Itφ is true if the states reachable from
ω using the relation It coincides with the truth set of φ: It(ω) = {φ{. The beliefs at
time t+1 are the results of the interaction between beliefs at time t and information
received at t+1.
4.4 Game Theory and Iteration
There are a few models in game theory that consider time as an element. These
include repeated games [230, 231, 242], evolutionary game theory [91, 360], and games
with temporal logic. Each of these models handles time in a slightly different matter.
Each is discussed, with an overview given focusing on the time element of the model.
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4.4.1 Repeated Games.
In repeated games, where a base game played for some number of repetitions.
Each repetition can be considered as a time epoch where the players must consider
how their current action will impact the future actions of the other players in the game.
Some of the early work was completed by Ezio Marchi with respect to introducing
time into the minimax theorem [230, 231]. There are many models for repeated games
in the literature, but in 1989 Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir presented a general model for
repeated games [242]. This tuple model includes most other repeated game models
as special cases [248].
ΓΓ , (N,Θ, (Di, Si, ui)iεN , q, p) (4.1)
Where N is a nonempty set of players and i ∈ N is a specific player. The
possible states of nature (environment) is represented by Θ, a nonempty set. Di
denotes a set of moves for player i and Si denotes a set of signals player i may
receive, where D = Xi∈NDi and S = Xi∈NSi. The initial distribution is given by
q ∈ ∆(S × Θ), the transition function by p : D × Θ ⇒ ∆(SxΘ), and the payoff
function by ui : D ×Θ⇒ R.
An example of an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is shown in Figure 4.1.
Using the repeated game equation (Equation 4.1), the Prisoners’ Dilemma can be
described by letting N = {1,2}, Θ={0,1}, Di={fi, gi} and Si = Θ ∪ (D1 x D2). For
each player i ∈ N and d ∈ D, let ui(d, 1) be given by the payoffs listed in Figure 4.1
and let ui(d, 0) = 0. Then let q(1,1,1) = 1, p(d,d,1|d,1) = 0.99, p(0,0,0|d,1) = 0.01,
and p(0,0,0|d,0) = 1. Active play continues in state 1 and stops in state 0. The initial
distribution q(1,1,1) = 1 means with a probably 1 in the first round, both players
will receive a signal “1” and the state of nature will be 1. At each round k+1, if the
state of nature is 1, then each player receives a signal with the results of the preceding
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round. The probability of continuing is 99% given by p(d,d,1|d,1) = 0.99 and the
probability of stopping is 1% given by p(0,0,0|d,1) = 0.01.
Figure 4.1: Prisoners’ Dilemma Game Example.
4.4.2 Evolutionary Game Theory.
Another game theoretic model is from evolutionary game theory with replicator
dynamics [91, 360]. In evolutionary game theory, the population in the current
iteration competes to reproduce or survive to the next population, as shown in Figure
4.2. Each individual in the population will have variation which results in different
strategy selection. The game rules test the individual strategies in order to determine
the payoff or fitness. This payoff is then used to reproduce or replicate the individual
into the next population using replicator dynamics. This produces population (n+1),
which takes the place of the previous population and the game is replayed.
Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma defined in Figure 4.3, an application of
evolutionary game theory (EGT) follows. The game is defined using variables:
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Figure 4.2: Evolutionary Game Theory Model.
• C denotes cooperation
• D denotes defection
• R is the reward attained when all players cooperate
• L is the loser’s reward when all players defect
• P is the punishment received by the cooperator when the other player defects
• W is the reward received by the defector when the other player cooperates
• P < L < R < W
In EGT the payoff matrix for each player is A =
(
R
W
P
L
)
. In the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, there are two pure strategies, which allows a population with two groups to
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Figure 4.3: Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma.
be constructed. In the population the frequency of cooperators is x and the frequency
of defectors is 1 - x. The strategy frequency vector is then given by ~x =
(
x
1−x
)
.
The fitness of the population is then given by ~xTA~x and the fitness of the
cooperators is then (A~x). If ~x = ~x(t) then the cooperators replicator dynamics is
ẋ = x((A~x)1 − ~xTA~x). The frequency of cooperators converges to 0, leaving only
defectors in the population, the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). This means D,
defectors, is a Nash equilibrium and ESS.
4.4.3 Temporal Logic.
Propositional game logic has been used to study the game structure for algebraic
properties [274]. This was improved upon by Pauly, who developed Coalition Logic
(related to Alternating Temporal Logic) and Game logic (related to Propositional
Dynamic Logic and the modal ν-calculus) [276]. Pauly showed relationships between
games and software programs using Game Logic, as well as to describe coalitions using
Coalition Logic [276]. Other research used a dynamic epistemic language to study the
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change of information caused by the player’s actions in a game by van Ditmarsch [87],
while van Benthem used dynamic logic in order to describe games and the strategies
of the players in those games [46].
Alternating temporal logic is applied to a game where players and an environment
alternate moves, allowing quantification of the possible outcomes of the game [19].
Goranko has shown the relationship between Pauly’s Coalition Logic and alternating
temporal logic [140]. These logics focus reasoning on the existence of strategies, while
the strategies are not directly considering in reasoning.
van der Hoek et al. provide the foundation for the work of Ramanujam
and Simon. They develop logics for strategic reasoning and equilibrium concepts
[159, 172]. Ramanujam and Simon [292] present a logic for strategic reasoning and
equilibrium concepts using alternating temporal logic. The authors focus on studying
strategies by their properties. Strategies can be partial, where they are not completely
known as a function instead of atomic (similar to the work of [159, 172]). They
use partial strategy specifications, which leads to more generality in reasoning. For
example, “(partial) strategy σ ensures the (intermediate) condition α”. [292]
4.4.3.1 Game Theoretic Temporal Model.
Ramanujam and Simon present a temporal game model [292] that is divided into
discrete sections, as shown in Figure 4.4. The model consists of a game and game
arena that provide the foundational elements of the game shown in Figure 4.5. A
game defines the structure of the game and is defined as:
G , (N,Σ,Φ, {i}i∈N) (4.2)
Where N is a nonempty finite set of players and i ∈ N is a specific player. Σ is a
nonempty finite set of player actions. A game arena, Φ, defines the rules about game
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Figure 4.4: Temporal Game Model Presented by Ramanujam and Simon.
Figure 4.5: Overview of Temporal Game Model.
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progression and termination. The preference relation, i, orders the preferences of
player i over the player actions Σ. The preference relation is complete, reflexive, and
transitive [292].
A game arena defines the rules about game progression and termination and is
defined as:
Φ , (W,−→, w0,χ) (4.3)
W is a set of game positions or states. The move function, −→, defines a
set of transitions between game positions such that (WxΣ) −→ W . The initial
node of the game is given by w0. The set of successors of w ∈ W is defined as
−→w = {w′ ∈ W | w a−→ w′ for some a ∈ Σ} and the terminal node is defined as
−→w = {∅}. The function χ assigns every node w ∈ W the player whose turn it is such
that χ : W → N .
4.4.3.2 Strategy Switching in Temporal Game Model.
Paul et al. propose a method to specify a player’s rationale for switching
strategies during the course of a game [275]. The focus is on whether players will
settle on a strategy without further switching of strategies. The strategy switching
notation from [275] is as follows:
• σ1 ∪ σ2 the player can play according to the strategy σ1 or the strategy σ2
• σ1 ∩ σ2 if σ1 is defined at a history t ∈ T then the player follows σ1. Else if σ2
is defined at a history t ∈ T then the player follows σ2. If σ1 and σ2 are defined
at history t, then the moves(actions) specified by σ1 and σ2 at history t are the
same. σ1 and σ2 are said to be compatible and the ∩ operator is used to denote
compatible pairs of strategies.
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• σ1 _ σ2 the player plays the strategy σ1 and then after some time (based on
history), switches strategies and plays σ2. The position in time of the strategy
switch is unknown in advance and not fixed.
• (σ1 + σ2) allows the player to choose either strategy σ1 or σ2 at every point of
the game
• ψ?σ based on the history of game play, the player tests if the property ψ holds
and if it holds the player according to σ
4.4.3.3 Branching Time Frames.
Surowik [344] uses temporal logic of branching time first presented by A.
N. Prior[287] which leads to an indeterministic temporal logic. Modification of
the structure of time removes determinism, making the logic indeterministic [344].
Temporal logic of branching time is used to model the dynamic interactions between
players in a temporal context, given the notion of process. The author models
extensive games in temporal logic by adding a notion of agent and a notion of
prediction to the semantics [344].
Surowik starts with the notion of branching-time frames presented by Bonanno
[55]. A branching-time frame with agents (BTA-frame) is a tuple:
BTA-frame = ‹T, ≺, Rii∈N›
– T âĂŞ a set of nodes
– ≺ - a binary relation on T (precedence relation) satisfying
A1) antisymmetry: if t1 ≺ t2, then t2 ⊀ t1
A2) transitivity: if t1 ≺ t2 and t2 ≺ t3, then t1 ≺ t3
A3) left linearity: if t1 ≺ t3 and t2 ≺ t3, then t1 = t2 or t1 ≺ t2 or t2 ≺ t1
– N = {1,...,n} a finite set of agents
125
– Ri is a binary relation on T (Ri a subrelation of ≺) - if t1Rit2, then t1 ≺
t2 for any I ∈ N
The properties of antisymmetry (A1), transitivity (A2), and left linearity (A3)
contain the definition of branching time, with the left linearity property limits the
possible frames to frames where the past is unique and there are alternatives in the
future at any node[344]. The binary relation Ri allows an agent, denoted i, to make
a decision which leads to a node where the agent does not have any available actions.
The notion of prediction is added to a BTA-frame by defining the prediction
binary relation as ≺p on T, such that [344]:
B1) if t1 ≺p t2, then t1 ≺ t2 (≺p is a subrelation of ≺)
B2) t1 ≺p t2 and t2 ≺p t3, then t1 ≺p t3
B3) if t ≺ t1 for some t1, then t ≺p t2, for some t2
B4) if t1 ≺ t2, t2 ≺ t3 and t1 ≺p t3, then t1 ≺p t2 and t2 ≺p t3
The BTA-frame is then used to build a game model based on the extensive form
with perfect information. For perfect information games the following sentences are
introduced:
S1) µi = q, where i ∈ N and q ∈ Q i.e. the player’s payoff
S2) q1 ≤ q2, i.e. the payoff q1 is less than or equal to q2
Given this a BTA frame for a perfect information game can be created, denoted
T . The game modelM is based on T with an added valuation function V : s −→ 2T
with the following conditions [344]:
• if the sentence is of the form of S1, then V(S1) = T
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• if the sentence is of the form of S2, then V(S2) = {t ∈ L(T): µ(t) = q}
The game model can then be used to determine the truth of formulas that
describe properties of games. For example, the author models the game theoretic
concept of backward induction with the context of temporal logic branching time.
Samuel Reid [297] presents a similar temporal logic model for game theory. A
branching-time frame is used, but a history is added in order to be able to determine
if the formulas are satisfied. A history h ∈ H in T is a maximal linearly ordered
subset of T, where H is the set of all histories in T [297]. Articulated histories are
used to split histories into past and future time points. ReidâĂŹs definition of an
articulated history and time point instant is:
• An articulated history of a time point t ∈ T is a pair (hp(t), (hf(t)), where
(hp(t) = {tâĂŸ — tâĂŸ ¡ t} is the set of all past time points of t in all histories
containing t and hf(t) = {tâĂŸ — tâĂŸ ¡ t} is a set of future time points of t
which determines a unique history h = hp(t)
⋃ {t} ⋃ hf(t)
• A set of time points {t1, âĂę., tn} belongs to an instant I ⊆ T if ti ≮ tj and
—hp(ti)— = —hp(tj), ∀ i,j
These definitions then allow a branching-time frame, T , be a game, G. If Ψ is
a formula that denotes a tie between players, Reid gives the following definition of a
game:
• In an n-player game G, the Instant Ii is player kâĂŹs turn if k ≡ I mod n.
Furthermore, player k wins the game at a turn t in a history h if |hf (t)| = 0
and t ∈ Ii with k ≡ i âĂŞ 1 mod n and Gh,t |= ⇁ Ψ
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4.4.3.4 Other Approaches.
Agotnes et al. discuss irrevocable strategies under Alternating-time Temporal
Logic (ATL) [4]. In ATL in order to achieve a goal, an agent chooses a strategy and
then follows the strategy without considering what other agents do, which leads to
the goal always being true. Although in ATL, the strategies are revocable, where the
agent is not restricted by previous choice of strategies resulting in the state where the
goal is evaluated. Irrevocable strategies are often assumed in game theory [4]. The
authors discuss variants of ATL where the strategies are irrevocable. The aim is to
further multi-agent logic by aligning them with strategies in game theory. The two
variants are IATL (memory-less irrevocable strategies) and MIATL (memory-based
irrevocable strategies). In IATL the model is updated directly by fixing the choices of
every agent in a given state as defined by the agent’s chosen strategy. In MIATL, it
is not possible to update the model directly; instead the model must be represented
as a tree-like structure where the branches that are not compatible with the current
strategy are eliminated.
Anticipation games where developed in order to handle concurrent interactions
among players [65]. Anticipation games are based on game theory [269] using
Timed Alternating-time Temporal Logic (TATL) to model concurrent interactions by
executing time-based rules [164]. Using timed-based rules the model can incorporate
an element of surprise where one player receives an advantage over the other [9].
In the Attacker-Defender environment, surprise may happen by the attacker using a
zero-day exploit or the defender patching a known vulnerability before the attack can
exploit it [358]. Anticipation games have been extended to determine the cost and
time needed to eliminate an attack [63, 64].
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, temporal logic is explored as a foundation for adding time to the
hypergame model, which has currently not been researched. Reasoning is discussed
as a way to formalize the decision making in the hypergame analysis of the players.
Different types of reasoning can be used by the players at different points of the game.
For example, in hypergames with strategic surprise a player would use abductive
reasoning in order to try to reasoning about missing information.
The foundation provided in this chapter is built upon in the following chapters
as hypergame theory is extended with temporal logic and abductive reasoning is used
in the game model. The next chapter provides an overview of the problem domain
and discusses how temporal logic is used to extend hypergame theory. Chapter three
also provides the problem domain for the application of abductive logic to hypergame
theory.
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V. Hypergame Models
This chapter develops the hypergame models in mathematical notation for clear
understanding. There are two distinct hypergame models presented in the background
literature. The first was presented by Bennett [34, 39], providing the foundation of
hypergame theory. The second was presented by Vane in his doctoral dissertation
work [356], building on the work by Bennett. Vane’s model was later extended by
Gibson [135].
5.1 Bennett’s Model
The original hypergame representation proposed by Bennett in his seminal papers
on hypergame theory [34, 39], is based on using ordered sets of outcomes. The
representation consist of two different, but related, game theoretic models. Using
Bennett’s original hypergame definitions and the notation presented by Fraser and
Hipel [106], a hypergame is:
Definition 9. Bennett Hypergame is given by H , {G1, G2, ..., Gn} where Gi is
the perceived game by player i.
A game, G, is defined as:
Definition 10. A game is given by G , {N, θ, (Σ, µ)i∈N ,≤}
Where N is the set of players in the hypergame from the view of the player under
consideration. The set of possible game states, θ, is given for the perceived game. For
each player in the perceived game, there is a set of strategies/actions and a payoff
function µ, such that µ : Σ× θ ⇒ R. Finally, a preference relation, ≤, over µ is used
to order the payoffs of the game.
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5.2 Vane’s Model
The second hypergame model is described by Vane in the literature. Vane
expands on Bennett’s hypergame theory by developing Hypergame Normal Form
(HNF). HNF added hyperstategies to the hypergame model, in addition to the
Nash equilibrium solution. Each hyperstategy represents a solution to the hypergame
where the player in question may be able to obtain an outcome better than the Nash
equilibrium.
Vane also adds belief contexts to the model in order to represent the belief that
the opponent chooses a particular strategy. Risk is incorporated into the model
through the fear of being outguessed. Vane restricts Bennett’s hypergame model
by only focusing on a single player’s view during game play. While this appears to
reduce the information available in the model, a given player would have their game
perception and can incorporate what their opponent does into the belief contexts.
For a hypergame in HNF, the model is:
Definition 11. Hypergame Normal Form (HNF) is given by HNFrow , {Grow}
where Grow refers to the row player and is the primary point-of-view during game play.
The HNF model only contains a single game, since it only models the perception
of the row player and does not consider the perceptions of other players. A game, G,
is defined as:
Definition 12. A game in HNF is given by G , {N, θ, β, (ΣFull, µ)i∈N ,≤, γ}
Where N is the set of players in the hypergame from the view of the player under
consideration. The set of possible game states, θ, is given for the perceived game.
The belief of the primary point-of-view player is represented by β. For each player in
the perceived game, there is a set of strategies/actions ΣFull and a payoff function µ,
such that µ : ΣFull×θ×β ⇒ R. The set of strategies/actions ΣFull is made up of two
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types of strategies: normal and hidden. Therefore ΣFull = {ΣNormal,ΣHidden}, where
ΣHidden represent strategies that are not believed to be considered by the player, but
are available as valid in the game. Finally, a preference relation, ≤, over µ is used to
order the payoffs of the game. The fear of being outguessed, γ, is a percentage such
that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
5.3 Extension of Vane’s Model
Gibson extends Vane’s HNF model to use variable payoff/utility functions [135].
Hypergames initially have only been represented using an ordered set of outcomes
which represents preference as Bennett has done. Gibson updates the hypergame
model with the ability to have variables in payoff functions. This update requires
variable definitions, such as payoff function variables, initial variable values, variable
update function, and variable constraints.
Bennett’s original hypergame model can also be updated to use variable payoff
functions. While the HNF model provides more realistic modeling, this model is
provided for completeness. For a perceived game, denoted G, the updated model for
hypergames with variable payoff functions is:
Definition 13. Variable Payoff Functions are represented in a game by G ,
{N, θ, β, (ΣFull, µ)i∈N ,≤,V , γ}
Most of the parameters are the same between Vane’s model and Gibson’s model.
Gibson’s model adds, V , which are payoff function variable definitions from the view
of the primary point-of-view player. The payoff function variable definitions can be
defined as:
Definition 14. Payoff function variable definitions are given by V ,
{ω, λ, ψ, σ}
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where ω are the payoff function variables. The initial variable values at the start
of game play is represented by λ. The variable update function(s) are represented by
ψ and the constraints placed on the variables during updating are defined as σ. The
payoff function µ, must now use V , such that µ : ΣFull × θ × β × V ⇒ R.
5.4 Extension of Theorems
Sasaki [310] presents theorems (Theorems 10, 12, 11 and Lemma 13) that all
focus on a simple hypergame. Simple hypergames are hypergame where the only
difference between the perceived games is in the outcomes. This means the current
theorems are not directly applicable to the hypergame model presented by Vane [356].
In Vane’s model (as well as numerous examples from Bennett’s work [34]) there is
overlap of the perceived games between the players. The lack of overlap often occurs
because of additional strategies (called hidden strategies in Vane’s model). A base
game similar to Sasaki’s Theorem 11 is defined as:
Finding 1. Let H = (Gp, Gq) be a hypergame with Gp = (N, Σp, up) and Gq = (N,
Σq, uq) where p, q ∈ N. A normal form game G = (N, Σ, u) is called the base game
of H iff u = up, u = uq, and Σ = Σp ∩ Σq , . Let the base game (BG) of hypergame
H be denoted by BGH .
A simple conclusion from the previous Finding, is that subgames always have
the same base game under Vane’s model.
Finding 2. Subgames always have the same base game
The game that remains after considering the BG can also be defined. This part of
the game is important because this is where misperception and deception can happen.
The difference game of a hypergame is:
Finding 3. Let H = (Gp, Gq) be a hypergame with Gp = (N, Σp, up) and Gq = (N,
Σq, uq) where p, q ∈ N. A normal form game G = (N, Σ, u) is called the difference
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game of H iff u = up ∪ uq \ up ∩ uq, Σ = Σp ∪ Σq \ Σp ∩ Σq, and u , or Σ , . Let
the difference game of hypergame H be denoted by ∆H .
The hyper Nash equilibrium solution for a simple hypergame can also be extended
to include differences in strategies as well as outcomes in gmaes. The definition is the
same as Sasaki [310] but inclues the additional constraint that the strategy profile
must be in both perceived games. Lemma 13 is still valid according to the previous
finding.
Finding 4. Let H = (Gp, Gq) be a hypergame with Gp = (N, Σp, up) and Gq = (N,
Σq, uq). Then a∗ ∈ Σp ∩ Σq is called a stable hyper Nash (SHN) equilibrium iff a∗ ∈
N(Gp) and a∗ ∈ N(Gq) where N(G) represents the Nash equilibriums for game G.
5.5 Summary
This chapter defines the hypergame models found in the literature using concise
mathematical notion. The two major models from Bennett and Vane, as well as the
extended by Gibson are covered. Theorems presented in other literature are extended
to better represent Vane’s model in this chapter. The mathematical notion for the
models serves as the foundation of integrating hypergames and temporal constructs
for a new framework. In the next chapter the hypergame models are integrated with
temporal logic to from a temporal hypergame framework.
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VI. Temporal Hypergame Model
Given the background on hypergame models (by Bennett and Vane), as well
as game theoretic temporal aspects, a temporal hypergame model can be used
to reason about conflicts, specifically the decisions and the misperceptions of the
participating players. This chapter aims to unify the two approaches, creating
a temporal hypergame model. A base temporal model is presented, representing
Bennett’s original hypergame model [34].
This base temporal model is the foundation refined using the enhancements
provided by Vane and Gibson. Vane’s Hypergame Normal Form (HNF) adds four
enhancements to the base temporal model including beliefs, fear of being outguessed,
hyperstrategies, and hidden strategies (to support the restriction of row’s point-of-
view) [356]. Gibson enhances Hypergame Normal Form (HNF) by adding support
for variable payoff functions [135]. Using this temporal hypergame framework, the
concepts of trust, misperception, and deception are constructed.
6.1 Base Hypergame Model
The temporal hypergame model builds on the game theoretic temporal model
by adding perceptions. A high level overview of the temporal hypergame model is
shown in Figure 6.1. Each hypergame is composed of multiple games, with each game
having a game arena.
In a first level hypergame, each player may have an unique view of the game, or
conflict. This results in a hypergame being formulated as a set of games, one from
each player. A superscript “T” is used to denote temporal models. For n players, a
temporal hypergame is defined as a set:
135
Figure 6.1: Overview of Temporal Hypergame.
Definition 15. A Temporal Hypergame is given by HT , {GT1 , GT2 , ..., GTn} where
GTi represents the perceived game by the ith player. The perceived game specifies the
winning conditions, which specify the game outcomes.
Definition 16. A Perceived temporal game in a hypergame is given by GT ,
{N,Σ,ΦT ,≤ii∈N} where N is a non-empty set of players (at least two). Σ represents
the non-empty finite set of player actions. A game arena, ΦT , defines the rules about
game progression and termination. A preference relation, ≤i, is given for each player
and represents the perceived preferences of the player instead of actual preferences.
A game arena, ΦT , is a finite graph defining the rules about game progression
and termination. A game arena is defined as:
Definition 17. A Game Arena in a temporal game is given by ΦT , {W,→, w0, χ}
where the set of game positions, w, represents the outcomes and possible states as the
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game progresses. The move function, →, is responsible for transitioning the game.
The initial node, or position of the game, is represented by w0. χ : W → N is the
function that assigns every node w ∈ W the player whose turn it is at the node.
In this model the hypergame provides perceptions and subgames, the game
provides structure, and the game arena defines rules for progression and termination,
as shown in Figure 6.2. Another view of the model is through the learning/decision
making process defined in Figure 3.1. The hypergame models the player’s perceptions,
the game models the structure of the learning/decision making process, and the game
arena provides the rules for orienting and observing, as well as for feedback and
learning.
Figure 6.2: Temporal Hypergame Structure.
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6.2 HNF Refinements
The Hypergame Normal Form proposed by Vane [356] offered a few refinements to
the original hypergame model. These refinements include the row’s belief of the what
the column player does, the fear of being outguessed, Row Mixed Strategy (RMS) and
Column Mixed Strategy (CMS), and the focus on row’s point of view. Gibson further
refined the Hypergame Normal Form (HNF) model to use variable update functions.
These additions need to be integrated into the temporal model. An outline of how to
integrate beliefs, fear-of-being-outguessed, hyperstrategies, and row’s point-of-view is
given in symbolic form.
6.2.1 Beliefs.
Beliefs are incorporated into the Hypergame Normal Form (HNF) model in two
different ways. The first is through the use of Column Mixed Strategy (CMS), which
represents the row player’s beliefs about the percentages the other player is using
to select a strategy. These can be known prior or calculated by finding the Nash
Equilibrium of subgames. The second is through belief contexts, which represents
the row player’s beliefs the other player is using the particular strategy. The game
arena ΦT . is updated as follows to reflect the row player’s beliefs:
Definition 18. A Game Arena with Beliefs is given by ΦT , (W,−→
, w0, β, C, ↪→, β0, C0,χ)
where β is the belief contexts over the game, and β0 is the initial set of beliefs
for the row player about the strategies the other player will choose to play. C is
the Column Mixed Strategy (CMS) over the game, while C0 represents the initial
set of Column Mixed Strategy (CMS) values for the row player. The ↪→ is the
update function for the row player’s beliefs, where Wcurrent × β× ≤ii∈N ↪→ βnew and
Wcurrent × C× ≤ii∈N ↪→ Cnew. The remaining symbols retain the previous meaning.
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6.2.2 Fear-of-being-outguessed.
The HNF model uses the fear-of-being-outguessed to represent a player’s
willingness to accept risk by deviating from the Nash equilibrium and introduce
strategic surprise into the game. At the heart of the HNF model, the fear-of-being-
outguessed, measures uncertainty the row player has about the game. This is just one
measure of uncertainty, and other measures can be included into the model in a similar
way if they lead to better strategy selection and ultimately to better payoffs/outcomes.
The fear-of-being-outguessed can be static for the entire game or it can be
dynamically update based on game play and the row player’s beliefs. It can cause
oscillation between strategies (including mixed) and may not lead to equilibrium
solution. This is especially important with dynamically updating the variable. These
effects can be reduced by updating the fear-of-being-outguessed based on maximizing
the column player’s expected utility rather than minimizing the row player’s expected
utility.
The game arena ΦT is updated as follows to reflect the fear-of-being-outguessed:
Definition 19. A Game Arena with the Fear-of-being-Outguessed is given
by ΦT , (W,−→, w0, β, C, ↪→, β0, C0,Υ,, γ,χ)
where Υ is the fear-of-being-outguessed over the game, and γ is the initial
fear-of-being-outguessed. The fear-of-being-outguessed has the following constraint:
0 ≤ Υ, γ ≤ 1. The  is the update function for the row player’s fear-of-being-
outguessed, where Υcurrent×Wcurrent Υnew. This also has an affect on the move
function in the game arena by influencing the possible move states: W ×Υ a−→ w′.
6.2.3 Hyperstrategies.
Given the progression of hypergames to date (Bennett, Vane, Gibson) and
considering the element of strategic surprise, it is necessary to represent the ability of
the players to switch strategies. This is especially true when looking at hyperstategies
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such as Row Mixed Strategy (RMS). Row Mixed Strategy (RMS) are based on
what the row player believes (or perceives) the column player is going to play in the
game. Since only one strategy applies to the whole game (represented by the Nash
equilibrium), the row player would be free to switch to a hyperstrategy if he believed
the other player was playing a subgame. Players can start with a set of potential
strategies (hyperstrategies) and switch between each at will, which could be event
based, time based, etc. Paul, et al. [275] provide a syntax for representing players’
rationale for switching strategies which is used to represent strategy switching in the
hypergame model. A strategy set with switching is defined as:
Definition 20. Strategy set with switching in a hypergame is given by Πnew :,
σ ∈ Σi|σ1 ∪ σ2|σ1 ∩ σ2|σ1 _ σ2|σ1 ∗ σ2|ψ?σ
The expanded meaning of the strategy switching syntax is as follows:
• σ1 ∪ σ2 the player can play according to the strategy σ1 or the strategy σ2
• σ1 ∩ σ2 if σ1 is defined at a history t ∈ T then the player follows σ1. Else if σ2
is defined at a history t ∈ T then the player follows σ2. If σ1 and σ2 are defined
at history t, then the moves(actions) specified by σ1 and σ2 at history t are the
same. σ1 and σ2 are said to be compatible and the ∩ operator is used to denote
compatible pairs of strategies.
• σ1 _ σ2 the player plays the strategy σ1 and then after some time (based on
history), switches strategies and plays σ2. The position in time of the strategy
switch is unknown in advance and not fixed.
• (σ1 ∗ σ2) allows the player to choose either strategy σ1 or σ2 at every point of
the game
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• ψ?σ based on the history of game play, the player tests if the property ψ holds
and if it holds the player according to σ
Strategy switching does not guarantee the game results in a stable solution. At
any point of time during a game when strategy switching occurs, the game can move
to a different equilibrium. It is only possible to move to a different equilibrium and
is not guaranteed.
6.2.4 Row’s Point-of-View.
In HNF, Vane restricted the model to only the row’s point-of-view. This removes
the additional perceived games by other players. In reality the perceived games of
other players may not be known, except in cases of historical analysis (which is the
primary use for the Bennett version of the hypergame model). In Vane’s model the
importance is placed on the idea of subgames, or games that vary in a same way,
from the row’s master perceived game.
Definition 21. HNF model with only row’s point-of-view is given by
HNFrow , {Grow}
where Grow refers to the row player and is the primary point-of-view during game
play. The HNF model only contains a single game (a restriction of Bennett’s original
model), since it only models the perception of the row player and does not consider
the perceptions of other players.
Definition 22. A Game is defeined as GT , {N, (ΣFull)i∈N ,ΦT ,≤ii∈N}
The set of strategies/actions ΣFull is made up of two types of strategies: normal
and hidden. Therefore ΣFull = {ΣNormal,ΣHidden}, where ΣHidden represent strategies
that are not believed to be considered by the player, but are available as valid in the
game.
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6.2.5 Variable Payoff Refinements.
Another refinement to the HNF model is from Gibson [135] who integrated
variable payoff functions into the model. The variable payoff functions are defined
by a set of variables, initial values, an update function, and a set of constraints. The
game arena ΦT is updated as follows to reflect the variable payoff functions:
Definition 23. Temporal Game Arena with Beliefs and fear-of-being-
outguessed is given by ΦT , (W,−→, w0, β, C, ↪→, β0, C0,Υ,, γ,V ,χ)
The addition to the game arena is the V representing variable payoff functions.
Definition 24. Variable Payoff Functions is defined as V , {ω, ωinit, ψ, δ} where
ω are the payoff function variables. The initial variable values are given by ωinit. The
variable update function is ψ subject to the constraints defined by δ.
6.3 The Temporal Model
The temporal work of Ramanugam and Simon [292] serves as the foundation
of the hypergame temporal model. The temporal model is extended to incorporate
hypergame theory, including Bennett’s and Vane’s models. A superscript “T” is
used to denote temporal models. An overview of the variables used in the temporal
hypergame framework are shown in Figure 6.3. The model is presented with the
hypergame refinements for completeness. For n players, the temporal hypergame is
defined as:
Definition 25. Temporal Hypergame is denoted as HT , {GT1 , GT2 , ..., GTn} for n
∈ N where GTi represents the perceived game by the ith player. The perceived game
specifies the winning conditions, which specify the game outcomes.
Definition 26. Perceived Temporal Game is denoted by GT , (N,ΣFull,ΦT , {i}i∈N)
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Figure 6.3: Temporal Hypergame Framework Variables.
Where N is a nonempty finite set of players and i ∈ N is a specific player. Σ is a
nonempty finite set of player actions. A game arena, Φ, defines the rules about game
progression and termination. The preference relation, i, orders the preferences of
player i over the player actions ΣFull. The set of strategies/actions ΣFull is made up
of two types of strategies: normal and hidden. Therefore ΣFull = {ΣNormal,ΣHidden},
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where ΣHidden represent strategies that are not believed to be considered by the player,
but are available as valid in the game. The preference relation is complete, reflexive,
and transitive.
A game arena, Φ, is a finite graph defining the rules about game progression and
termination:
Definition 27. A Temporal Game Arena is denoted by ΦT , (W,−→
, w0, β, C, ↪→, β0, C0,Υ,, γ,V ,χ) where W is a set of game positions or states. The
move function, −→, defines a set of transitions between game positions such that
(WxΣ) −→ W . The initial node of the game is given by w0. The set of successors of
w ∈ W is defined as −→w = {w′ ∈ W | w a−→ w′ for some a ∈ ΣFull} and the terminal
node is defined as −→w = {∅}.
The belief contexts, β, over the game and β0 is the initial set of beliefs for ith row
player about the strategies the other player chooses to play. C is the Column Mixed
Strategy (CMS) over the game, while C0 represents the initial set of Column Mixed
Strategy (CMS) values for the row player. The ↪→ is the update function for the row
player’s beliefs, where Wcurrent × β× ≤ii∈N ↪→ βnew and Wcurrent × C× ≤ii∈N ↪→ Cnew.
The fear-of-being-outguessed, Υ, over the game represents the risk of selected
a hyperstrategy and γ is the initial fear-of-being-outguessed. Υ is subject to the
following constraint: 0 ≤ Υ, γ ≤ 1. The is the update function for the row player’s
fear-of-being-outguessed, where Υcurrent×Wcurrent Υnew. This also has an affect
on the move function in the game arena by influencing the possible move states:
W ×Υ a−→ w′.
The addition to the game arena is the V representing variable payoff functions.
The function χ assigns every node w ∈ W the player whose turn it is such that
χ : W → N . If χ(w) = k and w is not a terminal node then player k must choose an
action at w.
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When χ(w0) = k, player k owns the game position w0 and must choose an action
’a’ available at w0. The new game position is then w′ where w0 a−→ w′. A play (denoted
p) in Φ is a sequence of moves, or infinite path, p = w0
a1−→ w1
a2−→ ... ak−→ wk where
wk is a terminal node or the path is infinite: p = w0
a1−→ w1
a2−→ ... where ∀ i : wi
ai−→
wi+1.
Definition 28. Variable Payoff Function is denoted by V , {ω, ωinit, ψ, δ} where
ω are the payoff function variables. The initial variable values are given by ωinit. The
variable update function is ψ subject to the constraints defined by δ.
An extensive form game tree T can be associated with a game arena, Φ.
Definition 29. Extensive Form Game Tree is denoted by T , (S,⇒, s0, λ)
The countably infinite tree, (S,⇒), is rooted at s0 with edges from ΣFull. The
function λ maps the nodes of the tree to game positions - λ : S → W . Where λ has
the following properties:
• λ(s0) = w0
• ∀s, s′ ∈ S, if s a=⇒ s′ then λ(s) a=⇒ λ(s′)
• if λ(s) = w and w a−→ w′ there exists s′ ∈ S s.t. s a=⇒ s′ and λ(s′) = w′
With the extensive form game tree T and some node s, a restriction of T to s,
denoted T∫ , is the unique path from the root s0 to s, the tree root.
If T is the extensive form game tree and s1 is a node in T . At s1 a strategy for
player 1 is defined as ν = (S1ν , S2ν , ⇒ν , s1). ν is a subtree of Ts1 which represents the
unique path from s0 to s1 in T satisfying:
• s1 ∈ S1ν , where χ(λ(s1)) = 1
• ∀ s ∈ TG rooted at s1; if s ∈ Siν then for some ai ∈ Σ, ∀ s′ such that s
ai=⇒ s′,
then s ai=⇒ν s′
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6.3.1 Hypergame Strategies.
A strategy for a given player i is defined by a function νi : Si → ΣFull, which
specifies the moves for the player at every game position. If T is the extensive form
game tree and s1 is a node in T . At s1 a strategy for player 1 is defined as ν = (S1ν , S2ν ,
⇒ν , s1). The strategy ν can be viewed as a subtree of T . This means that for each
node assigned to player i, there is a unique outgoing edge and for nodes belonging to
other players every available move is included [134]. The strategy tree is defined as
Tν = (Sν , ⇒ν , s0, λ̂ν) associated with ν is a least subtree of T which represents a
unique path in T satisfying:
• s0 ∈ Sν
• For any s ∈ Sν
– if λ̂(s) = i, there exists a unique s′ ∈ Sν and action a s.t. s
ai=⇒ s′
– if λ̂(s) , i, ∀ s′ s.t. s ai=⇒ s′, then s ai=⇒ν s′
Ωi(T ) denotes the set of player i’s strategies in game G with extensive form game
tree T . A play p : s0a0s1 in the game, is consistent with ν if ∀ j ≥ 0, sj ∈ Si, then
ν(sj) = aj. A strategy profile ‹νi, νi+1, ..., νN ›results in a play pνi+1,...,νNνi that is
unique in G.
6.3.2 Hypergame Partial Strategies.
Strategy specifications can be partial, in which a player is allowed to assume an
opponent plays α whenever p holds without considering or knowing the conditions
that would cause the opponent to pick another move b in the opponent’s strategy.
Partial strategies lead to more generality in reasoning with the temporal logic.
A partial strategy for a given player i is defined by a function σi : Si ⇀ ΣFull,
which specifies the moves for the player at some, but not every, game position. The
domain of the partial function σi is denoted by Dσi . The partial strategy σ can be
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viewed as a subtree of T . This means that for some nodes that belong to player i,
there is an unique outgoing edge and for player i’s other nodes (as well as the nodes
belonging to the other players) every move is included [134].
The partial strategy tree is defined as Tσ = (Sσ, ⇒σ, s0, λ̂σ) associated with σ
is a least subtree of T which represents a unique path in T satisfying s0 ∈ Sν . For
any s ∈ Sν , if λ̂(s) = i and s ∈ Dσi , there exists a unique s′ ∈ Sν and action a s.t. s
ai=⇒ s′. Otherwise if (λ̂(s) = i and s < Dσi) or λ̂(s) , i, ∀ s′ s.t. s
ai=⇒ s′, then s ai=⇒ν s′.
Partial strategies can be represented by a set of total strategies, and any total
strategy can be represented as a partial strategy, where the set of total strategies is
s singleton set. For the partial strategy σ and the partial strategy tree Tσ the set of
total strategy trees T̂σ is defined as T = (S,⇒, s0, λ̂) ∈ T̂σ if and only if the following
are true:
• if s ∈ T then ∀ s′ ∈ ~s, s′ ∈ T implies s′ ∈ Tσ
• if λ̂(s) = i, there exists a unique s′ ∈ Sσ and action a such that s
a=⇒σ s′
6.3.3 The Logic - Strategy Specification.
The logic for reasoning about composite strategies is divided into two parts:
strategy specification and game formulas. Atomic strategy formulas specify the
conditions a player tests before making a move. Connectives are then used to
construct composite strategy specifications from the atomic strategy formulas. Game
formulas represent the model logic description of the game area. It specifies the results
of a player executing a strategy, choosing a move a, and ensuring an outcome at some
intermediate time α.
The following preliminaries are useful before describing the logic and its
semantics. For some countable set X , let the past combinations of the members
of X be denoted by Past(X ):
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ψ ∈ Past(X ) :, x ∈ X | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∨ ψ2 | ψ
These formulas obtain meaning when applied over a finite sequence. For example,
given any sequence ξ = t0t1 . . . tm, V : {t0, . . ., tm} → 2X , and n such that 0 ≤ n ≤
m, ξ, n |= ψ (the truth of the formula ψ ∈ Past(X ) at k) as:
• ξ, n |= p iff p ∈ V(tk)
• ξ, n |= ¬ψ iff ξ, n 6|= ψ
• ξ, n |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff ξ, n |= ψ1 or ξ, n |= ψ2
• ξ, n |= ψ iff ∃ j : 0 ≤ j ≤ n such that ξ, j |= ψ
Let P i = {pi0, pi1, . . .} represents a set of proposition symbols where τi ∈ P i, for
I ∈ N. Let P = ⋃i∈N P i ∪ {leaf}. τi represents which player’s turn it is to move at a
given game position. A terminal node is specified by leaf. The finite set of player’s
moves, σ = {a1,a2, . . ., am}, parameterizes the logic when game areas over σ are
considered.
Definition 30. Let Strati(P i), for i ∈ N be the strategy specification set given by:
Strati(P i) :, [ψ 7→ ak]i | σ1 + σ2 | σ1 · σ2 | πι ⇒ σ
where πι ∈ Stratι (
⋂
i∈N P
i) (the other player i’s strategy specification), ψ ∈
Past(P i) and ak ∈ σ.
Definition 31. Let Switchi, for i ∈ N be the strategy specification set with strategy
switching given by: Switchi := σ ∈ Σi|σ1 ∪ σ2|σ1 ∩ σ2|σ1 _ σ2|σ1 ∗ σ2|ψ?σ
For a partial strategy denoted by σ, the strategy switching operators have the
following expanded meaning:
• σ1 ∪ σ2 the player can play according to the strategy σ1 or the strategy σ2
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• σ1 ∩ σ2 if σ1 is defined at a history t ∈ T then the player follows σ1. Else if σ2
is defined at a history t ∈ T then the player follows σ2. If σ1 and σ2 are defined
at history t, then the moves(actions) specified by σ1 and σ2 at history t are the
same. σ1 and σ2 are said to be compatible and the ∩ operator is used to denote
compatible pairs of strategies.
• σ1 _ σ2 the player plays the strategy σ1 and then after some time (based on
history), switches strategies and plays σ2. The position in time of the strategy
switch is unknown in advance and not fixed.
• (σ1 ∗ σ2) allows the player to choose either strategy σ1 or σ2 at every point of
the game
• ψ?σ based on the history of game play, the player tests if the property ψ holds
and if it holds the player according to σ
These constructs allow the properties of strategies to be specified, resulting in
using the combination of constructs to describe game play. The meaning of [ψ 7→ ak]i
for p ∈ P i is that player i chooses move “a” when it is that player’s turn and p holds.
At positions of the game where it is player i’s move and p does not hold, any enabled
move is allowed to be instead. The construct σ1 + σ2 means that the strategy of
player i conforms to the specification σ1 or σ2, while the construct σ1 · σ2 means the
strategy conforms to specification σ1 and σ2. πι ⇒ σ says that player i sticks to the
specification σ if the history of play reveals all moves made by ι conforms to πι. This
captures the game theoretic view that the actions of players are in responses to the
opponent(s) moves and the play is forced to make a move on the history game play
without knowing the opponent(s) complete strategy.
These constructs are formalized for a game tree T and a node s ∈ T and the
strategy specification σ ∈ Strati(P i). The least subtree of T∫ is defined as: T∫  σ
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= (Sσ, ⇒σ, s0) which contains the unique path from s0 to s, denoted pss0 . T∫  σ is
closed under the following conditions:
• ∀ s′ ∈ Sσ such that s ⇒∗σ s′
– s′ is an i node: s′ a=⇒ s′′ and a ∈ σ(s′) ⇔ s′ a=⇒σ s′′
– s′ is an 6i node: s′ a=⇒ s′′ ⇔ s′ a=⇒σ s′′
For the game tree T and a node, s ∈ T , let the unique path from s0 to s be pss0
: s0
a=⇒ s1 · · ·
am=⇒ sm = s. Given the strategy specification σ ∈ Strati(P i) and node
s ∈ t, the definition of σ(s) is:
• [ψ 7→ a]i(s) =

{a} if s ∈ W i and pss0 , m |= ψ
σ otherwise
• (σ1 + σ2)(s) = σ1(s) ∪ σ2(s)
• (σ1 · σ2)(s) = σ1(s) ∩ σ2(s)
• (π ⇒ σ)(s) =

σ(s) if ∀ j : 0≤j<m, aj ∈ π(sj)
σ otherwise
Path ps′s : s = s1
a1=⇒ s2 · · ·
am−1===⇒ sm = s′ ∈ T is said to conform to σ if ∀ j : 1 ≤
j < m, aj ∈ σ(sj). Play is said to conform to σ when the path leads to proper play.
The following null is used to represent an empty specification and is defined as:
Definition 32. An empty specification is denoted by nulli , [> 7→ a1] + · · · +
[> 7→ am]
Any strategy for player i conforms to nulli, which is useful for asserting a strategy
exists while the property of the strategy are irrelevant.
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6.3.4 Strategy Specification Syntax.
The logic syntax is given by P and Π:
Definition 33. The strategy logic syntax is given by Π :, p ∈ P | ¬α | α1 ∨ α2
| < a+ > α | < a− > α | α | (σ)i : c | σ {i β
where c ∈ Σ, σ ∈ Strati(P i), β ∈ Past(P i). Let α = ¬¬α, < N+ > α =∨
α∈Σ < a
+ > α, [N]α = ¬ < N > ¬α, < P > α = ∨α∈Σ < a− > α, and [P] =
¬ < P > ¬α. Other standard connectives are used: ∧ (conjunction), ⊃ (if then), and
[a]α.
The formula (σ)i : c means that at any position in the game the player i’s strategy
specification σ suggests the move c can be played at the given position. The formula
σ{i β means that from the current position in the game, there exists a way to follow
player i’s strategy σ where β is ensured to be the outcome.
6.3.5 Semantics.
Extensive form game trees and a valuation function serve as the model for the
logic. This results in a model M , (T , V) where game tree T , (S1, S2, →, s0)
defined from before, and the valuation function V : S → 2P such that the following
is true:
• For i ∈ N, τi ∈ V(s) iff s ∈ S ′
• leaf ∈ V(s) iff moves(s) = ∅
where for a node s, moves(s) = {a|s a=⇒ s′}.
The truth of formula α ∈ Π in the modelM and at position s, denotedM, s |=
α, is defined on the structure of α. Let pss0 : s0
a0=⇒ s1 · · ·
am−1===⇒ sm = s.
• M, s |= p iff p ∈ V(s)
• M, s |= ¬α iff M, s 6|= α
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• M, s |= α1 ∨ α2 iff M, s |= α1 or M, s |= α2
• M, s |= < a+ > α iff ∃s′ ∈ W such that s a−→ s′ and M, s′ |= α
• M, s |= < a− > α iff m > 0, a = am−1 and M, sm−1 |= α
• M, s |= α iff ∃ j : 0 ≤ j ≤ m such that M, sj |= α
• M, s |= (σ)i : c iff c ∈ σ(s)
• M, s |= σ {i β iff ∀s′inTs  σ, such that s ⇒∗ s′ then M, s′ |= β ∧
(τi ⊃ enabledσ).
where enabledσ ≡
∨
a∈Σ(< a > True ∧ (σ)i : a).
Satisfiability and validity can be defined for a function, α. α is said to be
satisfiable if and only if there exists a model M, and there exists s such that M,
s |= α. α is said to be valid if and only if M, s |= α, ∀M,∀s.
6.4 Trust, Misperception, and Deception
At the foundation of human decision making is trust. When people have trust
in others they are dealing with, they assume more risk or cooperate in the face of
incomplete or imperfect information. This makes trust a central concept in order to
formulate the key idea of deception in a hypergame model.
The concepts of trust and distrust can be found discussed throughout literature
(see [232] or [148]). Using the temporal hypergame model, the concept of trust
is defined within the constrains of the model. Given a formal definition of trust, a
definition of distrust is then constructed. From these two concepts a formal definition
of deception is given.
Recall the temporal hypergame framework presented in this chapter. Given a
temporal hypergame model HT , {GT} (Definition 15), a perceived temporal game
GT , {N,Σ,ΦT ,≤ii∈N} (Definition 16), and the extensive form game tree T associated
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with the game arena ΦT . For two strategies σ1 and σ2 in GT with N = {1, 2}
with the extensive form game tree T , (S,⇒, s0, λ) the concept of trust, distrust,
misperception, and deception is defined.
6.4.1 Trust.
In modeling conflicts and decision-making problems, trust is an important
concept. Trust can determine how players respond to perceived devaitions in the
game, or which strategies the players prefer. Trust is defined in the temporal
hypergame framework by:
Finding 5. Weak Trust - Player 1 has weak trust in Player 2 if at a vertex s′ ∈ Sσ1
∃ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′.
Finding 6. Strong Trust - Player 1 has strong trust in Player 2 if ∀ s′ ∈ Sσ1 ∃ s
∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′.
The distinction between weak and strong trust is important during decision
making or human interactions. Weak trust (Definition 5) covers the case of when
there is only one vertex in the extensive form game tree where the strategy leads
to expected play/outcome. Strong trust (Definition 6) covers the case of when all
vertices in the extensive form game tree lead to the expected play/outcome for the
selected strategy.
While it is important to trust other players in a game, it is also important to
know which players to distrust. Distrust is defined using the definitions of trust in
Definition 5 and Definition 6.
Finding 7. Weak Distrust - Player 1 has weak distrust in Player 2 if at a vertex
s
′ ∈ Sσ1 @ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′.
Finding 8. Strong Distrust - Player 1 has strong distrust in Player 2 if ∀ s′ ∈ Sσ1
@ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′.
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Mistrust occurs when a player has distrust (as defined in either Definition 7 or
Definition 7) in the other player. Formally this is defined as:
Finding 9. Mistrust - Player 1 mistrust Player 2 if ∃ s′ ∈ Sσ1 where Player 1
distrusts Player 2.
6.4.2 Misperception.
The concept of misperception is closely related to trust, distrust, and mistrust.
When a player misperceives something, then they recognize it incorrectly in some
way. Misperception is an important concept in hypergames, and is necessary to gain
an advantage. A formal definition of misperception over the temporal hypergame
framework is:
Finding 10. Misperception - Player 2 misperceives the strategy of Player 1 if there
is at least one vertex s′ ∈ Sσ1 ∃ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′ so that when
a new strategy σ∗ which is equal to σ1 except that @ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that
s
a=⇒ s∗ and (σ1, σ2) ≤1 (σ∗, σ2)
6.4.3 Deception.
If a player intentionally takes advantage of a misperception in a game, then the
player is said to deceive the other player(s). Formally deception is defined over the
temporal hypergame model:
Finding 11. Deception - Player 1 (p) deceives Player 2 (q) if for a hypergame H,
the following is true:
• Player 2 trusts Player 1, according to Finding 5 or Finding 6.
• Player 2 misperceives the strategy of Player 1, according to Finding 10.
• If there exists a strategy pair (σp, σq), σp ∈ Σp and σq ∈ Σq where (σp, σq) ∈
N(GT ) and (σp, σq) < SHN(GT ) and (σp∗, σq) ∈ SHN(GT )
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The first condition clearly states that player 2 must trust player 1. The second
condition states that player 1 must have a strategy that is only different in one way
from the expected strategy. The final condition states that the strategy pair with the
deception strategy must be a Nash equilibrium in the hypergame, but not a stable
hyper Nash equilibrium and that the strategy for the deceived player must be a stabel
hyper Nash equilibrium with the strategy that is misperceived.
6.5 Additional Findings on the Temporal Hypergame
Given the Theorem 4 stating that there exists a SPNE in a game with finite
repetitions and the Theorem 10 where there is a hyper Nash equilibrium in every
finite game with mixed strategies. Then it can be concluded:
Finding 12. In every finite temporal hypergame with mixed strategies, there is at
least one SPNE (which may be in the base game).
If a stage game has a Nash equilibrium then the repeated game has a SPNE (in
infinitely repeated games) according to Theorem 8 and Lemma 9.
Finding 13. If a temporal hypergame H at some time x has a Nash equilibrium in
the base game (i.e. stable hyper Nash equilibrium), then the temporal hypergame has
a SPNE.
Given Finding 12 and Finding 13 then the following is true:
Finding 14. In both the infinite and finite temporal hypergame with mixed strategies,
there is at least one SPNE.
According to the one-shot deviation principle (Theorem 6) states that a strategy
is a SPNE if and only if there is no profitable one-shot deviation. The implication of
this applied to hypergames is:
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Finding 15. In a hypergame H, a strategy is a SPNE in the base game iff there is
no profitable one-shot deviation. A one-shot deviation would produce a strategy in the
difference game of hypergame H.
6.6 Summary
This chapter develops and discusses a temporal hypergame framework, repre-
senting a new frontier with hypergames. The temporal hypergame framework started
with the original hypergame model from Bennett and is enhanced with the models
provided by Vane and Gibson. The concepts of trust, misperception, and deception
are given using the constructs of the temporal hypergame framework in symbolic
form. This framework is applied in the next chapter to the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Chicken (classical game theoretic examples), as well as a more complex SCADA net-
work (attacker/defender) game.
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VII. Temporal Hypergame Cyber Physical System Applications
This chapter presents the application of the temporal hypergame framework to
different hypothetical conflicts. First, an overview on verification and validation for
models is given. Next, a discussion on why the examples where chosen is presented.
The temporal hypergame framework is applied to a classical game theoretic game, an
iterated hypergame, and three cyber physical system examples.
The first application involves the classical game theoretic example of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The framework is applied to‘ the Prisoner’s Dilemma in order
to show the framework is valid with classical games. The detailed mathematical
description is included in Appendix C. The example focuses on the repeated (or
iterated) Prisoner’s Dilemma where the same game is played over and over by the
players. This example shows the ability of the temporal hypergame framework
to model the Prisoner’s Dilemma and demonstrate the reasoning concept of the
backwards induction.
In real world players often reason using iterated hypergames. Each hypergame
in the iterated series, has unstable outcomes that are intended to give the player an
advantage in a later iteration [199]. The hypergame is the same game in each iteration,
as is done in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This is shown in second application,
when the temporal hypergame framework is applied to an iterated hypergame.
The temporal hypergame framework builds on this concept of iteration, but
allows the model to change with time which is more representative of real-world
conflicts. The temporal hypergame framework does not require the hypergame to be
the same game as in the iterative hypergame, instead aspects of the hypergame can
vary from time epoch to time epoch. Aspects that can vary include available actions
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to a player, the way the outcomes are calculated, and the way the player chooses a
strategy.
In this chapter, the complete temporal hypergame framework is applied to one
game theoretic and two additional examples with hypergame properties, in order
to better demonstrate the temporal utility of the framework. By definition of
hypergames, the temporal hypergame framework provides a way to find the strategies
equal to or better than the Nash equilibrium. The examples show that the framework
results in an appropriate result for the hypergame structure.
7.1 Verification and Validation
Models (like the temporal hypergame framework) are built in order to gain
a better understanding of complex systems [185]. A model is a logical structure
used to suggest the progression and conclusion of the represented system over time.
The system complexity, which may have infinite parts and interactions, can make it
difficult to characterize and understand the complete system [209]. The objective of
the model is to reduce the system complexity by identifying aspects of the system
that allow a satisfactory, but not always perfect understanding. While models are not
right or wrong, some may provide more insight into a system than others. Various
models can be compared on the basis of how the model helps in system understanding.
Because a model is based on a few chosen aspects, to fully exercise the model
a system is required to have representative measures for the chosen aspects. If the
system to be modeled does not demonstrate the aspects of interest or only a partial
set of the aspects, then the model may not produce realistic results or may exercise
part of the model, but still give realistic results. The utility of a model is based how
accurately the measures extracted from the model collate to the measures extracted
from the represented system.
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There are two ways to determine the utility of the model with respect to the
system. The first way is to determine if the model implements the assumptions
correctly through model verification [151]. The second, is to determine whether the
assumptions are reasonable for the represented system through model validation[151].
While one way does imply the other, both are commonly used together. The
goal of the verification and validation process is to show the model represents the
system being modeled at a fidelity needed for decision-making [186]. Verification and
validation also show the model is credible at an acceptable level for usage by the
decision-maker.
There are two ways to conduct verification and validation. The first, is through
mathematical proofs that give high fidelity results that the assumptions hold in the
model for given cases. The second, through justification by example gives a lower
fidelity result that the assumptions may hold in the model for the specific case and
are representative of the specific modeled system [318]. This chapter uses justification
by example to validate the utility of the hypergame temporal framework.
When using justification by example, it is not possible to test 100% as testing
every conceivable combination of inputs (game models) is not possible. The structural
properties of the games chosen as inputs to the temporal hypergame framework
determine which aspects of the framework are tested. While not every input can
be tested, a subset of the structural properties can provide a satisfactory level of
confidence that the framework behaves as expected.
A chosen specific game may not have the structural properties that exercise all
aspects of the framework. Normally a game has a subset of properties that can
exercise some partial aspects of the framework. This means more than one game may
be needed to exercise more aspects of the framework to determine if it has correct
behavior.
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In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (discussed in Appendix C), the structural
properties of the game do not allow for detailed hypergame analysis which is a testing
objective. With the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the game is symmetric and does not have
differences in perception required for hypergame analysis. For improved hypergame
analysis, a game should have asymmetric structural properties such as a player with
an unknown action/strategy or misperception about the value or ordering of the
game outcomes. The simple cyber physical system example and the extended cyber
physical system example are designed to exercise the additional structural properties
for improved hypergame analysis.
7.2 Iterated vs. Temporal Hypergames
In game theory, a repeated game (also known as an iterated game [366]) consists
of some number of repetitions of a base game [254]. The base game (also known
as a stage game) remains exactly the same through the repetitions (or time) [294].
This same definition and concept can be applied to hypergames, where the repeated
hypergame does not change over time or from iteration to iteration.
How does an iterated hypergame relate to a temporal hypergame? The idea is
that any iterated hypergame can be represented using a temporal hypergame (shown
in Figure 7.1). In doing this, the temporal hypergame should produce the exact
same result (outcome) as the iterated hypergame, without additional information or
knowledge being incorporated into the temporal model.
The temporal hypergame cannot produce a different result from the iterated
hypergame, by definition of an iterated and temporal hypergame. If different results
were produced then the two methods would not be related as shown in Figure 7.2.
This view is not supported in this research, as this research is based on the relationship
in Figure 7.1.
160
Figure 7.1: Iterated and Temporal Hypergame Relationship.
Figure 7.2: Alternative Hypergame Method Relationship.
This is demonstrated in Appendix C, where the iterated (repeated) Prisoner’s
Dilemma results in the same outcome when using the iterated or temporal methods.
The outcome is the same under both methods, and backward induction applies in both
cases. Not every temporal hypergame can be represented as an iterated hypergame.
161
7.3 Model Application Steps
There are six basic steps to applying the temporal hypergame framework
presented in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6, as shown in Figure 7.3. The first step,
initial game definition, is where the game structure is defined in terms of players
and actions. The next step, identification of states and transitions, is where the game
progression rules are developed. In the game mapping step, the game is mapped
to the extensive form game tree. Path structuring develops the game model and
allows the simplification of reasoning about paths in the game tree. With the basic
structure, progression, and transition of the game, the next step builds upon the rules
and game constraints in order to define player strategies. Finally, using the constructs
developed in the previous steps the temporal hypergame framework is used to analyze
the game.
Figure 7.3: Temporal Hypergame Framework Process Overview.
7.4 Iterated Attacker-Defender Hypergame Application
Gibson [135] presents a hypergame model of an attacker-defender network game.
The game is based on the original game theoretic model presented by Chen and
Leneutre [72]. A detailed overview is given in Appendix B. The game presented by
Gibson is used here with modified outcomes. The outcomes are modified to allow
manual definition of the game while allowing uncluttered symbolic definitions.
The game is shown in Figure 7.4 in normal form. The defender has four actions:
not defend, defend, provide ruse, and shutdown. The attacker has three actions: not
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attack, attack, and zero-day exploit. The attacker-defender game is also shown in
Figure 7.5 as a game tree in extensive form.
Figure 7.4: Attacker-defender Game Normal Form.
Figure 7.5: Attacker-defender Game Extensive Form.
7.4.1 Initial Game Definition.
To apply Step 1: Initial Game Definition of the temporal hypergame framework
to the information from the network model, it is necessary to create a temporal
hypergame model. Let the temporal hypergame be:
HTnet , {GTD}
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The perceived game GTnet:
GTnet , (N,ΣFull,ΦT , {i}i∈N)
Where N = {Attacker (A), Defender (D)} is the set of players. ΣFull is the finite
set of player actions such that ΣFull = ΣA∪ΣD, ΣA = {NotAttack(NA), Attack(AT ),
Zero−DayExploit(ZD)}, and ΣD = {NotDefend(ND), Defend(DE), P rovideRuse(PR),
andShutdown(S)}. In this model the action provide ruse and shutdown is known to
the defender, but not the attacker.
The preference ordering function for the ith player i = ui(x, y) ≤ ui(x′, y) for i
∈ N. This means for attacker A indicates the outcome (x,y) is preferred to outcome
(x′, y) if x ≤ x′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . For defender D indicates the outcome (x,y) is preferred
to outcome (x, y′) if y ≤ y′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . Notice the Nash equilibrium concept is
defined in the preference relation, i, assuming both players are rational.
This model does not use variable payoff functions, so V , {null}. There are also
no constraints to be applied in the game model.
7.4.2 Identification of States and Transitions.
For Step 2: Identification of States and Transitions of the temporal hypergame
framework, it is necessary to define the rules of the game the players must follow and
is derived from the game tree. The game arena is given by:
ΦTnet , (W,−→, w0, β, C, ↪→, β0, C0,Υ,, γ,V ,χ)
W consists of sixteen game states, including start, DND, DDE, DPR, DS,
DNDANA, DNDAAT , DNDAZD, DDEANA, DDEAAT , DDEAZD, DPRANA, DPRAAT ,
DPRAZD, DSANA, DSAAT , DSAZD. The function −→ defines the game transitions
such that (W x Σ) → W. The possible transitions are:
• start x ND → DND where ND ∈ ΣD
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• start x DE → DDE where DE ∈ ΣD
• start x PR → DPR where PR ∈ ΣD
• start x S → DS where S ∈ ΣD
• DND x NA → DNDANA where NA ∈ ΣA
• DND x AT → DNDAAT where AT ∈ ΣA
• DND x ZD → DNDAZD where ZD ∈ ΣA
• DDE x NA → DDEANA where NA ∈ ΣA
• DDE x AT → DDEAAT where AT ∈ ΣA
• DDE x ZD → DDEAZD where ZD ∈ ΣA
• DPR x NA → DPRANA where NA ∈ ΣA
• DPR x AT → DPRAAT where AT ∈ ΣA
• DPR x ZD → DPRAZD where ZD ∈ ΣA
• DS x NA → DSANA where NA ∈ ΣA
• DS x AT → DSAAT where AT ∈ ΣA
• DS x ZD → DSAZD where ZD ∈ ΣA
• DNDANA → start
• DNDAAT → start
• DNDAZD → start
• DDEANA → start
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• DDEAAT → start
• DDEAZD → start
• DPRANA → start
• DPRAAT → start
• DPRAZD → start
• DSANA → start
• DSAAT → start
• DSAZD → start
The initial state of the game w0, is equal to start ∈ W, where
−−−→
start =
{DND, DDE, DPR, DS}. The belief context β0 is set to 0.8 (which is selected randomly
for this example), the update function for the belief context ↪→ simply makes no
modification to the belief contexts (i.e. β0 ↪→ βnew implies β0 = βnew). The CMS
C, and the initial value C0 is set to the NEMS value for the hypergame. The fear-of-
being-outguessed Υ, is set to an initial value γ of zero. The update function maps
γ  Υ = 0. Therefore there is no update. The χ function assigns he player whose
turn it is to the game state w ∈ W where W → N. For example, χ(start) = D, while
χ(DND) = χ(DDE) = χ(DPR) = χ(DS) = A.
7.4.3 Game Mapping.
For Step 3: Game Mapping, an extensive form game tree T is associated with
the network game arena, φTnet. The extensive form game tree is defined as:
T = (S,⇒, s0, λ) (7.1)
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where (S, ⇒) is a countably infinite tree rooted at s0 with edges from Σ. The
nodes of the tree are given by S, where S = {root, DND, DDE, DPR, DS, DNDANA,
DNDAAT , DNDAZD, DDEANA, DDEAAT , DDEAZD, DPRANA, DPRAAT , DPRAZD,
DSANA, DSAAT , DSAZD}. The root of the tree denoted s0, is equal to root ∈ S. The
x=⇒ is the function that moves between nodes of the tree using the edge denoted by x
∈ Σ.
The possible nodes transitions are {root ND==⇒ DND, root
DE==⇒ DDE, root
PR=⇒ DPR
, root S=⇒ DS where ND, DE, PR, S ∈ σD} ∪ {DND
NA==⇒ DNDANA, DND
AT=⇒ DNDAAT ,
DND
ZD=⇒ DNDAZD, DDE
NA==⇒ DDEANA, DDE
AT=⇒ DDEAAT , DDE
ZD=⇒ DDEAZD, DPR
NA==⇒DPRANA, DPR
AT=⇒DPRAAT , DPR
ZD=⇒DPRAZD DS
NA==⇒DSANA, DS
AT=⇒DSAAT ,
DS
ZD=⇒ DSAZD where NA, AT, ZD ∈ σA}.
The function λ is S → W, where
• λ(s0) = w0
• ∀s, s′ ∈ S, if s a=⇒ s′ then λ(s) a=⇒ λ(s′)
• if λ(s) = w and w a−→ w′ there exists s′ ∈ S s.t. s a=⇒ s′ and λ(s′) = w′
7.4.4 Path Structuring.
For Step 4: Path Structuring, the players individual paths through the game
tree are defined. Theses paths are later used to define the strategies, but are not
required. Defining the paths reduces the amount of notation required for the strategy
definitions. The model for the network temporal hypergame can be represented by
Mnet = (T ,V). The game tree, T is given from the previous game mapping and the
valuation function v is given by:
• V(pint) = {s0}
• V(pdomA) = {DND, DNDAAT} or {DND, DNDAZD} or {DDE, DDEAAT} or
{DDE, DDEAZD}
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• V(pdomDexp) = {DDE}
• V(pworstA) = {DND, DNDANA} or {DDE, DDEANA}
• V(pworstD) = {DND, DNDAAT} or {DND, DNDAZD}
When the hypergame advantageS (defender can Provide Ruse and Shutdown) is
considered, the additional functions are included; while the other functions remain
the same:
• V(pdomDhyp) = {DPR, DPRAAT}
• V(pworstAhyp) = {DS, DSAAT} or {DS, DSAZD}
The pdomDhyp represents the dominant path for the defender from the attacker’s
point-of-view. The attacker has failed to account for the defender’s provide ruse
option. While the pdomDexp represents the dominant path for the defender when the
defender’s advantage (Provide Ruse) is considered. The attacker is unaware of this
option, and therefore assumes pdomDexp is the expected outcome for a rational defender.
7.4.5 Define Player Strategies.
For Step 5: Define Player Strategies, strategies for each player are defined in
terms of the states and transitions, as well as the paths defined previously. In this
game the attacker’s strategy can be defined as:
StratA ≡ ([pint 7→ ND]D ⇒ [pdomDexp 7→ AT ]A ∨ [pdomDexp 7→ ZD]A) ·
([pint 7→ DE]D ⇒ [pdomDexp 7→ AT ]A ∨ [pdomDexp 7→ ZD]A) · ([pint 7→ ND]D ⇒
[pworstAexp 7→ NA]A) · ([pint 7→ DE]D ⇒ [pworstAexp 7→ NA]A)
From the attacker’s perspective, the defender’s strategy is defined as:
StratDA ≡ ([pint 7→ ND]D) · ([pint 7→ DE]D) · ([pint 7→ ND]D ⇒ pdomDexp) ·
([pint 7→ DE]D ⇒ pdomDexp)
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But the defender has two extra actions available (Provide Ruse and Shutdown)
that the attacker is not aware of, so the defender’s strategy can be defined as:
StratD ≡ ([pint 7→ ND]D) · ([pint 7→ DE]D) · ([pint 7→ PR]D · ([pint 7→ S]D) ·
([pint 7→ ND]D ⇒ pdomDexp) · ([pint 7→ DE]D ⇒ pdomDexp) · ([pint 7→ PR]D ⇒
[pdomDhyp 7→ AT ]A) · ([pint 7→ S]D ⇒ [pworstAhyp 7→ AT ]A ∨ [pworstAhyp 7→ ZD]A)
7.4.6 Analyze Model.
For the final Step 6: Analyze Model, the previous definitions are used to logical
analysis the constructed model. From the previous definitions, StratDA {D (pdomDexp
∨ pworstD), which means the defender can either follow the dominant strategy or the
worst case strategy from the view of the attacker. A rational defender is always
assumed to follow the dominant strategy. In this case if the defender plays ”Defend”
then the defender can ensure the worst outcome is avoided:
[turnD 7→ D]D {D ¬pworstD
This represents the result of the game where the defender always desires to
defend. With this, the defender would expect the attacker to reach the expected best
case pexpA. Which means the defender would expect StratA {A pdomA.
The attacker follows [turnA 7→ AT ]A ∧ [turnA 7→ ZD]A. This allows the attacker
to achieve the best outcome, while allowing the defender to follow their perceived
dominant strategy.
For the defender the solution is always to use the ”Defend” strategy:
[turnD 7→ D]D {D ¬pworstD
The attacker’s strategy is to always choose the Attack (AT) or Zero-Day (ZD).
[turnA 7→ AT ]A ∧ [turnA 7→ ZD]A {A pdomA
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Up to this point the analysis has focused on the solution to the game without
considering the hypergame advantage for the defender. From the previous definitions,
StratD {D (pdomDhyp ∨ pworstD), which means the defender can either follow the
hypergame strategy or the worst case strategy. It is assumed that a rational defender
always plays to the hypergame strategy, since it is dominant. In this case, if
the defender plays ”Defend” or the hidden hypergame strategies Provide Ruse and
Shutdown, then the defender can ensure the worst outcome is avoided:
[turnD 7→ ND]D {D ¬pworstD
This shows the hypergame result of the game where the defender would expect
the defender to reach the expected worst case pworstD .
The attacker still follows [turnA 7→ AT ]A ∧ [turnA 7→ ZD]A. This allows the
attacker to achieve their perceived best outcome, which is StratA {A pdomA from the
previous analysis. Because of the hypergame, the attacker does not end up in the
dominant or worst outcome StratA ¬ {A pworstAhyp ∨ pdomA.
Since the solution to the hypergame is for the defender to play Provide Ruse
and the attacker to play Attack or Zero-Day, the defender can guarantee the worst
possible outcome is avoided.
[turnD 7→ PR]D {D ¬pworstD ∧ (pdomDhyp
The attacker’s strategy is to always play the action or Attack or Zero-Day.
[turnA 7→ AT ]A ∧ [turnA 7→ ZD]A
The temporal hypergame analysis shows that the defender can improve upon
their outcome by leveraging the attacker’s misperception. It also shows that the
defender can guarantee the attacker does not reach the dominant (best case) outcome.
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7.5 Cyber Physical Security Application
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) are physical entities controlled and monitored by
computer-based algorithms. A CPS is usually designed as a network of interacting
systems with inputs and outputs as opposed to standalone devices. CPS is similar in
architecture to the Internet of Things (IoT), but require higher coordination between
physical and computational elements. An overview of CPS is provided in Figure 7.6.
The specific application focus of this research (shown in Figure 7.7) is on the cyber
security of CPSs.
Figure 7.6: Overview of Cyber Physical Systems [66].
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Figure 7.7: Focus Area of Cyber Physical System Application [66].
These types of systems include those found in avionics, ships, satellites, cars and
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) SCADA systems. Reports on exploits such
as Stuxnet [323] and APT28 [99] are appearing more frequently and are becoming a
growing concern (see Section 1.1.2 in Chapter 1 for a more detailed listing of exploits).
As CPSs begin to depend more on meta-level information infrastructures and as this
IP- based technology begins to be integrated into these systems, critical CPSs are
becoming a larger part of the already established vulnerability target. This puts the
mission assurance of these systems at risk with potentially higher stakes than losing
data or intellectual property. A Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
system is an example of a Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) and is a type of Industrial
Control System (ICS). SCADA systems monitor and control industrial processes that
exist in the physical world.
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7.5.1 Cyber Physical SCADA Security Hypergame Example - Game
Theoretic.
Hewett et al. [165, 307] present a game theoretic model for cyber-security analysis
of SCADA systems. The game is based on the classic attacker-defender game. The
authors present the game in extensive form as shown in Figure 7.8. The defender has
two actions: defend the SCADA network or not defend. The attacker has five actions:
sybil (identity spoofing), node compromise (control of a sensor node), eavesdropping
(traffic sniffing), data injection (datastore or communication channels), or no attack.
Figure 7.8: SCADA Sensor Network Game [165, 307].
The unique property of the game is that it is not symmetric. Depending on
whether the attacker chooses sybil or node compromise as a first action, leads to
the set of actions that are available to the attacker in the second round. If the
attacker chooses sybil then in the next round the attacker chooses from the actions of
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eavesdropping or data injection. For node compromise, the attacker chooses from the
actions of eavesdropping or data injection. The authors use variables in the payoff
functions. The payoff function is denoted Ud(p, a), of player p at a decision node
of depth d as a result of action a. Action a can be either taken by player p or the
opponent. The payoff function (utility) is calculated by :
Ud(p, a) = Ud−1(p, a
′) +B(p, a, d) (7.2)
B(p, a, d) denotes the behavior of the impact of the action and a′ denotes the
action of p’s opponent. At the root of the game tree (i.e. start of the game) there
are no previous payoffs, so the initial payoff is U0(p, nil) = (0, 0) where nil is no
action. B(p, a, d) is the behavior of the impact of the action, as shown in Table 7.1.
It depends on the action a, the player p, and the depth d of the game tree as an
indicator of the game’s advancement.
Table 7.1: SCADA Behavior of the Impact [165, 307].
B(p, a, d) a is A’s action a is D’s action
p = A (Attacker) d ∗ Impact(a) 0
p = D (Defender) −Impact(a)d Impact(a)
The impact function shown in Table 7.1, determines the impact of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Let C(a), I(a), and A(a) be the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability with the corresponding weights wC , wI , and wA of action a. The
function is defined as:
Impact(a) = wCC(a) + wII(a) + wAA(a) (7.3)
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The weight sum to 1 and are fixed at wC = 0.1, wI = 0.6, and wA = 0.3. The
impact function is calculated according to Table 7.2. Not defend and not attack have
no impact on the model and are excluded from the table. In Table 7.2, the value 1 is
considered low, 4 is moderate, and 8 is high, in terms of impact.
Table 7.2: SCADA Model Impact Function [165, 307].
Description C(a) I(a) A(a) Impact(a)
Defend 6 6 1 4.5
Sybil 6 1 1 1.5
Node Compromise 6 1 1 1.5
Eavesdropping 8 1 1 1.7
Data Injection 1 8 6 6.7
7.5.1.1 Initial Game Definition.
To apply Step 1: Initial Game Definition of the temporal hypergame framework
to the information from the SCADA model, it is necessary to create a temporal
hypergame model. Let the temporal hypergame be:
HTSCADA , {GTD}
The perceived game GTSCADA is:
GTSCADA , (N,ΣFull,ΦT , {i}i∈N)
Where N = {Attacker (A), Defender (D)} is the set of players. ΣFull is the finite
set of player actions such that ΣFull = ΣA∪ΣD, ΣA = {Sybil(Sy), NodeCompromise(NC),
Eavesdropping(E), DataInjection(DI), NotAttack(nil)}, and ΣD = {Defend(D),
NotDefend(nil)}.
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The preference ordering function for the ith player i = ui(x, y) ≤ ui(x′, y) for
i ∈ N. This means for the attacker A indicates the outcome (x,y) is preferred to
outcome (x′, y) if x ≤ x′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . For the defender D indicates the outcome
(x,y) is preferred to outcome (x, y′) if y ≤ y′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . The Nash equilibrium
concept is encoded in the preference relation, i, assuming both players are rational.
The variable payoff function is denoted by:
V , {ω, ωinit, ψ, δ}
The payoff function variables are given by ω = {wC , wI , wA, d, Impact(a)}. The
initial values ωinit, are set to 0 except for wC = 0.1, wI = 0.6, and wA = 0.3. The
function ψ works as follows:
• If variable Impact(a)
– If a = Defend, then Impact = 4.5
– if a = Sybil, then Impact = 1.5
– if a = Node Compromise, then Impact = 1.5
– if a = Eavesdropping, then Impact = 1.7
– if a = Data Injection, then Impact = 6.7
• if variable d, then d = d + 1
With the proposed model there are no constraints to be applied.
7.5.1.2 Identification of States and Transitions.
For Step 2: Identification of States and Transitions of the temporal hypergame
framework, it is necessary to define the rules of the game the players must follow and
is derived from the game tree. The game arena is given by:
ΦTSCADA , (W,−→, w0, β, C, ↪→, β0, C0,Υ,, γ,V ,χ)
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W consists of sixteen game states, including start, ASy, ANC , ASyDD, ASyDnil,
ANCDD, ANCDnil, AISEDD, ASyDDAE, ASyDDAnil, ASyDnilAE, ASyDnilADI ,
ASyDDAE, ASyDDADI , ASyDDAnil, ANCDnilAE, and ANCDnilADI . The function
−→ defines the game transitions such that (W x Σ) → W. The possible transitions
are:
• start x Sy → ASy where Sy ∈ ΣA
• start x NC → ANC where NC ∈ ΣA
• ASy x D → ASyDD where D ∈ ΣD
• ASy x nil → ASyDnil where nil ∈ ΣD
• ANC x D → ANCDD where D ∈ ΣD
• ANC x nil → ANCDnil where nil ∈ ΣD
• ASyDD x E → ASyDDAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ASyDD x nil → ASyDDAnil where nil ∈ ΣA
• ASyDnil x E → ASyDnilAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ASyDnil x DI → ASyDnilADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• ANCDD x E → ASyDDAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ANCDD x DI → ASyDDADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• ANCDD x nil → ASyDDAnil where nil ∈ ΣA
• ANCDnil x E → ANCDnilAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ANCDnil x DI → ANCDnilADI where DI ∈ ΣA
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The initial state of the game w0, is equal to start ∈ W, where
−−−→
start =
{ASy, ANC , AISE}. The belief context β0 is set to 0.8 (which is randomly chosen
for this example), the update function for the belief context ↪→ simply makes no
modification to the belief contexts (i.e. β0 ↪→ βnew implies β0 = βnew). The CMS
C, and the initial value C0 is set to the NEMS value for the hypergame. The fear-of-
being-outguessed Υ, is set to an initial value γ of zero. The update function maps
γ  Υ = 0. Therefore there is no update. The χ function assigns the player whose
turn it is to the game state w ∈ W where W → N. For example, χ(start) = A, while
χ(AC) = χ(AD) = D.
7.5.1.3 Game Mapping.
For Step 3: Game Mapping, an extensive form game tree T is associated with
the SCADA security game arena, φTSCADA. The extensive form game tree is defined
as:
T = (S,⇒, s0, λ)
where (S, ⇒) is a countably infinite tree rooted at s0 with edges from Σ. The
nodes of the tree are given by S, where S = {root, ASy, ANC , ASyDD, ASyDnil,
ANCDD, ANCDnil, ASyDDAE, ASyDDAnil, ASyDnilAE, ASyDnilADI , ASyDDAE,
ASyDDADI , ASyDDAnil, ANCDnilAE, and ANCDnilADI}. The root of the tree
denoted s0, is equal to root ∈ S. The
x=⇒ is the function that moves between nodes of
the tree using the edge denoted by x ∈ Σ.
The possible nodes transitions are {root Sybil==⇒ ASy, root
NodeCompromise==========⇒ ANC
where Sybil, Node Compromise ∈ σA} ∪ {ASy
D=⇒ ASyDD, ASy
nil=⇒ ASyDnil, ANC
D=⇒
ANCDD, ANC
nil=⇒ ANCDnil where D, nil ∈ σD} ∪ {ASyDD
E=⇒ ASyDDAE, ASyDD
nil=⇒
ASyDDAnil, ASyDnil
E=⇒ ASyDnilAE, ASyDnil
DI=⇒ ASyDnilADI , ANCDD
E=⇒ ANCDDAE,
ANCDD
DI=⇒ ANCDDADI , ANCDD
nil=⇒ ANCDDAnil, ANCDnil
E=⇒ ANCDnilAE, ANCDnil
DI=⇒ ANCDnilADI where E, DI, nil ∈ σA}.
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The function λ is S → W, where
• λ(s0) = w0
• ∀s, s′ ∈ S, if s a=⇒ s′ then λ(s) a=⇒ λ(s′)
• if λ(s) = w and w a−→ w′ there exists s′ ∈ S s.t. s a=⇒ s′ and λ(s′) = w′
7.5.1.4 Path Structuring.
For Step 4: Path Structuring, the players individual paths through the game
tree are defined. Theses paths are later used to define the strategies, but are
not required. Defining the paths reduces the amount of notation required for the
strategy definitions. The model for the SCADA security temporal hypergame can be
represented by MSCADA = (T ,V). The game tree, T is given from the previous game
mapping and the valuation function V is given by:
• V(pint) = {s0}
• V(pdom) = {ASy, ASyDDAE}
• V(pworstA) = {ANC , ANCDD}
• V(pworstD) = {ANC , ANCDnil} or {ASy, ASyDnil}
7.5.1.5 Define Player Strategies.
For Step 5: Define Player Strategies, strategies for each player are defined in
terms of the states and transitions, as well as the paths defined previously. In this
game the Attacker’s strategy can be defined as:
StratA ≡ ([pint 7→ Sy]A) · ([pint 7→ NC]A) · ([pdom 7→ D]D ⇒ [pmaxA 7→ E]A) ·
([pdom 7→ nil]D ⇒ [pmaxA 7→ DI]A)
The Defender’s strategy can be defined as:
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StratD ≡ ([pint 7→ Sy]A ⇒ [pdom 7→ D]D) · ([pint 7→ NC]A ⇒ [pdom 7→ D]D) ·
([pint 7→ Sy]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D) · ([pint 7→ NC]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D)
7.5.1.6 Analyze Model.
For the final Step 6: Analyze Model, the previous definitions are used to logical
analysis the constructed model. From the previous definitions, StratD {D (pdomD
∨ pworstD), which means the defender can either follow the dominate strategy or the
worst case strategy. If the defender plays “Defend” then the defender can ensure the
worst outcome is avoided:
[turnD 7→ D]D {D ¬pworstD
This indicates the standard result of the game where the defender always desires
to defend. With this, the defender would expect the attacker to reach the expected
best case pexpA. Which means the defender expects the attacker to follow StratA {A
pexpA.
For the defender the strategy is to always defend:
[turnD 7→ D]D {D ¬pworstD
7.5.2 Cyber Physical SCADA Security Temporal Hypergame Ex-
ample - Attacker View.
This section extends the previous game theoretic SCADA security example
with additional actions that can lead to misperceptions, in order to validate more
of the temporal hypergame framework. This example is designed to show how
misperceptions can lead to different results based on the view of the attacker. The
payoff function is denoted Ud(p, a), of player p at a decision node of depth d as a
result of action a. Action a can be either taken by player p or the opponent. The
payoff function (utility) is calculated by :
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Ud(p, a) = Ud−1(p, a
′) +B(p, a, d) (7.4)
B(p, a, d) denotes the behavior of the impact of the action and a′ denotes the
action of p’s opponent. At the root of the game tree (i.e. start of the game) there
are no previous payoffs, so the initial payoff is U0(p, nil) = (0, 0) where nil is no
action. B(p, a, d) is the behavior of the impact of the action, as shown in Table 7.3.
It depends on the action a, the player p, and the depth d of the game tree as an
indicator of the game’s advancement.
Table 7.3: SCADA Behavior of the Impact [165, 307].
B(p, a, d) a is A’s action a is D’s action
p = A (Attacker) d ∗ Impact(a) 0
p = D (Defender) −Impact(a)d Impact(a)
The impact function shown in Table 7.1, determines the impact of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Let C(a), I(a), and A(a) be the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability with the corresponding weights wC , wI , and wA of action a. The
function is defined as:
Impact(a) = wCC(a) + wII(a) + wAA(a) (7.5)
In order to make the game more interesting for hypergame modeling, the SCADA
impact function is expanded by adding two new actions - infect support equipment
and ruin/hide. The updated impact function is shown in Table 7.4. The infect support
equipment action is only available to the attacker in the first round (the attacker’s
initial decision). The ruin/hide action is only available to the attacker if the attacker
chose infect support equipment in the first round. The weight sum to 1 and are fixed
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at wC = 0.1, wI = 0.6, and wA = 0.3. Not defend and not attack have no impact on
the model and are excluded from the table. In Table 7.4, the value 1 is considered
low, 4 is moderate, and 8 is high, in terms of impact.
Table 7.4: Updated SCADA Model Impact Function.
Description C(a) I(a) A(a) Impact(a)
Defend 6 6 1 4.5
Sybil 6 1 1 1.5
Node Compromise 6 1 1 1.5
Eavesdropping 8 1 1 1.7
Data Injection 1 8 6 6.7
Infect Support Equipment 6 3 3 3.3
Ruin/Hide 2 5 3 4.1
The simple expanded SCADA sensor network game is shown in Figure 7.9.
This shows the addition of the extra Infect Support Equipment (ISE) option for
the attacker in the first round of play.
7.5.2.1 Initial Game Definition.
To apply Step 1: Initial Game Definition of the temporal hypergame framework
to the information from the SCADA model, it is necessary to create a temporal
hypergame model. Let the temporal hypergame be:
HTSCADA , {GTD}
The perceived game GTSCADA is:
GTSCADA , (N,ΣFull,ΦT , {i}i∈N)
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Figure 7.9: Expanded SCADA Sensor Network Game.
Where N = {Attacker (A), Defender (D)} is the set of players. ΣFull is the finite
set of player actions such that ΣFull = ΣA∪ΣD, ΣA = {Sybil(Sy), NodeCompromise(NC),
Eavesdropping(E), DataInjection(DI), NotAttack(nil), InfectSupportEquipment(ISE),
Ruin/Hide(RH)}, and ΣD = {Defend(D), NotDefend(nil)}.
The preference ordering function for the ith player i = ui(x, y) ≤ ui(x′, y) for
i ∈ N. This means for the attacker A indicates the outcome (x,y) is preferred to
outcome (x′, y) if x ≤ x′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . For the defender D indicates the outcome
(x,y) is preferred to outcome (x, y′) if y ≤ y′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . The Nash equilibrium
concept is encoded in the preference relation, i, assuming both players are rational.
The variable payoff function is denoted by:
V , {ω, ωinit, ψ, δ}
The payoff function variables are given by ω = {wC , wI , wA, d, Impact(a)}. The
initial values ωinit, are set to 0 except for wC = 0.1, wI = 0.6, and wA = 0.3. The
function ψ works as follows:
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• If variable Impact(a)
– If a = Defend, then Impact = 4.5
– if a = Sybil, then Impact = 1.5
– if a = Node Compromise, then Impact = 1.5
– if a = Eavesdropping, then Impact = 1.7
– if a = Data Injection, then Impact = 6.7
– if a = Infect Support Equipment, then Impact = 3.3
– if a = Ruin/Hide, then Impact = 4.1
• if variable d, then d = d + 1
With the proposed model there are no constraints to be applied.
7.5.2.2 Identification of States and Transitions.
For Step 2: Identification of States and Transitions of the temporal hypergame
framework, it is necessary to define the rules of the game the players must follow and
is derived from the game tree. The game arena is given by:
ΦTSCADA , (W,−→, w0, β, C, ↪→, β0, C0,Υ,, γ,V ,χ)
W consists of sixteen game states, including start, ASy, ANC , AISE, ASyDD,
ASyDnil, ANCDD, ANCDnil, AISEDD, AISEDnil, ASyDDAE, ASyDDAnil, ASyDnilAE,
ASyDnilADI , ASyDDAE, ASyDDADI , ASyDDAnil, ANCDnilAE, ANCDnilADI , AISEDDARH ,
and AISEDNDARH . The function −→ defines the game transitions such that (W x
Σ) → W. The possible transitions are:
• start x Sy → ASy where Sy ∈ ΣA
• start x NC → ANC where NC ∈ ΣA
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• start x ISE → AISE where ISE ∈ ΣA
• ASy x D → ASyDD where D ∈ ΣD
• ASy x nil → ASyDnil where nil ∈ ΣD
• ANC x D → ANCDD where D ∈ ΣD
• ANC x nil → ANCDnil where nil ∈ ΣD
• AISE x D → AISEDD where D ∈ ΣD
• AISE x nil → AISEDnil where nil ∈ ΣD
• ASyDD x E → ASyDDAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ASyDD x nil → ASyDDAnil where nil ∈ ΣA
• ASyDnil x E → ASyDnilAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ASyDnil x DI → ASyDnilADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• ANCDD x E → ASyDDAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ANCDD x DI → ASyDDADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• ANCDD x nil → ASyDDAnil where nil ∈ ΣA
• ANCDnil x E → ANCDnilAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ANCDnil x DI → ANCDnilADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• AISEDD x RH → AISEDDARH where RH ∈ ΣA
• AISEDnil x RH → AISEDnilARH where RH ∈ ΣA
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The initial state of the game w0, is equal to start ∈ W, where
−−−→
start =
{ASy, ANC , AISE}. The belief context β0 is set to 0.8 (which is randomly chosen
for this example), the update function for the belief context ↪→ simply makes no
modification to the belief contexts (i.e. β0 ↪→ βnew implies β0 = βnew). The CMS
C, and the initial value C0 is set to the NEMS value for the hypergame. The fear-of-
being-outguessed Υ, is set to an initial value γ of zero. The update function maps
γ  Υ = 0. Therefore there is no update. The χ function assigns the player whose
turn it is to the game state w ∈ W where W → N. For example, χ(start) = A, while
χ(AC) = χ(AD) = D.
7.5.2.3 Game Mapping.
For Step 3: Game Mapping, an extensive form game tree T is associated with
the SCADA security game arena, φTSCADA. The extensive form game tree is defined
as:
T = (S,⇒, s0, λ)
where (S, ⇒) is a countably infinite tree rooted at s0 with edges from Σ. The
nodes of the tree are given by S, where S = {root, ASy, ANC , ASyDD, ASyDnil,
ANCDD, ANCDnil, ASyDDAE, ASyDDAnil, ASyDnilAE, ASyDnilADI , ASyDDAE,
ASyDDADI , ASyDDAnil, ANCDnilAE, and ANCDnilADI}. The root of the tree
denoted s0, is equal to root ∈ S. The
x=⇒ is the function that moves between nodes of
the tree using the edge denoted by x ∈ Σ.
The possible nodes transitions are {root Sybil==⇒ ASy, root
NodeCompromise==========⇒ ANC ,
root ISE==⇒ AISE where Sybil, Node Compromise, ISE ∈ σA} ∪ {ASy
D=⇒ ASyDD,
ASy
nil=⇒ ASyDnil, ANC
D=⇒ ANCDD, ANC
nil=⇒ ANCDnil, AISE
nil=⇒ AISEDnil, AISE
D=⇒ AISEDD where D, nil ∈ σD} ∪ {ASyDD
E=⇒ ASyDDAE, ASyDD
nil=⇒ ASyDDAnil,
ASyDnil
E=⇒ ASyDnilAE, ASyDnil
DI=⇒ ASyDnilADI , ANCDD
E=⇒ ANCDDAE, ANCDD
DI=⇒ ANCDDADI , ANCDD
nil=⇒ ANCDDAnil, ANCDnil
E=⇒ ANCDnilAE, ANCDnil
DI=⇒
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ANCDnilADI , AISEDD
RH==⇒ AISEDDARH , AISEDnil
RH==⇒ AISEDnilARH where E, DI,
nil, RH ∈ σA}.
The function λ is S → W, where
• λ(s0) = w0
• ∀s, s′ ∈ S, if s a=⇒ s′ then λ(s) a=⇒ λ(s′)
• if λ(s) = w and w a−→ w′ there exists s′ ∈ S s.t. s a=⇒ s′ and λ(s′) = w′
7.5.2.4 Path Structuring.
For Step 4: Path Structuring, the players individual paths through the game
tree are defined. Theses paths are later used to define the strategies, but are
not required. Defining the paths reduces the amount of notation required for the
strategy definitions. The model for the SCADA security temporal hypergame can be
represented by MSCADA = (T ,V). The game tree, T is given from the previous game
mapping and the valuation function V is given by:
• V(pint) = {s0}
• V(pdomD) = {ASy, ASyDDAE}
• V(pworstA) = {ANC , ANCDD}
• V(pworstD) = {ANC , ANCDnil} or {ASy, ASyDnil}
• V(pexpA) = {ASy, ASyDDADI}
When the hypergame is considered, the additional valuation function is included:
• V(pdomA) = {AISE, AISEDD} or {AISE, AISEDnil}
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7.5.2.5 Define Player Strategies.
For Step 5: Define Player Strategies, strategies for each player are defined in
terms of the states and transitions, as well as the paths defined previously. In this
game the Attacker’s strategy can be defined as:
StratA ≡ ([pint 7→ Sy]A) · ([pint 7→ NC]A) · ([pint 7→ ISE]A) · ([pdomD 7→ D]D ⇒
[pmaxA 7→ E]A) · ([pdomD 7→ nil]D ⇒ [pmaxA 7→ DI]A) · ([pdomD 7→ D]D ⇒
[pdomA 7→ RH]A) · ([pdomD 7→ nil]D ⇒ [pdomA 7→ RH]A) · ([  [turnA 7→ Sy]A ⇒
[turnA 7→ E]A ∨ [turnA 7→ DI]A) ([  [turnA 7→ NC]A ⇒ [turnA 7→ E]A ∨
[turnA 7→ DI]A) · ([  [turnA 7→ ISE]A ⇒ [turnA 7→ RH]A)
The Defender’s strategy can be defined as:
StratD ≡ ([pint 7→ Sy]A ⇒ [pdomD 7→ D]D) · ([pint 7→ NC]A ⇒ [pdomD 7→ D]D) ·
([pint 7→ Sy]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D) · ([pint 7→ NC]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D)
7.5.2.6 Analyze Model.
For the final Step 6: Analyze Model, the previous definitions are used to logical
analysis the constructed model. From the previous definitions, StratD {D (pdomD
∨ pworstD), which means the defender can either follow the dominate strategy or the
worst case strategy. If the defender plays “Defend” then the defender can ensure the
worst outcome is avoided:
[turnD 7→ D]D {D ¬pworstD
This indicates the standard result of the game where the defender always desires
to defend. With this, the defender would expect the attacker to reach the expected
best case pexpA. Which means the defender expects StratA {A pexpA. Since there is
a hypergame, the strategy is really StratA {A pdomA.
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The attacker follows ¬ISE?[turnA 7→ ISE]A ∧ ISE?[turnA 7→ ISE]A. This
allows the attacker to achieve the best outcome, while allowing the defender to follow
their perceived dominant strategy.
For the defender the strategy is to always defend:
[turnD 7→ D]D {D ¬pworstD
For the attacker the strategy is to play the hidden hypergame strategy of always
choosing the ISE in the first round and then the RH action in the second round.
¬ISE?[turnA 7→ ISE]A ∧ ISE?[turnA 7→ ISE]A {A pexpA
7.5.3 Cyber Physical SCADA Security Temporal Hypergame Ex-
ample - Defender View.
This section extends the previous simple SCADA security example with
additional actions that can lead to misperceptions, in order to validate more
of the temporal hypergame framework. This example is designed to show how
misperceptions can lead to different results based on the view of the defender. The
payoff function is denoted Ud(p, a), of player p at a decision node of depth d as a
result of action a. Action a can be either taken by player p or the opponent. The
payoff function (utility) is calculated by:
Ud(p, a) = Ud−1(p, a
′) +B(p, a, d)
B(p, a, d) denotes the behavior of the impact of the action and a′ denotes the
action of p’s opponent. At the root of the game tree (i.e. start of the game) there
are no previous payoffs, so the initial payoff is U0(p, nil) = (0, 0) where nil is no
action. B(p, a, d) is the behavior of the impact of the action, as shown in Table 7.5.
It depends on the action a, the player p, and the depth d of the game tree (shown in
Figure 7.10) as an indicator of the game’s advancement.
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Table 7.5: SCADA Behavior of the Impact.
B(p, a, d) a is A’s action a is D’s action
p = A (Attacker) d ∗ Impact(a) 0
p = D (Defender) −Impact(a)d Impact(a)
The impact function shown in Table 7.5, determines the impact of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Let C(a), I(a), and A(a) be the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability with the corresponding weights wC , wI , and wA of action a. The
function is then defined as:
Impact(a) = wCC(a) + wII(a) + wAA(a)
The weight sum to 1 and are fixed at wC = 0.1, wI = 0.6, and wA = 0.3. The
impact function is calculated according to Table 7.6. Not defend and not attack have
no impact on the model and are excluded from the table. In Table 7.6, the value 1 is
considered low, 4 is moderate, and 8 is high, in terms of impact. The SCADA impact
function is expanded by adding four new actions - virus, ruin, hide, and disconnect.
The virus action is only available to the attacker in the first round (the attacker’s
initial decision). The ruin or hide action is only available to the attacker if the
attacker chose infect support equipment in the first round. The disconnect action is
only available to the defender in the first round, after that it is not available. The
virus action represents a cyber weapon that may be used in a future conflict. The
defenders option to disconnect represents a third world country, such as one in Africa,
that may have limited connectivity to the outside world and therefore have limited
infection vectors.
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Table 7.6: SCADA Model Impact Function.
Description C(a) I(a) A(a) Impact(a)
Defend 6 6 1 4.5
Disconnect 8 8 8 8.0
Sybil 6 1 1 1.5
Node Compromise 6 1 1 1.5
Eavesdropping 8 1 1 1.7
Data Injection 1 8 6 6.7
Virus 6 3 3 3.3
Ruin 2 8 8 7.4
Hide 4 0 0 0.4
The extended SCADA sensor nework game is shown in Figure 7.10. This game
tree shows the addition of the additional actions for the attacker and defender in their
respective rounds of play.
7.5.3.1 Initial Game Definition.
To apply Step 1: Initial Game Definition of the temporal hypergame framework
to the information from the SCADA model, it is necessary to create a temporal
hypergame model. Let the temporal hypergame be:
HTSCADA , {GTD}
The perceived game GTSCADA:
GTSCADA , (N,ΣFull,ΦT , {i}i∈N)
Where N = {Attacker (A), Defender (D)} is the set of players. ΣFull is the finite
set of player actions such that ΣFull = ΣA∪ΣD, ΣA = {Sybil(Sy), NodeCompromise(NC),
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Eavesdropping(E), DataInjection(DI), NotAttack(nil), V irus(V ), Ruin(R), Hide(H)},
and ΣD = {Defend(D), NotDefend(nil), Diconnect(DC)}. In this model the action
virus is known to the defender, but the action disconnect is not known to the attacker.
The preference ordering function for the ith player i = ui(x, y) ≤ ui(x′, y) for i
∈ N. This means for attacker A indicates the outcome (x,y) is preferred to outcome
(x′, y) if x ≤ x′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . For defender D indicates the outcome (x,y) is preferred
to outcome (x, y′) if y ≤ y′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . Notice the Nash equilibrium concept is
defined in the preference relation, i, assuming both players are rational.
The variable payoff function is denoted by:
V , {ω, ωinit, ψ, δ}
The payoff function variables are given by ω = {wC , wI , wA, d, Impact(a)}. The
initial values ωinit, are set to 0 except for wC = 0.1, wI = 0.6, and wA = 0.3. The
function ψ works as follows:
• If variable Impact(a)
– If a = Defend, then Impact = 4.5
– If a = Disconnect, then Impact = 8.0
– if a = Sybil, then Impact = 1.5
– if a = Node Compromise, then Impact = 1.5
– if a = Eavesdropping, then Impact = 1.7
– if a = Data Injection, then Impact = 6.7
– if a = Infect Support Equipment, then Impact = 3.3
– if a = Ruin, then Impact = 4.1
– if a = Hide, then Impact = 0.4
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• if variable d, then d = d + 1
With the proposed model there are no constraints to be applied.
7.5.3.2 Identification of States and Transitions.
For Step 2: Identification of States and Transitions of the temporal hypergame
framework, it is necessary to define the rules of the game the players must follow and
is derived from the game tree. The game arena is given by:
ΦTSCADA , (W,−→, w0, β, C, ↪→, β0, C0,Υ,, γ,V ,χ)
W consists of twenty-nine game states, including start, ASy, ANC , AV , ASyDD,
ASyDnil, ASyDDC , ANCDD, ANCDnil, ANCDDC , AVDD, AVDnil, AVDDC , ASyDDADI ,
ASyDDAE, ASyDnilADI , ASyDnilAE, ASyDDCADI , ASyDDCAE, ANCDnilADI , ANCDnilAE,
ANCDDCADI , ANCDDCAE, AVDDAR, AVDDAH , AVDnilAR, AVDnilAH , AVDDCAR,
AVDDCAH . The function −→ defines the game transitions such that (W x Σ)→W.
The possible transitions are:
• start x Sy → ASy where Sy ∈ ΣA
• start x NC → ANC where NC ∈ ΣA
• start x V → AV where V ∈ ΣA
• ASy x D → ASyDD where D ∈ ΣD
• ASy x nil → ASyDnil where nil ∈ ΣD
• ASy x DC → ASyDDC where DC ∈ ΣD
• ANC x D → ANCDD where D ∈ ΣD
• ANC x nil → ANCDnil where nil ∈ ΣD
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• ANC x DC → ANCDDC where DC ∈ ΣD
• AV x D → AVDD where D ∈ ΣD
• AV x nil → AVDnil where nil ∈ ΣD
• AV x DC → AVDDC where DC ∈ ΣD
• ASyDD x E → ASyDDAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ASyDD x DI → ASyDDADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• ASyDnil x E → ASyDnilAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ASyDnil x DI → ASyDnilADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• ASyDDC x E → ASyDDCAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ASyDDC x DI → ASyDDCADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• ANCDD x E → ASyDDAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ANCDD x DI → ASyDDADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• ANCDnil x E → ANCDnilAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ANCDnil x DI → ANCDnilADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• ANCDDC x E → ANCDDCAE where E ∈ ΣA
• ANCDDC x DI → ANCDDCADI where DI ∈ ΣA
• AVDD x R → AVDDAR where R ∈ ΣA
• AVDD x H → AVDDAH where H ∈ ΣA
• AVDnil x R → AVDnilAR where R ∈ ΣA
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• AVDnil x H → AVDnilAH where H ∈ ΣA
• AVDDC x R → AVDDCAR where R ∈ ΣA
• AVDDC x H → AVDDCAH where H ∈ ΣA
The initial state of the game w0, is equal to start ∈ W, where
−−−→
start =
{ASy, ANC , AV }. The belief context β0 is set to 0.8 (which is selected randomly
for this example), the update function for the belief context ↪→ simply makes no
modification to the belief contexts (i.e. β0 ↪→ βnew implies β0 = βnew). The CMS
C, and the initial value C0 is set to the NEMS value for the hypergame. The fear-of-
being-outguessed Υ, is set to an initial value γ of zero. The update function maps
γ  Υ = 0. Therefore there is no update. The χ function assigns he player whose
turn it is to the game state w ∈ W where W → N. For example, χ(start) = A, while
χ(AC) = χ(AD) = D.
7.5.3.3 Game Mapping.
For Step 3: Game Mapping, an extensive form game tree T is associated with
the SCADA security game arena, φTSCADA. The extensive form game tree is defined
as:
T = (S,⇒, s0, λ) (7.6)
where (S, ⇒) is a countably infinite tree rooted at s0 with edges from Σ. The
nodes of the tree are given by S, where S = {root, ASy, ANC , AV , ASyDD, ASyDnil,
ASyDDC , ANCDD, ANCDnil, ANCDDC , AVDD, AVDnil, AVDDC , ASyDDAE, ASyDDADI ,
ASyDnilAE, ASyDnilADI , ASyDDCAE, ASyDDCADI , ANCDnilAE, ANCDnilADI , ANCDDCAE,
ANCDDCADI , AVDDAR, AVDDAH , AVDnilAR, AVDnilAH , AVDDCAR, AVDDCAH}.
The root of the tree denoted s0, is equal to root ∈ S. The
x=⇒ is the function that moves
between nodes of the tree using the edge denoted by x ∈ Σ.
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The possible nodes transitions are {root Sybil==⇒ ASy, root
NodeCompromV=========⇒ ANC ,
root V=⇒ AV where Sy, NC, V ∈ σA} ∪ {ASy
D=⇒ ASyDD, ASy
nil=⇒ ASyDnil, ASy
DC==⇒ ASyDDC , ANC
D=⇒ ANCDD, ANC
nil=⇒ ANCDnil, ANC
DC==⇒ ANCDDC , AV
nil=⇒
AVDnil, AV
D=⇒ AVDD, AV
DC==⇒ AVDDC where D, nil, DC ∈ σD} ∪ {ASyDD
E=⇒
ASyDDAE, ASyDD
nil=⇒ ASyDDAnil, ASyDnil
E=⇒ ASyDnilAE, ASyDnil
DI=⇒ ASyDnilADI ,
ASyDDC
E=⇒ ASyDDCAE, ASyDDC
DI=⇒ ASyDDCADI , ANCDD
E=⇒ ANCDDAE, ANCDD
DI=⇒ ANCDDADI , ANCDD
nil=⇒ ANCDDAnil, ANCDnil
E=⇒ ANCDnilAE, ANCDnil
DI=⇒
ANCDnilADI , ANCDDC
E=⇒ ANCDDCAE, ANCDDC
DI=⇒ ANCDDCADI , AVDD
R=⇒
AVDDAR, AVDD
H=⇒ AVDDAH , AVDnil
R=⇒ AVDnilAR, AVDnil
H=⇒ AVDnilAH AVDDC
R=⇒ AVDDCAR, AVDDC
H=⇒ AVDDCAH , where E, DI, nil, R, H ∈ σA}.
The function λ is S → W, where
• λ(s0) = w0
• ∀s, s′ ∈ S, if s a=⇒ s′ then λ(s) a=⇒ λ(s′)
• if λ(s) = w and w a−→ w′ there exists s′ ∈ S s.t. s a=⇒ s′ and λ(s′) = w′
7.5.3.4 Path Structuring.
For Step 4: Path Structuring, the players individual paths through the game
tree are defined. Theses paths are later used to define the strategies, but are not
required. Defining the paths reduces the amount of notation required for the strategy
definitions. The model for the extended SCADA security temporal hypergame can
be represented by MSCADA = (T ,V). The game tree, T is given from the previous
game mapping and the valuation function v is given by:
• V(pint) = {s0}
• V(pdomA) = {AV , AVDD, AVDDAR}
• V(pdomDexp) = {ASy, ASyDD} or {ANC , ANCDD} or {AV , AVDD}
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• V(pworstA) = {ANC , ANCDD}
• V(pworstD) = {ANC , ANCDnil} or {ASy, ASyDnil} or {AV , AVDnil}
When the hypergame advantage (defender can Disconnect) is considered, the
additional functions are included; while the other functions remain the same:
• V(pdomDhyp) = {ASy, ASyDDC} or {ANC , ANCDDC} or {ANC , ANCDD} or {AV ,
AVDDC}
• V(pworstAhyp) = {AV , AVDDC , AVDDCAR} or {AV , AVDDC , AVDDCAH} or
{ASy, ASyDDC , ASyDDCADI} or {ASy, ASyDNCDDCAE}
The pdomDhyp represents the dominant path for the defender from the attacker’s
point-of-view. The attacker has failed to account for the defender’s disconnect option.
While the pdomDexp represents the dominant path for the defender when the defender’s
advantage (Disconnect) is considered. The attacker is unaware of this option, and
therefore assumes pdomDexp is the expected outcome for a rational defender.
7.5.3.5 Define Player Strategies.
For Step 5: Define Player Strategies, strategies for each player are defined in
terms of the states and transitions, as well as the paths defined previously. In this
game the attacker’s strategy can be defined as:
StratA ≡ ([pint 7→ Sy]A) · ([pint 7→ NC]A) · ([pint 7→ V ]A) · ([  [turnA 7→ Sy]A ⇒
[turnA 7→ E]A ∨ [turnA 7→ DI]A}) · ([  [turnA 7→ NC]A ⇒ [turnA 7→ E]A ∨
[turnA 7→ DI]A ∨ [turnA 7→ nil]A}) · ([  [turnA 7→ V ]A ⇒ [turnA 7→ R]A ∨
[turnA 7→ H]A}) · ([pdomDexp 7→ D]D ⇒ [pmaxA 7→ R]A) · ([pdomDexp 7→ nil]D ⇒
[pmaxA 7→ H]A)
From the attacker’s perspective, the defender’s strategy is defined as:
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StratDA ≡ ([pint 7→ Sy]A ⇒ [pdomDexp 7→ D]D) · ([pint 7→ NC]A ⇒ [pdomDexp 7→ D]D) ·
([pint 7→ V ]A ⇒ [pdomDexp 7→ D]D) · ([pint 7→ Sy]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D) ·
([pint 7→ NC]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D) · ([pint 7→ V ]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D)
But the defender has an extra action available (Disconnect) that the attacker is
not aware of, so the defender’s strategy can be defined as:
StratD ≡ ([pint 7→ Sy]A ⇒ [pdomDhyp 7→ DC]D) · ([pint 7→ NC]A ⇒
[pdomDhyp 7→ DC]D ∨ [pdomDhyp 7→ D]D) · ([pint 7→ V ]A ⇒ [pdomDhyp 7→ DC]D) ·
([pint 7→ Sy]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D) · ([pint 7→ NC]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D) ·
([pint 7→ V ]A ⇒ [pworstD 7→ nil]D)
7.5.3.6 Analyze Model.
For the final Step 6: Analyze Model, the previous definitions are used to logically
analyze the constructed model. From the previous definitions, StratDA {D (pdomDexp
∨ pworstD), which means the defender can either follow the dominant strategy or the
worst case strategy from the view of the attacker. A rational defender is always
assumed to follow the dominant strategy. In this case if the defender plays Defend
then the defender can ensure the worst outcome is avoided:
[turnD 7→ D]D {D ¬pworstD
This represents the standard result of the game where the defender always desires
to defend. With this, the defender would expect the attacker to reach the expected
best case pexpA. Which means the defender would expect StratA {A pdomA.
The attacker follows ¬V?[turnA 7→ V ]A ∧ V?[turnA 7→ V ]A. This allows the
attacker to achieve the best outcome, while allowing the defender to follow their
perceived dominant strategy.
For the defender the solution is always to use the ”Defend” strategy:
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[turnD 7→ D]D {D ¬pworstD
The attacker’s strategy is to always choose the Virus (V) in the first round and
then the Ruin (R) action in the third round. This strategy represents the temporal
relationship between the actions for the attacker. If the attacker chooses any other
available action in the first round, then the Ruin action is not available in the next
round.
¬V?[turnA 7→ V ]A ∧ V?[turnA 7→ V ]A {A pdomA
Up to this point the analysis has focused on the solution to the game without
considering the hypergame advantage for the defender. From the previous definitions,
StratD {D (pdomDhyp ∨ pworstD), which means the defender can either follow the
hypergame strategy or the worst case strategy. It is assumed that a rational defender
always plays to the hypergame strategy, since it is dominant. In this case, if the
defender plays ”Defend” or the hidden hypergame strategy ”Disconnect”, then the
defender can ensure the worst outcome is avoided:
[turnD 7→ D]D ∨ [turnD 7→ DC]D {D ¬pworstD
This shows the hypergame result of the game where the defender would expect
the attacker to reach the expected worst case pworstD . Which means the defender
expects StratA {A pworstAhyp .
The attacker still follows ¬V?[turnA 7→ V ]A ∧ V?[turnA 7→ V ]A. This allows
the attacker to achieve their perceived best outcome in the temporal sense, which is
StratA{A pdomA from the previous analysis. Because of the hypergame, the attacker
really ends up in the worst outcome StratA {A pworstAhyp .
Since the solution to the hypergame is for the defender to play Defend or
Disconnect and the attacker to play Virus followed by Ruin, the defender can eliminate
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Defend. By playing only Disconnect, the defender can guarantee the best possible
outcome.
[turnD 7→ DC]D {D ¬pworstD
The attacker’s strategy is to always play the action Virus (V) in the first round
and then Ruin (R) in the third round.
[turnD 7→ D]D ∨ [turnD 7→ DC]D {D ¬pworstD
The temporal hypergame analysis shows that the defender can improve upon
their outcome by leveraging the attacker’s misperception as the game progresses
temporally. It also shows that the defender can guarantee the attacker reaches the
worst case outcome instead of the best outcome from the standard game analysis.
7.6 Summary
This chapter applies the temporal hypergame framework presented in the
previous chapters to the game theoretic Prisoner’s Dilemma, an iterated hypergame,
and three cyber physical examples. All of the examples use the six-step process
from Section 7.3 for creating a representative model with the temporal hypergame
framework. These examples are applied for validation of the temporal hypergame
framework in order to show the utility and applicability of the framework. The
examples chosen exercise part of the temporal hypergame framework and are not
all inclusive. Each example exercises parts of the framework, showing the temporal
hypergame framework provides the correct insight into the modeled event.
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Figure 7.10: Expanded SCADA Sensor Network Game.
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VIII. Conclusions and Future Work
This research presents a temporal hypergame framework to capture the temporal
aspects of conflict and decision making. Overall this dissertation presents the first
application of temporal logic to hypergames in order to provide a more flexible method
for modeling by domain experts. Using this framework the concepts of trust, distrust,
and deception are developed and formalized for Hypergame Theory. The framework
is applied to a SCADA hypergame, as well as classical game theoretic games, to show
that the framework is a realistic modeling method for a variety of applications given
its flexibility.
8.1 Conclusions and Findings
Findings 1, 2, 3, and 4 take concepts from Sasaki [310] and generalize the concepts
to Vane’s hypergame model [356], by defining the base game, difference game, and
hyper Nash equilibrium in Chapter 5. The rest of the findings are in Chapter 6.
Findings 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 define trust, misperception and deception over the
temporal hypergame model. Findings 13, 14, and 15 relate theorems concerning the
SPNE of repeated games to the temporal hypergame framework. The findings are
repeated here for reference.
Finding 1. Let H = (Gp, Gq) be a hypergame with Gp = (N, Σp, up) and Gq = (N,
Σq, uq) where p, q ∈ N. A normal form game G = (N, Σ, u) is called the base game
of H iff u = up, u = uq, and Σ = Σp ∩ Σq , . Let the base game (BG) of hypergame
H be denoted by BGH .
Finding 2. Subgames always have the same base game
Finding 3. Let H = (Gp, Gq) be a hypergame with Gp = (N, Σp, up) and Gq = (N,
Σq, uq) where p, q ∈ N. A normal form game G = (N, Σ, u) is called the difference
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game of H iff u = up ∪ uq \ up ∩ uq, Σ = Σp ∪ Σq \ Σp ∩ Σq, and u , or Σ , . Let
the difference game of hypergame H be denoted by ∆H .
Finding 4. Let H = (Gp, Gq) be a hypergame with Gp = (N, Σp, up) and Gq = (N,
Σq, uq). Then a∗ ∈ Σp ∩ Σq is called a stable hyper Nash (SHN) equilibrium iff a∗ ∈
N(Gp) and a∗ ∈ N(Gq) where N(G) represents the Nash equilibriums for game G.
Finding 5. Weak Trust - Player 1 has weak trust in Player 2 if at a vertex s′ ∈ Sσ1
∃ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′.
Finding 6. Strong Trust - Player 1 has strong trust in Player 2 if ∀ s′ ∈ Sσ1 ∃ s
∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′.
Finding 7. Weak Distrust - Player 1 has weak distrust in Player 2 if at a vertex
s
′ ∈ Sσ1 @ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′.
Finding 8. Strong Distrust - Player 1 has strong distrust in Player 2 if ∀ s′ ∈ Sσ1
@ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′.
Finding 9. Mistrust - Player 1 mistrust Player 2 if ∃ s′ ∈ Sσ1 where Player 1
distrusts Player 2.
Finding 10. Misperception - Player 2 misperceives the strategy of Player 1 if there
is at least one vertex s′ ∈ Sσ1 ∃ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that s
a=⇒ s′ so that when
a new strategy σ∗ which is equal to σ1 except that @ s ∈ Sσ1 and a ∈ ΣFull such that
s
a=⇒ s∗ and (σ1, σ2) ≤1 (σ∗, σ2)
Finding 11. Deception - Player 1 (p) deceives Player 2 (q) if for a hypergame H,
the following is true:
• Player 2 trusts Player 1, according to Finding 5 or Finding 6.
• Player 2 misperceives the strategy of Player 1, according to Finding 10.
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• If there exists a strategy pair (σp, σq), σp ∈ Σp and σq ∈ Σq where (σp, σq) ∈
N(GT ) and (σp, σq) < SHN(GT ) and (σp∗, σq) ∈ SHN(GT )
Finding 12. In every finite temporal hypergame with mixed strategies, there is at
least one SPNE (which may be in the base game).
Finding 13. If a temporal hypergame H at some time x has a Nash equilibrium in
the base game (i.e. stable hyper Nash equilibrium), then the temporal hypergame has
a SPNE.
Finding 14. In both the infinite and finite temporal hypergame with mixed strategies,
there is at least one SPNE.
Finding 15. In a hypergame H, a strategy is a SPNE in the base game iff there is
no profitable one-shot deviation. A one-shot deviation would produce a strategy in the
difference game of hypergame H.
8.2 Future Work
The first area would be gathering empirical evidence on how to integrate this
approach into real-world decision making problems for the warfighter. The warfighter
(especially in the cyber sense) would benefit from the insights and concise image of the
battlefield that hypergame theory present such as the temporal hypergame framework
presented in this dissertation. This approach has a lot of theoretical applicability, but
it is still a model that has not been exercised in any real capacity. Especially when
considering the functional payoffs. It is also necessary to understand the ability of
the warfighter when using tools such as those proposed in this research. First, is
the level of information required for modeling realistic and obtainable? Second, is
the warfighter able to use a tool that models misperceptions without introducing
additional bias into the decision making process?
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The second area of future work concerns the jHALF software for analyzing
hypergames [135]. It should be updated to support the temporal hypergame
framework proposed in this research. There are indications in the design of the
jHALF software or the temporal hypergame framework that would make the two
incompatible. Incorporation also opens the door for additional analysis, such as
modeling checking. While modeling checking was not part of this research, its
applicability to Hypergame Theory should be investigated and understood.
The third area of future research is into real-time strategy games. The hypergame
model can be used to determine the best strategy given the game environment. It
also be used to train a decision maker by adding or removing columns and rows from
the hypergame. This allows game ply by the AI to be tuned to the player’s ability -
becoming harder for advanced players or softening for novice players. By applying the
temporal hypergame framework to the real-time strategy games, complex strategies
can be formed to mimic real world events.
The fourth area is proving how “strategy switching” [275], as defined in
the temporal hypergame framework, affects the outcomes and analysis. Strategy
switching can cause a cycle to appear over time as the game progresses. The properties
of the hypergame model should be identified to limit the cycling. This may involve
using a subset of the strategy switching operators in the language model.
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Appendix A: Hypergame Military Applications Expanded
This appendix expands on the military applications of hypergames. Previously,
a short review was provided on many of the applications. Here each application is
expanded to show the notion as well as how the analysis was performed by the original
authors. The expanded form is contained in an appendix in order to keep flow and
consistency in the main body of the document. The Fall of France, Nationalization of
the Suez Canal, an Arms Race, Nuclear Confrontation, and the Falkland/Malvinas
Conflict are discussed.
A.1 Fall of France
Bennett and Dando [40] [39] first applied hypergames to the first real world
application during their analysis of the Fall of France during WWII. Hypergame
representation of the Fall of France by Bennett and Dandos is shown in Table A.1.
The Germans believe the French would not include the Germans attacking
through the Ardennes forest since such an attack could be stopped. The Germans
therefore reasoned the French would believe an attack in the north (Belgian plains)
or the south (Maginot Line) was more likely. The French player is only able to
see the game on the left in Table A.1. Given the outcomes, the French follows
the Nash Equilibrium, choosing F2 as their strategy and expecting the Germans to
choose G2, but the Germans were playing a metagame that incorporated the broader
view, and included the strategy the French had discounted. The Germans figured
the French would not consider defending the center heavy, so they decided to attack
there, choosing G3 from the game on the right in Table A.1. This lead to the success
of the German attack and France falling quickly. This attack had to be excluded from
French rationale in order to make it feasible and allow the Germans to select their
highest expected utility based on probable French thought.
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Table A.1: Hypergame Representations of the Fall of France.
French
F1 F2
Germans G1 1,4 2,3
G2 4,1 3,2*
French
F1 F2 F3
1,4 2,3 2,3 G1 Germans
4,1 3,2 3,2* G2 * Nash Equilibrium
3,2 5,0** 2,3 G3 ** True Outcome
A.2 Nationalization of the Suez Canal
Wright et. al. [369] [328] presented a more complex hypergame example in their
analysis of the Nationalization of the Suez Canal. By 1955 Egypt was becoming
nationalistic, and pursued plans to free itself of control by Britain. Britain wanted to
protect Western marine traffic, including safeguarding oil shipped from the Middle
East, by preventing Russian interference in the Middle East and protecting the Suez
Canal. Tensions had also increased between Egypt and Israel. Military raids between
the two countries lead to both countries desiring a stronger military. In August of
1955, Egypt wanted to purchase arms to support its military. France, Britain, and
the U.S. did not supply arms because of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 limited
arms deals. This lead to Egypt approaching Russia to purchase arms.
In 1956, Egypt wanted to create hydroelectric power and new farmland by
building the High Aswan Dam. The Egyptian government could not afford the cost
of constructing the dam without help from either the West or Russia. The West was
concerned that Russia would seize the opportunity to fund the construction to develop
closer ties with Egypt, building on the momentum of the previous arms deal. Western
funding would keep Russia from gaining influence in the Middle East, while allowing
Britain to gain influence after its failure to support the arms deal. Meanwhile the
U.S. desired to help Egypt develop independence economically.
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By December 1955 a proposal to finance the dam construction was made by
Britain, the U.S., and the World Bank. The deal provided 30% of the cost of
constructing and imposed numerous conditions:
• Egypt had to commit one third of its internal revenue for 10 years to the
construction of the dam
• Egypt was required to use economic policy to limit inflation from the addition
of foreign capital
• Competitive selection was required for contracts
• Egypt could not accept help from communist countries
Egypt already wanting less control by Britain, feared the terms of the loan would
lead to Western dominance, and decided to reject the finance proposal. This caused
Egypt to change the proposal and send a counter offer to the West in February 1956.
By this time domestic policy in the U.S. was shifting and anti-western sentiment
was increasing in the Middle East and the U.S. was quickly losing interest in the
financing offer. Meanwhile the General of the Jordan Army, an Englishman, was
dismissed which was seen as a political move caused by the anti-western sentiment.
This caused the U.S. and Britain to let the finance proposal expire. Egypt hoped
either the counter offer would be accepted or its negotiating position would change.
By April 1956, Egypt desired to purchase more weapons as the Israeli attacks
increased. A deal was reached in May of 1956 to limit the shipment of arms into
the Middle East by Russia, the U.S., and Britain, which lead to Egypt turning to
the People’s Republic of China. This increased tension with the U.s. and Britain,
putting more strain on negotiating the loan offer. Egypt was becoming aware of lack
of interest in the loan by the West and decided to accept the original loan offer. In
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an effort to get the U.S. to reconsider the original loan, Egypt stated it could also
get a loan from Russia. The U.S. felt Egypt was trying to blackmail and withdrew
the loan offer with the British, with the official reason being Egypt did not have the
resources to complete the dam construction.
Egypt turned to Russia for a last chance at a loan, but Russia offered no such
offer. Without foreign capital, seizure of the Suez Canal was attractive to Egypt.
Nationalization of the Canal would raise much needed cash and remove the last of
Western control in Egypt.
Egypt wanted to avoid another ultimatum from the West and decided for a
surprise canal takeover. A surprise takeover was thought to help avoid the loss of
life from military clashes. Egypt also thought it would take Britain two months to
prepare a military response and a settlement could be negotiated before the response
took place. In July of 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, denouncing the West
in the process. the West was shocked by the move, and immediately raised concerns
about the security of the canal.
The hypergame is formalized by picking a point in time to model. The authors
choose February of 1956 when Egypt proposed an alternative loan agreement which
is before the West became discouraged with the process. Egypt is trying to assert its
nationalism and wants to finance the Aswan Dam. Britain wants to be influential in
the Middle East, preventing Russian influence and appealing Egypt after the arms
refusal. The U.S. wanted to limit Russia’s influence in the Middle East and promote
Egyptian nationalism without upsetting Britain. Russia wanted stronger influence in
the Middle East.
Britain and the U.S. are modeled as one player, since they act together on the
loan proposal. Because Russia is not an active participant, it is not represented in
the game. The options of the hypergame are the following:
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Britain and U.S.
1. Offer loan based on original conditions
2. Offer loan on Egypt’s conditions
Egypt
3. Negotiate loan based on original conditions
4. Negotiate loan on Egypt’s conditions
5. Appease West
6. Pursue Russian loan.
Egypt (secret)
7. Pursue Russian loan and if it fails, then nationalize the Suez Canal
First the unfeasible options are excluded such as the West offering a loan on
the original conditions and offering a loan with Egypt’s conditions. The possible
outcomes are listed in Table A.2 where each column is an outcome. Each outcome is
decimalized for easy manipulation. Decimalization is accomplished by treating each
outcome as a binary number with the lowest order bit on top. The binary number is
then converted to a decimal number.
Decimalized outcomes are then put in order of preference for each player. The
most preferred outcome is placed on the left, with the least preferred on the right, as
shown in Table A.3. Two preference vectors are used for Egypt - one to show Egypt’s
preferences from the viewpoint of the West and the other for Egypt’s real preferences.
The only difference between vectors is that the first vector does not contain option 7.
Each outcome is then analyzed for stability from the point of view of each player.
The equilibria are formed from outcomes that are stable for all of the players. This is
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Table A.2: Possible Outcomes.
Players/Options Possible Outcomes
West
1) 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Egypt
3) 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Egypt(secret)
7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Decimalized 0 1 4 5 8 9 10 20 21 24 25 26 32 33 64* 65*
* Unknown to the West
done by looking for Unilateral Improvements (UIs) from each outcome in a player’s
preference vector. Unilateral Improvement (UI) is formed when the player reaches a
preferred outcome where the other player’s strategies remain the same. Table A.4 give
the UIs for each outcome in the preference vector. If an outcome does not have a UI
then it is rational and stable for the given player. In the table ”r” indicates rational
outcomes, ”u” indicates an unstable outcome. Unstable outcomes exist when there is
a UI where another player cannot make an improvement which results in an outcome
worse than the original outcome for the player. All UIs below an outcome must be
checked to see if another player can deter the outcome. The outcome is stable, marked
by an ”s”, if all of the UIs have a deterrent. For example, Egypt has a UI from 65 to
5. The West does not realize 65 is a possibility, but there is an UI from 5 to 4. Since
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4 is less preferred to 65 by Egypt, this deters Egypt from moving from outcome 65
to 5.
Equlibria are where outcomes are stable for all players. Egypt’s and the West’s
preference vectors are compared, if both vectors have an ”r” or ”s” then an ”E”
is placed above the preference to denote an equilibrium. An ”x” denotes a lack of
equilibrium. Outcomes 5, 64, and 65 are the true equilibria to the Suez Crisis, while
the West believes 5, 32, and 33 are the equilibria. This shows outcome 5 is preferred
by all players - Egypt would accept the original loan. From history it is known, this
is not what happened. Egypt was not irrational. Instead Egypt tried to wait for
the West’s attitude to change and allow outcome 10 - a loan on Egypt’s terms. The
West’s attitude did not change in Egypt’s favor, and the possibility of a loan passed.
This left only 64 and 65 as equilibria, and the outcome 64 is what happened in history.
A.3 Arms Race
Bennett and Dando [41] also model an arms race as a hypergame where they
model an arms race between two nations, Nation A and Nation B. Higher numbers
are used to represent more highly preferred outcomes, as shown in Figure A.1. The
preference of both nations is peace loving with the following preferences: (4) mutual
disarmament, (3) arms lead for self, (2) arms Race, and (1) arms lead for opponent.
In this game, both peace loving nations would have no trouble reaching the desired
outcome of mutual disarmament. Mutual disarmament is the only stable outcome
(both nations choose “disarmâĂŹâĂŹ).
Even with peace loving players, Bennett and Dando introduce misperception
into the model by giving NationâĂŹs X belief of the opponent preferences. Each
nation believes its opponents preferences are the following: (4) arms lead for self, (3)
mutual disarmament, (2) arms race, and (1) arms lead for opponent. As shown in
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Figure A.1: Arms Race Model âĂŞ Preferred Outcome.
Figure A.2, these misperceptions about opponent preferences leads to a hypergame
where each nation perceives a slightly different version of the same game. While each
nation would like to move to mutual disarmament, they will be deterred because of
the perception that the other nation would prefer to an arms lead. This leads to an
arms race (both nations choose “armâĂŹâĂŹ).
The authors give two reasons for the nations to have misperceptions: (1) failure
to see how the other side sees the world, i.e. alternative views, (2) concentration on
the individual instead of the system in general. Their analysis forces the analyst to
consider the perceptions, beliefs, and actions of all parties involved, which they claim
leads to a more competent analysis.
A.4 Nuclear Confrotation
Fraser et al. [107] apply five conflict analysis models to a possible nuclear
confrontation between the USA and USSR. The five conflict analysis models are
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Figure A.2: Arms Race Model âĂŞ Misperceptions introduce a hypergame.
normal form analysis from game theory, metagame analysis [175], and hypergame
analysis [108] [106]. An overview of each of the models follows.
The normal form model is shown in Figure A.3 and is taken from the work of
Richelson [304]. The game theoretic model is played between two players, United
States of America (USA) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The three
strategies for each country are: (C) conventional attack, (L) limited nuclear strike,
(S) full nuclear attack.
The authors state that the normal form is useful for giving structure to real world
problems, as well as modelling the interactions between players. They also concluded
the normal form lacks ability to model complicated problems, including ones with
more than two players or a large number of strategies, and is not convenient for
solving the model for equilibria that are more subtle [107]. In order to overcome the
issues with normal form, the authors use metagame theory from Howard [175].
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Figure A.3: USA âĂŞ USSR Nuclear Confrontation in Normal Form.
Metagames are game theoretic models that take into account the possible
reactions a player will have to the known strategies of another player(s). The
playerâĂŹs strategies reflect its reaction to the other player(s) in a metagame, instead
of just the actions the player can choose from in the normal form. Because players
can have reaction to reactions, there are an infinite number of metagames for each
basic game. To reduce the number of metagames, and allow for analysis, Howard
([175] developed the Characterization Theorem. The Characterization Theorem
allows analysis of all possible metagames, while only analyzing the initial game. The
outcomes of the initial metagame are known as metarational outcomes, and either
is considered stable for a particular player. There are three types of metarational
outcomes:
• Rational Outcomes (Nash Equilibrium)
• Symmetric Metarational Outcomes (Dominated Strategies)
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• General Metarational Outcomes (Weak form of stability)
Using the basic game shown in Figure A.3, the metagame analysis shown in
Figure A.4 is constructed for the USSR outcome (L, C) or (010 100) or limited
nuclear attack by USA and conventional attack by USSR. The player and the actions
available to each are listed on the left side of the figure. Next a 1 or 0 is placed
in the same row as the actions to indicate if the action is taken (1) or rejected (0).
The combination of 1âĂŹs and 0âĂŹs in a column forms a strategy for the particular
player. Each feasible outcome is placed either in the preferred category or the not
preferred category relative to the particular outcome under analysis.
Figure A.4: Metagame Analysis of Outcome (010 100) for the USSR.
This outcome is symmetric metarational for USSR because USA has the ability to
enforce sanctions on the USSR. The stability for the all the outcomes in this game are
listed in Table A.5. This shows that the outcome of total nuclear war is rational. The
other four possible outcomes depend on whether the USA can enforce the sanctions,
due to the symmetric metarationality for the individual strategies. The ability to
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determine if sanctions can be enforce is a complex problem, for which the authors do
not give a solution. This leads to the majority of outcomes being equilibria.
The improved metagame analysis proposed by Fraser and Hipel [108] [106] allow
for hypergame analysis. The improved analysis uses the known preferences of the
other player(s) to test if the threat of sanction is credible. The authors convert the
binary preference vector into a decimalized form. For example, the outcome (100 010)
has a decimalized value of: 1∗20 + 0∗21 + 0∗22 + 0∗23 + 1∗24 + 0∗25 = 1 +16 = 17.
The three distinct representations and the relationship for outcomes are shown in
Table A.6.
Next the UIs of every player for every one of the outcomes in the preference
vectors are found. UIs are recorded below the preference vector outcomes in
decreasing order of preference. This is shown in Table A.7. Above each outcome
is recorded the player stability: r for rational, s for symmetric metarational, and u for
unstable. Then overall stability is identified by E for equilibrium and X for unstable.
Again, the analysis shows the only stable outcome that is rational for both players is
36, or (001 001), or (S,S).
Their analysis determine the improved metagame analysis (i.e. hypergame
analysis) of conflicts is the best for modeling real world conflicts. This is
due to its nature for extension, where it can be used to model coalitions and
bargaining/negotiation situations between players.
A.5 Falkland/Malvinas Conflict
Hipel et al. [167] examine the Falkland/Malvinas conflict between Britain and
Argentina in 1982. The authors approach the conflict from a different angle in their
analysis of the conflict between Britain and Argentina. The hypergame analysis of the
conflict is used to show how misperceptions dictated an outcome that was unexpected
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by all sides. The authors construct the hypergame model based on historical material,
using a first-level hypergame.
The conflict can only be modeled at a certain point and time because the conflict
is a dynamic phenomenon. A player’s perceptions, actions, strategies, and preferences
will change over the course of the conflict. The authors therefor chose three important
periods of time in the conflict: the day of invasion by Argentina, a month long period
of negotiations, and the day Britain issued a military response. Each period of time is
modeled as a game iteration where each choice and outcome from a previous iteration
affects the next iteration.
The game changes at each iteration as the choices of the players are used to
updated the hypergame model, as shown in Table A.8. In the table, an underlined
strategy refers to the strategy taken by the corresponding player. As the hypergame
model is updated, it is possible to reduce it to a simple game. The simple game forms
as misperceptions are corrected as players become aware of the remaining actions
and outcomes. It is shown that the stability analysis for Britain is the belief that
both sides would prefer to settle the conflict by peace. Argentina’s preference is to
invade. This gives the stability set {settle by peace, invade}. The real outcome is not
expected by either player.
At the next iteration Argentina continues to play the same game while Britain
updates its game with Argentina’s past actions. Britain tried to maximize the pressure
for a peaceful resolution, while Argentina continued to view the British warning as
a bluff. At this point if both player’s have the same attitude (and information) the
conflict could be avoided.
At the third iteration it can be seen that the player’s knowledge has increased
since the start of the conflict, although misperceptions by both players played a fatal
role at each iteration. At this point the player’s had complete information about
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the game and the other player’s preferences, but the conflict had already moved to
a point where neither player could return to their original position. Therefore, the
worst possible outcome, war, happens in the conflict.
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Table A.3: Preference Vectors.
Egypt 10 5 [64 65] [32 33] [0 1 4 8 9] [20 24 25] 26 21
West’s
View of
Egypt
10 5 [32 33] [0 1 4 8 9] [20 24 25] 26 21
West 21 [20 24 25] [0 1 4 8 9] 5 26 [32 33] 10
[] = equally preferred outcomes
220
Table A.4: UIs in Preference Vectors.
Egypt’s View of Egypt
X E E E X X X X X X X X X X X X
r r r s u u u u u u u u u u u u
10 5 [64 65] [32 33] [0 1 4 8 9] [20 24 25] 26 21
5 64 5 64 5 64 64 5 64 64 5 10 5
65 32 65 32 32 65 32 32 65 65
33 33 8 8 33 33
4 4 1 1
9 9
25
British and American View of Egypt
X E E E X X X X X X X X X X
r r r s u u u u u u u u u u
10 5 [32 33] [0 1 4 8 9] [20 24 25] 26 21
5 32 5 32 32 5 32 32 5 10 5
33 33 8 8 33 33
4 4 1 1
9 9
25
Britain and U.S.
r s r r r r r r r s u r r u
21 [20 24 25] [0 1 4 8 9] 5 26 [32 33] 10
21 4 24 9
25 8
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Table A.5: Metagame Analysis Results for the USA âĂŞ USSR Nuclear Confronta-
tion.
Outcome
USA
Stability
USSR
Stability
Overall
Stability
(100 100)
Symmetric
Metarational
Symmetric
Metarational
Equilibrium
(if credible)
(100 010)
Symmetric
Metarational
Rational
Equilibrium
(if credible)
(100 001) Unstable
Symmetric
Metarational
Unstable
(010 100) Rational
Symmetric
Metarational
Equilibrium
(if credible)
(010 010)
Symmetric
Metarational
Rational
Equilibrium
(if credible)
(010 001) Unstable
Symmetric
Metarational
Unstable
(001 100)
Symmetric
Metarational
Unstable Unstable
(001 010) Rational Unstable Unstable
(001 001) Rational Rational Equilibrium
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Table A.6: Outcome Representations and Relationships [107].
Players/Options Outcomes
USA
C 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
L 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
S 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
USSR
C 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
L 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Normal Form: (C,C) (L,C) (S,C) (C,L) (L,L) (S,L) (C,S) (L,S) (S,S)
Decimalized
Outcomes
9 10 12 17 18 20 33 34 36
Table A.7: Improved Metagame Stability Analysis [107].
E X X E E X E X X overall stability
r s r s s u r u u player stability
USA 10 12 20 18 9 17 36 34 33 preference vector
10 20 10 20 36 36 UIs
12 18 34
r s s r s s r u u player stability
USSR 17 9 33 18 34 10 36 20 12 preference vector
17 17 18 18 36 36 UIs
9 34 20
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Table A.8: Perceptual and overall equilibria in the Falkland Islands crisis.
Game Equilibria H′ (Iteration 1) H′ (Iteration 2) H′ (Iteration 3)
Argentinian
[
Invade
Blockade
] [
Maintain
Blockade
]
British
[
SettlebyP eace
SettlebyP eace
] W ithdrawNegotiate
Negotiate
 [W ithdraw
Blockade
] MaintainBlockade
Invade

Overall
[
Invade
SettlebyP eace
] [
Maintian
Negotiate
] [
Maintain
Blockade
] MaintainBlockade
Invade
 [Maintain
Invade
]
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Appendix B: Hypergame Network Defense Application Expanded
There are many approaches that apply game theory to intrusion problems on
networks. One approach uses game theory to select which security measures are
applied to the network based on which ones result in the lowest incurred cost while
providing the highest level of security, thus allowing the system to be optimized [326].
This allows game theory to be a worthwhile tool in influencing the decisions made
in the deployment and use of intrusion detection systems. Research similar to [326]
shows the ability of game theory to solve and optimize network intrusion problems.
This section focuses on two key research efforts that have expanded the modeling
ability of intrusion detection.
B.1 Game Theoretic Model
Chen and Leneutre [72] model a heterogeneous network for intrusion detection
using game theory. They use the classic two-player game with an attacker and a
defender; each player has two strategies: to attack/not attack or defend/not defend.
The model presented by Chen and Leneutre starts with a network, N = (SD, SA, T ).
SD is the set of defending agents with an IDS module and SA is the set of attackers,
where T = {1,2,...,N} is the set of targets or network nodes that can be attacked.
The normal form of the intrusion model is shown in Table B.1
Table B.1: Chen and Leneutre Intrusion Model Normal Form for Target i.
Monitor Not Monitor
Attack (1 - 2a)Wi - CaWi, -(1 - 2a)Wi - CmWi Wi - CaWi, - Wi
Not Attack 0, -bCfWi - CmWi 0, 0
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The attacker attempts to attack the target nodes without being detected by
choosing a strategy, p = {p1, p1, ..., pN},according to the attack probability
distribution of the target set, T , where p represents the probability of attacking target
i, and
∑
i∈T
pi ≤ P ≤ 1 is the resource constraint of the attacker. The defender monitors
the target nodes by choosing a strategy, q = {q1, q1, ..., qN}, where
∑
i∈T
qi ≤ Q ≤ 1 is
the defender’s resource constraint.
The player’s utility values are based on functions with predetermined variables,
as shown in Table B.2. Wi represents the loss of security on a node. The detection
rate of the defender’s IDS is denoted a and the false alarm rate is denoted b, where
a, b ∈ [0,1]. The cost of attacking is represented by CaWi, the cost of monitoring
represented by CmWi, and CfWi is the loss of a false alarm. The model assumes
Ca < 1 and Cm < 1, so the players have incentive to monitor and attack.
Table B.2: Predetermined Variables from Chen and Lenutre.
Variable Symbol Meaning
a IDS Detection Rate
b IDS False Alarm Rate
Ca Cost of Attack
Cf Cost of False Alarm
Cm Cost of Monitoring
Wi Value of Target
The payoffs of the attacker is given by UA and the payoffs of the defender is given
by UD:
UA(p, q) =
∑
i∈N
piWi(1− 2aqi − Ca)
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UD(p, q) =
∑
i∈N
qiWi[pi(2a+ bCf )− (bCf + Cm)] -
∑
i∈N
piWi
This results in a intrusion detection game with an attacker and defender defined
with the following properties:
• Players: Attacker, Defender
• Strategy sets:
– Attacker: AA = {p:p ∈ [0, P ]N ,
∑
i∈N
pi ≤ P}
– Defender: AD = {q:q ∈ [0, Q]N ,
∑
i∈N
qi ≤ Q}
• Payoff: UA for attacker and UD for defender
• Game Rule: Strategy selection is done by the attacker/defender according to
p/q ∈ AA/AD, maximizing UA/UD
The authors use the utility values based on variables to show a real world
intrusion problem, where the rational attacker would have preference to attack higher
value targets. This is shown through Nash equilibrium analysis, as the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium is zero with the target is not in the rational set. This research
contributes to intrusion detection by showing that increasing attack or monitoring
does not affect the Nash equilibrium, or does the attacker gain from a decreased attack
cost. Cost decreases are demonstrated when the intrusion detection system improves
its performance through improving the detection rate of intrusions or decreasing the
rate of false alarms. The authors use of variables in utility functions allow for valuable
insight into how to improve the individual player’s performance.
B.2 Hypergame Model
Alan Gibson presents a model based on the intrusion model presented by Chen
and Leneutre [72] and the Hypergame Normal Form model presented by Vane [356]
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[355]. The author achieves a model that has a changeable nonzero-sum utility values
with a process for delineation of strategy selection [135]. In order to achieve this
model, the Chen and Leneutre intrusion model is extended by adding strategies for
both the attacker and defender; while the HNF model is used to hide or discount
strategies from the other player.
In order to use hypergame theory, the game is organized with the defender as
row, as the Hypergame Normal Form analyzes the game from the perspective of the
row player. The model also keeps the functional and nonzero-sum utilities from the
Chen and Leneutre model. The resulting game model is shown in Figure B.1.
Figure B.1: Game Model as Presented by [135].
In order to use HNF as presented by Vane, the game is organized with the
defender as row, as the Hypergame Normal Form analyzes the game from the
perspective of the row player. The model also keeps the functional and non-zero-
sum utilities from the Chen and Leneutre model. The resulting game model is shown
in Figure B.3. The attacker is given a new strategy, zero-day exploit, which is an
attack where there is no defense since the vulnerability is undiscovered. The defender
is given two new strategies: provide ruse or shutdown. A defender may provide a ruse
by fooling the attacker into attacking a honeypot, while collecting information about
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the type and style of the attack. The shutdown option allows the defender to remove
the system from the network and stop the attack in its tracks, but also removes the
system from operation even for mission critical activities.
Table B.3: Gibson Intrusion Model Normal Form for Target i.
Not Attack Attack Zero-Day Exploit
Not Defend 0, 0 -Wi, Wi - CaWi -Wi, Wi - CzWi
Defend -bCfWi - CmWi, 0 -(1-2a)Wi-CmWi, (1-2a)Wi-CaWi -Wi, Wi - CzWi
Provide Ruse -Wi - CrWi, 0 Va - CrWi, Wi - CaWi -Wi, Wi - CzWi
Shut Down -Wi - CtWi, 0 Va - Wi - CtWi, -Wi Va - CtWi, -Wi
New variables are added for the calculation of utility payoffs, as shown in Table
B.4 with the original Chen and Leneutre variables. A zero-day exploit has a cost of
Cz which is a percentage of the value of the target. The shutdown option has a cost
of Ct which is the deration of time the system is unavailable on the network. The
provide ruse option has a cost of Cr which is the time or sophistication level of the
ruse. The important variable introduced by Gibson is the value of the attacker, Va
which allows certain strategies to be more worthwhile as the complexity and danger
level of the attacker increases. This allows the game to represent different levels of
attackers, such as script kiddies, hackavists, and national states.
Since the variables are not static and change over time or iterations an initial
value and a method for updated the variables is needed. The initial values for the
variables introduced by Gibson are shown in Table B.5. The variables are updated
using a predetermined change amount. The amounts for the variables introduced by
Gibson are shown in Table B.6.
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Table B.4: Enhanced Model Variables from Gibson.
Variable Symbol Meaning
a IDS Detection Rate
b IDS False Alarm Rate
Ca Cost of Attack
Cf Cost of False Alarm
Cm Cost of Monitoring
Cr Cost of Providing Ruse
Ct Cost of Time Down
Cz Cost of Zero-Day Exploit
Va Value of Attacker
Wi Value of Target
The payoffs of the attacker is given by UA and the payoffs of the defender is given
by UD:
UA(p, q) =
∑
i∈N
(
pAi (1-qi)[Wi - CaWi] + pZi (1-qi)[Wi - CzWi] + pAi qDi [(1-2a)Wi
- CaWi] + pZi qDi [Wi - CzWi] + pAi qPi [Wi - CaWi] + pZi qPi [Wi - CzWi] + pAi qSi [-
Wi] + pZi qSi [-Wi]
)
UD(p, q) =
∑
i∈N
(
pAi (1-qi)[-Wi] + pZi (1-qi)[-Wi] +(1+pi)qDi [-bCfWi - CmWi] +
pAi q
D
i [-(1-2a)Wi - CmWi] + pZi qDi [-Wi] + (1+pi)qPi [-Wi - CrWi] + pAi qPi [Va -
CrWi] + pZi qPi [- Wi] + (1 - Pi)qSi [-Wi - CtWi] + pAi qSi [Va - Wi - CtWi] + pZi qSi [Va
- CtWi]
)
This results in a intrusion detection game with an attacker and defender defined
with the following properties:
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Table B.5: Gibson’s defender type initial variable values.
Variable Nuisance Low Mid High All-Out
Detection rate for attack (a) 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.80
False alarm rate (b) 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
Cost of attack (Ca) 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Cost of false alarm (Cf ) 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70
Cost of monitoring (Cm) 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Cost of providing ruse (Cr) 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00
Cost of time down (Ct) 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00
Cost of zero-day exploit (Cz) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.50
Value of Attacker (Cz) 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00
Value of Target (Ct) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
• Players: Attacker, Defender
• Strategy sets:
– Attacker: AA = {p:p ∈ [0, P ]N ,
∑
i∈N
pi ≤ P}
– Defender: AD = {q:q ∈ [0, Q]N ,
∑
i∈N
qi ≤ Q}
• Payoff: UA for attacker and UD for defender
• Game Rule: Strategy selection is done by the attacker/defender according to
p/q ∈ AA/AD, maximizing UA/UD
B.3 Conclusion
A unique part of the model is that the attacker’s utility is the same for the
strategy to attack when the defender selects either the not defend or provide ruse
strategies. This correctly models the deployment of a sound honeypot where the
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Table B.6: Gibson variable update changes.
Strategy Strategy Value
Variable Variable Selected Selected Changes
ID Name Defender Attacker Amount
Cr Cost of Not Defend Any -0.5
Providing Ruse Defend Any -0.5
Provide Ruse Any 0.1
Shut Down Any 0.1
Ct Cost of Not Defend Any -0.02
Time Down Defend Any -0.02
Provide Ruse Any 0.5
Shut Down Any 1.0
Cz Cost of Not Defend Zero-Day 0.1
Zero-Day Defend Zero-Day 0.4
Provide Ruse Zero-Day 0.1
Va Value of Not Defend Not Attack -0.01
Attacker Defend Not Attack -0.01
Provide Ruse Not Attack -0.01
Not Defend Attack 0.5
Defend Attack 0.1
Provide Ruse Attack 0.5
Not Defend Zero-Day 0.5
Defend Zero-Day 1.0
Provide Ruse Zero-Day 1.0
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attacker believes they have succeeded in attacking the desired system. It also gives
the attacker decreased utility when the system is shut down because of an attack.
This incorporates a rational attacker’s preference to keep system up and running in
order to continue collecting information and prolonging the attack. The shutdown
system strategy is modeled as the only effective strategy against the zero-day exploit
strategy. The zero-day exploit strategy is considered costly to an attacker since they
are generally costly to find and once used are generally fixed so they no longer work.
Given the attacker does not consider the new defender strategies and the attacker’s
zero-day exploit is too costly, the subgame that results is the original Chen and
Leneutre model.
The most important contribution of Gibson’s model is that by combining the
Chen and Leneutre model with HNF, dynamic variables are added to the payoff
functions in HNF. This allows for dynamic play and updating of variables as the
game is played.
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Appendix C: Prisoner’s Dilemma Temporal Hypergame Example
This appendix demonstrates the application of the temporal hypergame
framework to the classical game theoretic example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The
framework is applied to the Prisoner’s Dilemma in order to show the framework
is valid with classical games. The structural properties of the game do not allow
for detailed hypergame analysis, since the game is symmetric and does not have
differences in player perceptions required for hypergame analysis.
In game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a classic example of how the interaction
between two individuals leads to cooperation or not. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma there
are two players, Prisoner A and Prisoner B [90, 104, 284]. Each player can choose one
of two actions, either the player can choose to cooperate by staying silent or defect
by betraying the other player.
The consequence of selecting an action results in no jail time (jail(0)) or jail time
(jail(x) where x is the amount of time in jail). The payoff function is if the player
cooperates and the other player cooperates, both receive one year in jail, otherwise
if the other player defects the player receives 10 years in jail while the other player
receives no jail time. If both players defect, then both players receive five years in jail.
This game is shown in normal form in Figure C.1. Note that cooperate is abbreviated
“C” and defect as “D”.
In a single observation Prisoner’s Dilemma it is assumed the prisoners do not
have an opportunity to punish or reward their partner over the outcome of the game.
The only punishment are the prison sentences each prisoner receives and reputations
remain intact. After this non-repeated game each prisoner do not have any other
interaction with each other.
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Figure C.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma.
There is a repeated, or iterative, version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma where the
same prisoners play the game over and over [115]. Since the same players are playing
the same multiple times in succession, they can remember their opponent’s previous
actions and change their strategy accordingly. In this case it is assumed the players
know the number of times the game will be played, so the game is finite.
C.1 Initial Game Definition
The repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma can be represented using the notation of of the
temporal hypergame framework in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6, where the hypergame is
defined as:
HTPD , {GTP1} (C.1)
The perceived game GTPD:
GTPD , (N,ΣFull,ΦTPD, {i}i∈N) (C.2)
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where N is the set of players, such that N = {Prisoner A, Prisoner B}. Σ is
the set of actions available to the prisoners, where Σ = ΣPrisonerA ∪ ΣPrisonerB. The
actions available to Prisoner A is represented by ΣPrisonerA = {C, D} and Prisoner B
by ΣPrisonerB = {C, D}.
C.2 Identification of States and Transitions
The next step to represent a game in the temporal hypergame framework is to
identify the states and transitions for the game. The game arena is given by Equation
27 in Chapter 6:
ΦPD = (W,−→, w0,χ) (C.3)
W consists of seven game states, including start, AC , AD, ACBC , ACBD, ADBC ,
and ADBD. The −→ defines the game transitions such that (W x Σ) → W. The
possible transitions are:
• start x C → AC where Cooperate ∈ ΣPrisonerA
• start x D → AD where Defect ∈ ΣPrisonerA
• AC x C → ACBC where C ∈ ΣPrisonerB
• AD x C → ADBC where C ∈ ΣPrisonerB
• AC x D → ACBD where D ∈ ΣPrisonerB
• AD x D → ADBD where D ∈ ΣPrisonerB
• ACBC → start
• ADBC → start
• ACBD → start
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• ADBD → start
The initial state of the game w0, is equal to start ∈ W , where
−−−→
start = {AC , AD}.
χ - W —→ N function assigns he player whose turn it is to the game state w ∈
W. For example, χ(start) = Prisoner A, while χ(AC) = χ(AD) = Prisoner B. The
preference ordering function for the ith player i = ui(x, y) ≤ ui(x′, y) for i ∈ N. This
means for Prisoner A PrisonerA indicates the outcome (x,y) is preferred to outcome
(x′, y) if x ≤ x′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . For Prisoner B PrisonerB indicates the outcome (x,y)
is preferred to outcome (x, y′) if y ≤ y′ ∀(x, y) ∈ W . Notice the Nash equilibrium
concept is encoded in the preference relation, i, assuming both players are rational.
C.3 Game Mapping
The next step of defining a game in the temporal hypergame framework is to
map the game to the extensive form game tree. An extensive form game tree T can
be associated with the Prisoner’s Dilemma game arena, φPD. The extensive form
game tree is defined from Equation 29 in Chapter 6:
T = (S,⇒, s0, λ) (C.4)
where (S, ⇒) is a countably infinite tree rooted at s0 with edges from Σ.
The nodes of the tree are given by S, where S = {root, AC , AD, ACBC , ACBD,
ADBC ,ADBD}. The root of the tree denoted s0, is equal root ∈ S. The
x=⇒ is the
function that moves between nodes of the tree using the edge denoted by x ∈ Σ. The
possible nodes transitions are root C=⇒ AC , root
D=⇒ AD where C, D ∈ σPrisonerA} ∪
{AC
C=⇒ ACBC , AC
D=⇒ ACBD, AD
C=⇒ ADBC , AD
D=⇒ ADBD where C, D ∈ σPrisonerB
• λ - S → W, where
– λ(s0) = w0
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– ∀s, s′ ∈ S, if s a=⇒ s′ then λ(s) a=⇒ λ(s′)
– if λ(s) = w and w a−→ w′ there exists s′ ∈ S s.t. s a=⇒ s′ and λ(s′) = w′
C.4 Path Structuring
The model for the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be represented by MPD = (T ,V)
using the notation discussed in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. The game tree, T is given
above and the valuation function V is given by:
• V(pint) = {s0}
• V(pdom) = {AD, ADBD}
• V(pworstA) = {AC , ACBD}
• V(pworstB ) = {AD, ADBC}
C.5 Define Player Strategies
The next step is to define the player strategies using the temporal hypergame
framework constructs defined in Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 of Chapter 6. In this game
Prisoner’s A strategy can be defined as:
StratA ≡ ([pint 7→ D]A) · ([pint 7→ C]A) · ([ [turnB 7→ C]B ⇒ [turnA 7→ C]A) · ([
[turnB 7→ D]B ⇒ [turnA 7→ D]A)
Prisoner’s B strategy can be defined as:
StratB ≡ ([pint 7→ D]A ⇒ [pdom 7→ D]B) · ([pint 7→ C]A ⇒ [pworstA 7→ D]B) ·
([[turnA 7→ C]A ⇒ [turnB 7→ C]B) · ([[turnA 7→ D]A ⇒ [turnB 7→ D]B)
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C.6 Analyze Model
Thus, StratA {B (pdom ∨ pworstA). Note that pworstA is actually the worst move
for Prisoner A but the best move for Prisoner B. If Prisoner A knows Prisoner B’s
strategy, Prisoner A might be tempted to play ”Cooperate” which could lead to the
worst outcome for Prisoner A. But if Prisoner A plays ”Defect”, Prisoner A can ensure
the worst outcome is avoided:
[pint 7→ D]A {A ¬pworstA .
This means Prisoner’s A strategy can be reduced with the ability to ensure
avoidance of the worst outcome:
StratA ≡ ([pint 7→ D]A)
Without cooperation player A still have the strategy set StratA {B (pdom ∨
pworstA). Note that pworstA is actually the worst move for Prisoner A but the best
move for Prisoner B. If Prisoner A knows Prisoner B’s strategy, Prisoner A might be
tempted to play “Cooperate” which could lead to the worst outcome for Prisoner A.
Prisoner A can ensure the worst outcome is avoided if Prisoner A plays “Defect”.
In theory, in a repeated game the prisoners can enforce punishment and rewards
since the players with interact multiple times. This means each can force the other
player to play “cooperate”. The problem comes with the sequence being finite;
which means the last game played between the players results cooperation being
unenforceable. In the last round the prisoner B has the following strategy:
[turnB ∧ (< D+ > leaf∨ < C+ > leaf) 7→ D]B
This is worst case for prisoner A if they play cooperate in every round of the
game: [turnA 7→ C]A {A [turnB ∧ (< D+ > leaf∨ < C+ > leaf) 7→ D]B. But if
prisoner A plays defect then they can enforce throughout the game the result will not
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be the worst outcome: [turnA 7→ C]A {A [turnB ∧ (< D+ > leaf∨ < C+ > leaf) 7→
D]B ≡ ¬pworstA .
Using backward induction on the game model, the result for the repeated version
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the same as for the single observation version. It results
in Prisoner A choosing to enforce that the outcome is not the worst possible.
[turnA 7→ D]A {A ¬pworstA .
C.7 Summary
This Appendix discusses the application of the temporal hypergame framework
to the classical game theoretic repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Using the temporal
hypergame framework, the concept of backwards induction was shown as a solution
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is symmetric and does not have
differences in perception, therefore the structural properties do not allow for detailed
hypergame analysis. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is used for justification by example
to show validity to the classical game theoretic problems. There is nothing in the
formation of the temporal hypergame framework to limit its applicability to other
classical game theoretic games.
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Appendix D: Analysis of ’Hypergames and Bayesian Games’
Yasuo Sasaki and Kyoichi Kijima published “Hypergames and Bayesian Games:
A Theoretical Comparison of the Models of Games with Incomplete Information”. It
appears in the Journal of Systems Science and Complexity [313]. In this article the
authors make the claim “any hypergame can naturally be reformulated in terms of
Bayesian games in an unified way”. This claim is much stronger than the method they
actually propose. There are limitations that results in hypergames that cannot be
reformulated in terms of a Bayesian game. The authors discuss the limitations of their
method, which limits the ability to reformulate a hypergame in terms of a Bayesian
game. The purpose of this discussion is to cover what they did, including the claims
they made, present information the authors missed and highlight the usefulness of
hypergames as original proposed by P.G. Bennett [34] and extended later by Russell
Vane [356].
D.1 Hypergames and Bayesian Games
Sasaki and Kijima propose a Bayesian Representation of Hypergames by using
Harsanyi’s theory that any game of incomplete information can be transformed into
a game of complete information. Before discussing Sasaki and Kijima’s work, an
overview of Harsanyi research will be given for understanding. Harsanyi researched
games of incomplete information in game theory. In game theory, a game of
incomplete information is when partial or no information concerning the opponent’s
past moves are given in advance of the player’s decision. Harsanyi claims uncertainties
in the game and perceptual differences between players can be modeled as a game
of complete information, where all players know the strategies and payoffs of every
player, by:
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• Players - Participation by an player is converted into the players action set. If
the player is suppose to be out of the game, then the player is only allowed one
action, “non-participation”.
• Actions - Feasibility of a particular action for an player is converted into the
players utility function. If the action is not feasible then the player receives a
low utility whenever the action is taken.
• Utility Functions - Uncertainties in the game and perceptual differences between
players are reduced to uncertainties or perceptual differences about the utility
functions. Each possible utility function is then modeled as a type of player.
Hypergames are games of incomplete information by design. In a hypergame, one
player may information or a strategy the other player(s) is not aware of or discounts.
Because hypergames are games of incomplete information, Sasaki and Kijima applies
Harsanyi’s claim to hypergames as follows to transform the game from incomplete
information to complete information.
• Set of Players Transformation - If player A does not believe another player B
participates in the game, but player B actually does participate in the game,
then according to Harsanyi, player A excluding player B from the game is the
same as player A including player B in the set of players in the game but only
allowing player B one action “non-participation”. This allows every player to
see a common set of players; a requirement for a game of complete information.
• Set of Actions Transformation - If player A does not believe an action is feasible
for player B in the game, but the action is really feasible for player B (player
A discounts an action of player B), then according to Harsanyi, player A
excluding the action for player B is the same as player A including the action
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for player B in the action set but assigning a very low utility to the action’s
usage for player B, in player A’s own view of the game.
D.2 Issues with Modeling Hypergames as Bayesian Games
The authors clearly state there are a few issues with modeling hypergames as
Bayesian games. This results in the inability to reformulate “any” hypergame in
terms of a Bayesian game as the authors claim.
First, analyzing hypergames using Bayesian games is possible if one is only
concerned with the hyper Nash equilibrium and Bayesian Nash equilibrium concepts.
A Nash equilibrium is a set of actions in which neither player can increase their utility
by unilaterally changing his or her strategy. If a player uses mixed strategies, then the
expected value of the payoffs are maximized. A hyper Nash equilibrium [195], is an
outcome where each player chooses an action that leads to a Nash equilibrium. The
set of all hyper Nash equilibria for a given game, is the set of all possible outcomes
“likely to happen” [195]. The authors do discuss that other equilibrium concepts may
not allow for modeling as a Bayesian game [313].
Second, Bayesian games make an assumption that allows every player to see
a common set of possibilities concerning the game structure. The authors discuss
how in real situations, this assumption is “hard to accept”, pointing out it is a
controversial issue in epistemic game theory [313]. This leads the authors to conclude
the assumption is incompatible with hypergames [313].
In real situations, it may not be possible for every player to see a common set of
possibilities of the game structure. The inability to see a common set of possibilities
may be due to the fact that in real world situations information is missing, obstructed,
or misleading. For example, the U.S. Government uses all three techniques to limit
and/or the release of sensitive information to adversaries. The U.S. Government
will classify information to create missing information on true capabilities, redact
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documents to obstruct information, and participate in deception techniques to mislead
adversaries about true capabilities.
D.3 Hypergame Normal Form
Sasaki and Kijima only apply Harsanyi’s claims to the original hypergame model
developed by P.G. Bennett [34]; they do not discuss or mention the extension to
hypergame theory by Russell Vane in his doctorial dissertation published in 2000.
Vane extends the original hypergame model by including an assessment of the player’s
beliefs, as well as an assessment about the risk of selecting a strategy that is a non
Nash equilibrium mixed strategy (NEMS). This extended hypergame model is called
Hypergame Normal Form [356].
Vane uses six assessment properties when building Hypergame Normal Form.
The first three are taken from game theory and decision theory without modification
[356].
Property 1: The result of every Row strategy versus every considered Column
strategy must be estimable. Which means every row-column pair leads to an
outcome.
Property 2: Every result can be evaluated as a utility for Row.
Property 3: Every result can be evaluated as Row’s quantification of the
Column’s utility.
Vane then proposes three additional assessment properties as he constructs the
Hypergame Normal Form in order to allow Row to record beliefs about the reasoning
of Column. These three are unique to Vane’s research [356].
Property 4: Row has a reasoning context about the Column’s decision process,
which allows the recording of Row’s information about Column’s expected play.
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Property 5: Row has a way to record uncommitted subgame belief about
Column’s expected play.
Property 6: Row has a way to express and quantify his exposure to Column’s
most effective counterstrategy. This property corresponds to the fear of being
outguessed in the game.
Vane extended hypergame theory by building upon the theoretical concepts
in game theory, decision theory concepts, and risk mitigation knowledge [356].
Vane research aims to correct some of the shortfalls of game theory and decision
theory by creating a mathematical bridge between the two. Why is a mathematical
bridge needed? Game theory and decision theory disagree about how the to access
probability of a given situation arising and how to use the probability to select the
most desirable strategy.
The probabilities are implicitly derived from an expert’s view of the game being
modeled in game theory, referred to as the full game. In game theory, the selected
strategy is often the strategy with the least amount of vulnerability. This is seen
through the use of Nash equilibriums as game theoretic solutions, where neither
player can increase their utility by unilaterally changing his or her strategy. A
Nash equilibrium leads to a game theoretic solution with vulnerability minimized
by discouraging an opponent to change their choice of action (doing so would result
in a decrease in expected utility by the Nash equilibrium definition).
Decision theory derives the probabilities by understanding the situation. These
probabilities are normally derived without regard for the opponent (by definition
decision theory only deals with the current player not the opponent), resulting in the
player’s best guess being used to select strategies. This leads to selected strategies
with higher expected utility, when compared to game theory, but one a smart and
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clever adversary would be able to exploit or outmaneuver (an example would be to
use game theoretic concepts to exploit the decision theoretic outcome).
Hypergame Normal Form offers an approach that minimizes the risk of being
outmaneuvered by an adversary while achieving a higher expected utility. This
is accomplished by incorporating both explicit and implicit assessments of the
probability distributions. This allows the risky strategy selection (although resulting
in higher expected utility) from decision theory to be compared to the safer, but less
rewarding strategies recommended in the game theoretic approach using the full game
- where a player considers not only their actions on the outcome, but also the actions
of their opponent(s).
Introduction of hypergame expected utility by Vane is the mathematical bridge
between game theory and decision theory. Vane does this by taking into account the
player’s fear of being outguessed or outmaneuvered by their opponent. When there is
no fear of being outguessed, then hypergame expected utility resembles the expected
utility from decision theory. When the fear of being outguessed approaches 1 (100%),
the hypergame expected utility is the worst case solution. For the worst case solution
game theory provides a better solution than decision theory, since game theory leads
to maximizing the minimum expected utility.
D.4 Advantages of Hypergames
Hypergame theory, even with its foundation in game theory, is fundamentally
heretical to game theoretic concepts. Game theory assumes full knowledge of the
conflict and a common mode of rationality among players in order to derive consistent
alignment in beliefs. This consistent alignment in beliefs under lays the assumption
of rationality in game theory. This leads to a player believing opponents reasons in
the same manner as themselves. Hypergame theory disregards consistent alignment
because it is often a fallacy given the wide range of beliefs within human nature. For
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example, terrorists may not reason according to rational expectations. A rational
terrorist would try to maximize the expected utility (in terms of causalities) of
carrying out an attack, but from experience terrorist often carry out attacks that
result in lower expected utility (in terms of causalities) but are still successful. This
means a terrorist’s beliefs being any success maximizes expected utility, while a
rational actor, such as law enforcement, would expect maximization of expected utility
in terms of causalities to be rational.
Hypergames allow a player to take advantage of the of strategies resulting the
highest expected utility, while minimizing being deceived by an opponent. In extended
hypergames this is accomplished by comparing the game theoretic solution against
the decision theoretic solution. Any solution that is greater than, equal to, or less
is considered completely effective, partially effective, or ineffective strategies. Vane
discounts the expected utility by evaluating the vulnerability resulting from its use
and assigning a weight to it.
D.5 Bayesian Games and Probability Distributions
As discussed previously, when a hypergame is reformulated as a Bayesian game
a probability distribution is required. Hypergames, as extended by Vane, do not
require an initial probability distribution as do the Bayesian games. Even the original
hypergame model proposed by P.G. Bennett does not require an initial probability
distribution. When a hypergame is transformed into a Bayesian game, a probability
distribution is required, but none of the decision theory axioms determine how the
probability distribution is derived.
In reality, this means additional information is need (not just the hypergame
model) in order to represent a hypergame in decision theory. This additional
information is used to derive the probability distribution. If additional information is
required on the Bayesian model than was previously given in the hypergame model,
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did the authors actually present a method to transform hypergames into a Bayesian
game and ultimately decision theory? Or did the authors just propose a Bayesian
representation of hypergames if more information is given.
It could be argued that game theoretic concepts such as the Nash equilibrium
can be used to derive the probability distribution. While this is true this would not be
a pure decision theory based model; it would still be a game theoretic and raises the
question if the hypergames have been fully modeled under decision theory without
the need for game theory.
D.6 Summary
This appendix discussed the paper by Yasuo Sasaki and Kyoichi Kijima published
in 2012 on hypergames and Bayesian games. The authors work is discussed, their
claims, as well as weaknesses of their approach including the limited usage of
equilibrium concepts and inability to see a common game structure in real world
situations. Questions are also raised as to if hypergames, which do not require a
probability distribution, can be transformed into a Bayesian game without additional
information.
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